Strait of Hormuz Tracker

Two tankers struck off Khasab as Hormuz transits fall 15% and UBS lifts Q4 Brent to $100

The water layer escalated with two unidentified-projectile strikes on outbound tankers near Khasab on 11/21 , while UKMTO's count for the week to 11/18 fell to 263 vessels — down 15% week-on-week — and UBS lifted its Q4 2026 Brent forecast to $100/bbl from $83.74 .

12 sources ~48 min

0. Weekly Arc

Seven sessions of escalation that repeatedly failed to move the flat price. 11/14–11/15: mine claims with no third-party confirmation. 11/16–11/17: a third US carrier and the Houthi seizure of Bab al-Mandab set against a “near pre-war” flow read. 11/18–11/19: Iranian strikes on Kuwait and Bahrain, Gulf crude put at 70% of normal. 11/20: a Houthi strike on Riyadh’s financial district, the IEA at 90% of pre-war Hormuz crude, Brent near $92. 11/21: transits falling, insurance at $64mn, UBS lifting Q4 Brent to $100.

1. Situation Overview

The past ~24 hours are an escalation in the water layer that has finally begun to register in the transit data. A UKMTO notice issued on 11/21 recorded two tankers struck in succession by unidentified projectiles while exiting the Strait of Hormuz: at 05:00 UTC a tanker’s stern was hit in waters about 11 nautical miles north of Khasab, Oman, and at 05:50 UTC a second tanker’s engine room was hit about 17 nautical miles east of Khasab, with no casualties reported and environmental impact not yet confirmed [1][2][3]. Separately, UKMTO reported on 11/20 that a tanker leaving the strait was hit on its port side by an unidentified object about 8 nautical miles north of Khasab and caught fire, with no casualties [4]. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy claimed the strikes as mine damage, saying that since the evening of 11/20 multiple oil tankers have exploded and burned in the southern strait after a violating tanker backed by the US military struck a mine at the entrance to Khasab port and caught fire, and that a second blast occurred early on 11/21 about three kilometres off Qarnayn Island [5][6]. The IRGC said the US military deployed large-scale air power on the evening of 11/20 — aerial refuelling aircraft, F-16, F/A-18 and F-35 jets, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters and MQ-series drones — to cover tankers transiting the strait and assist what Tehran called unauthorised cargo transport [5]. The physical outcome is now in the measurement: the FT reports oil flows through Hormuz have begun to drop in the face of near-daily Iranian strikes, with UKMTO counting 263 vessels in and out in the week to 11/18, some 15% fewer than the prior week and 20% below the week before that, of which 37 were oil tankers against 52 a week earlier [7].

2. Key Parties’ Positions

  • [NEW] Negotiation progress: A partial bargain has surfaced on the Gulf side. A Middle Eastern diplomat said Gulf Arab states are concerned about a resumption of full-scale hostilities and are working through existing channels for a sustainable, if only partial, solution that could remove all constraints on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for limited sanctions relief for Iran and pave the way to broader talks including Tehran’s nuclear programme, with mediators discounting public posturing from both Washington and Tehran and taking seriously only closed-door statements [8]. Iran’s condition is stated plainly: Foreign Minister Araghchi said on 11/20 that the US naval blockade must be broken for Iran to resume oil exports, per Wallstreetcn [9]. Iran’s strikes have continued despite ongoing diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict and restore shipping flows [7].
  • [ESCALATED] US / main pressuring party: AP reports President Donald Trump said on 11/20 that Tehran wants a deal to end hostilities, but not one that is “acceptable” to him, and at a White House news conference: “We want to make a real deal, not a fake deal” [8]. He renewed his vow that “Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, ever” [8]. He had said on 11/19 that he would not make a “hasty” decision on action against Iran before the New Year, but the military option has not left the discussion [9], and CBS reported on 11/20, citing sources familiar with the matter, that the US and Israel are considering a new round of military strikes on Iran in the near term [9]. AP records that Trump had rejected earlier this month the idea that the US even needs a deal, leaving him little wiggle room, while the administration maintains an economic pressure campaign targeting Iran’s few remaining international financial ties [8].
  • [ESCALATED] Iran / counterparty: Tehran is claiming escalation management through interdiction. The IRGC Navy warned that no activity by violating vessels in the Strait of Hormuz or the Persian Gulf can escape its surveillance, and said the tanker struck a mine because it violated transit rules, chose an unauthorised route and trusted false information from the US military [6]; it attributed multiple tanker explosions and fires in the southern strait since the evening of 11/20 to vessels striking water mines [5]. On the military side, Iranian media reported that a missile from the “US-Israeli enemy” hit the outskirts of Qeshm Island around 18:50 local time on 11/20, with no casualty or damage details published by Iranian officials [9].
  • [ESCALATED] Israel: Two channels point the same way. CBS reported on 11/20 that the Israeli government is especially worried Iran is rapidly restoring ballistic missile production capacity while moving military and nuclear facilities underground, that the Israeli military has prepared for a new round of conflict with its defensive forces on high alert, and that the Netanyahu government leans toward joint action with the US, though whether Trump would order a new operation and at what scale remains unclear [9]. Axios reported on 11/19 that Trump faces heavy pressure from Netanyahu to launch a decisive bombing campaign against Iran soon, and that the White House has asked the Pentagon and intelligence experts to assess how Iran would respond to various strike options [9]. AP reports that Netanyahu has pushed for the US to restart the war or allow Israel to launch airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities and missile capabilities [8].

3. Military Actions

  • [ESCALATED] US: The escort mission is now overtly an air operation — on the evening of 11/20 the US military deployed aerial refuelling aircraft, F-16, F/A-18 and F-35 jets, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters and MQ-series drones to cover tankers transiting Hormuz, per Iran’s IRGC Navy [5]. The US military confirmed on 11/17 that its warplanes struck IRGC missile launch facilities on Qeshm Island in response to Iranian attacks on US personnel and assets [9], and thousands of US troops remain off Iran’s waters maintaining a naval blockade to stem the flow of Iranian oil to the global market [8]. Force posture is steady rather than growing: the USS George Washington has left the Middle East and two US carrier strike groups remain in the region, the same as in past months [10].
  • [ESCALATED] Iran: The strike campaign is running at near-daily frequency. At least seven tankers were hit in the week to 11/18 and at least three vessels have sunk since the conflict started, with Iran’s IRGC increasingly hitting ships twice to signal that it can still identify and engage the right targets [7]; strikes on shipping began to rise in October after a period of relative calm [7]. Rystad Energy’s Jorge León put Iranian attacks on shipping at an average of 1 to 1.5 a day with a lot of under-reporting [7], though IMO and UKMTO data cited by Deutsche Bank show the frequency of vessel attacks has declined [11]. Iran widened attacks on Gulf neighbours over the past week, targeting a US air base in Kuwait and launching several attacks on Bahrain, which it said were responses to US drone surveillance operations and an attack on Iranian communications towers [8].
  • [NEW] Unattributed (Hormuz, 11/20–11/21): The projectile strikes themselves carry no claim of responsibility — the projectiles were unidentified and no party has been attributed with the attacks in the UKMTO notice [2][3]. Beyond the two 11/21 hits and the 11/20 port-side hit [1][3][4], the IRGC’s own tally of multiple tanker explosions and fires in the southern strait since the evening of 11/20 is the only account of scale [5].
  • [ESCALATED] Proxies (Houthis): On 11/20 the Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis toward southern Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis threatened to target the Shuqaiq power station in Jazan province [9]. Middle East media note the Houthis have repeatedly threatened Saudi targets including Riyadh’s financial centre, Red Sea coastal ports and power facilities, and warned airlines that Saudi airspace could become a military operations area [9].

4. Strait of Hormuz Transit Status

  • [ESCALATED] Control-status change: Iran’s compliance regime is metastasising into a shipping blacklist: Tehran has continued adding ships — often after they were attacked — to a list of so-called “non-compliant vessels” it claims are violating its protocols for crossing the strait, despite the waterway being only partially Iranian territorial waters, and that list now holds 240 ships, up from 46 when it began naming ships in August [7]. On the US side the blockade rule was tightened this week: the Joint Maritime Information Center, a coalition overseen by the US Navy, warned that ships may be in violation if they have taken cargo transferred from another restricted vessel or are carrying goods loaded in Iran even if they never entered an Iranian port [8]. The structural baseline remains a US naval blockade in place since 04/13 and a strait Iran closed on 03/02, with nuclear talks and navigation mutually constraining and no ceasefire arrangement reached [9].
  • [REVERSED] Transit data: The recovery read carried in this series on 11/19–11/20 is displaced by a decline. UKMTO counted 263 vessels in and out of the strait in the week to 11/18, about 15% fewer than the previous week and 20% less than the week before that, with 37 oil tankers against 52 a week earlier — against about 135 ships a day before the US-Israeli strike on Iran at the end of February, carrying roughly a fifth of global oil and gas supplies [7]. Six days in October saw shipments exceed pre-war levels, but preliminary Kpler barrel data showed flows in the second week of November close to half those of the first week, and the figures may be revised higher as more dark transits are identified [7]. UBS’s day-264–265 tracker puts combined crude and product exports via Hormuz and bypass routes at a 7-day rolling average of 10.9 Mb/d, near the lowest since early September; November-to-date averages 13.3 Mb/d after upward revision versus October’s 15.5 Mb/d, Gulf of Oman exports are 11.7 Mb/d on a 7-day basis (November 12.6 versus October 13.9), Yanbu loadings averaged 3.1 Mb/d last week versus 3.4 in October and Yanbu plus Fujairah 5.0 versus 5.7 [10]. Gulf crude loadings excluding Iran fell to 6.5 Mb/d last week, the lowest since September, with the November average at 7.5 versus 8.4 Mb/d in October; product loadings are slightly above 1 Mb/d against a normal above 3 Mb/d; Omani Gulf gas flows held at 10–15% of pre-conflict levels with the loading rate down from around 40% to under 30%; Iranian crude loadings remain zero [10]. UBS separately estimates a 5 million b/d supply gap in October 2026 before strategic reserve release, with Iranian crude unloaded since end-August and global observed inventories at the low end of the range [12]. Media reports suggest Iranian tankers may try to test the US blockade in coming days [10].
  • [ESCALATED] Shipping / insurance signals: The cost layer has moved to a different order of magnitude. Acting US Navy Secretary Hung Cao said on 11/17 that a year ago it cost $54,000 to insure a tanker crossing the strait, but the figure has now reached $64mn [7]. A further increase in war-risk premiums after a period of relative stability is itself a deterrent to vessels, according to John Walker of EOS Risk Group [7], and a tanker industry executive said a loaded ship holed in its side must be repaired before sailing out of the region, requiring cargo discharge, tank cleaning, gas freeing and a repair berth — just under a week after some “minor” hits but far longer for damage to the bridge or engine room [7]. Beneath that, some VLCC freight rates fell sharply, reversing September’s strength, possibly linked to Aframax and Suezmax vessels participating in ship-to-ship transfers near the strait, while Gulf crude export rates remain similar to September and October [11]. UKMTO urged vessels to transit the area with caution and report suspicious activity while investigations proceed [3][4].

5. Asset Implications

AssetDirectionHorizonDriverAnchoring fact
Brent cruderange-firmdays–weeksA verified transit decline and a new insurance print against inventory builds and rolling-over cracks§4 — 263 vessels (−15% w/w), UBS 10.9 Mb/d; §2 — UBS Q4 $100/bbl versus DB’s ~$70 2H2027 base
Gold / precious metalsrange, firm biasdaysNo metals print; the bid transmits through a live US–Israeli strike debate and strike-range widening at Qeshm§2 — CBS and Axios strike reporting; §3 — Qeshm missile
Global equities / risk sentimentrange-softdaysNear-daily shipping attacks plus a possible new strike campaign, against firming but still-positive inventory signals§3 — seven tankers hit in a week, three sunk since the war began; §5 note — falling cracks, inventory builds
USD / haven currenciesrangedaysGrowth-negative regional risk against disinflationary product and inventory data§4 — product loadings ~1 versus 3 Mb/d; §5 note — DB inventory build and crack decline
Energy / shipping value chain↑ structuralweeks–monthsInsurance at $64mn per strait transit and a 240-ship blacklist are contracted, sticky costs§4 — Hung Cao’s $54,000 → $64mn; the non-compliant list at 240 ships
Refining margins / productsrange, rolling overweeks–monthsTwo houses pointing opposite ways on the same complex§5 note — UBS raised 2026 European composite margin to $26.2/bbl from $18.0 while DB has diesel cracks back to July levels

Mechanism read. This is a supply-shock tape that has at last found a measurement. Through the past week the bearish leg rested on a physical recovery — Hormuz crude near 90% of pre-conflict, Middle East exports back near pre-war, freight halving from its spike. That leg has now been tested and partly withdrawn: a 15% week-on-week fall in total transits, a 29% fall in oil-tanker transits, Kpler’s barrel measure near halved between the first two weeks of November, and a US bank’s combined Hormuz-plus-bypass series stuck near the lowest since early September. The tell is that the same 24 hours produced a formal forecast revision rather than a rhetorical one: UBS lifted its Q4 2026 Brent to $100 from $83.74 and WTI to $96 from $79.22, with full-year 2026 at $91.57 and $86.60, before falling to $80 and $76 in 2027 — a curve that says the shock is real now and expected to fade. Deutsche Bank’s ~$70 2H2027 base, with a fourth “long stalemate” scenario flagged as notable upside risk, is the same shape from the other side of the fence.

The second mechanism is the split between the shock and the balance, and it is a delivered-cost story, not a flat-price one. The demand- and inventory-side reads are unambiguously loose: global observable liquids inventories posted their largest increase since the war began in October, Chinese crude stocks rebounded near the pre-conflict restocking pace, US crude and product inventories built over the past two weeks, global refinery utilisation was revised up and crack spreads are falling — diesel to July levels, with the Singapore–Dubai gasoline crack down significantly. Against that, the physical access cost is being rationed: insurance from $54,000 to $64mn, a growing blacklist that makes the vessel, not the barrel, the scarce unit, repair timelines that pull hulls out of service for a week or more, and gas loading rates down from about 40% to under 30%. When the priced barrel is long and the insurable hull is short, the correct expression is long the delivered-cost complex — freight, cover, products — and short volatility on the flat barrel, with a bias to the upside only on a confirmed interruption. Rystad’s warning that vessel availability becomes a very big problem in two or three months if the current pace holds is the forward version of exactly this: it is a physical constraint on the logistics system, arriving on a schedule, that a barrel curve cannot express.

6. Contrarian & Watch Signals

  • Contrarian & tail risks: (1) The consensus being priced is “measured tit-for-tat, no appetite for all-out war” — the AP’s analysts read the calibrated strikes as mutual signalling that neither side can return to the height of the war, and Mona Yacoubian’s observation that Iran is hitting Bahrain and Kuwait, “the two weakest of the (Gulf) countries,” and not the UAE, Saudi Arabia or Qatar, is offered as evidence of restraint. The falsifier is that this same calibration is now producing a measurable transit collapse and a 1,200-fold increase in per-voyage insurance. Restraint at the level of target selection and functional closure at the level of logistics are not contradictory — they are the mechanism. (2) Ali Vaez’s frame is the sharpest available: Trump may have declared the war over, but Tehran is determined to show Washington cannot declare victory while keeping Iran under economic siege — and Yacoubian adds that Iran has “deprived President Trump of that face-saving off-ramp.” A counterparty with no off-ramp to offer is a counterparty in which the “long stalemate” scenario is the base case, not the tail. (3) Deutsche Bank’s own warning against over-weighting the past week’s unusual price stability is the cleanest statement of mispricing risk in the batch: the market has traded seven sessions of escalation as noise. (4) John Walker’s judgement that further escalation is likely in the short term and that the US must either counter decisively or accept its obvious inability to maintain security frames the fork precisely — an acceptance branch is a structural repricing of US naval guarantees across the Gulf, not an oil event. (5) The vessel-availability tail is the one nobody is pricing: attacks averaging 1 to 1.5 a day with heavy under-reporting, repair times of a week or more per hit, and an escort regime that absorbs hulls means the constraint arrives as a discrete capacity event, not a gradual one. (6) The demand-side second-order effect is quietly bearish for the region and bullish for nowhere: US strategic petroleum reserves at their lowest since 1983, European industrial gas demand down 8% year-on-year in October, and diesel the most pronounced drag on 2026 oil demand all point to a shock that destroys consumption rather than rationing it. (7) Trump’s domestic position cuts both ways — CBS notes the war was a significant factor in Republican midterm losses and is unpopular domestically, raising the political cost of restarting it, which caps escalation but also raises the value of a foreign-policy win. (8) The reported Iranian intent to test the blockade with tankers in coming days is the single highest-variance catalyst in the file, because it forces a binary US decision at sea.
  • Key watch signals: Whether UKMTO’s weekly transit count extends below 263 vessels and oil tankers below 37 — a second consecutive double-digit fall would confirm functional rather than episodic impairment. Whether UBS’s 7-day combined series breaks below 10.9 Mb/d toward its early-September low, or the November-to-date 13.3 Mb/d holds. Whether Hung Cao’s $64mn insurance figure is repeated by a broker or underwriter, which would convert a single official’s testimony into a market price. Whether any of the 11/20–11/21 hulls is named by flag state, owner or insurer — all three UKMTO notices leave the attacker unidentified and no party has claimed them. Whether Iran’s “non-compliant” list grows past 240 ships, which is the cleanest proxy for how much of the global fleet Tehran believes it can exclude. Whether an Iranian tanker actually tests the blockade, and whether the US counters or accepts. Whether the US–Israel strike debate reported by CBS and Axios converts into force movement, with Qeshm as the live precedent. Whether diesel and gasoline cracks keep falling toward July levels, which would falsify the product-squeeze thesis and confirm Deutsche Bank’s looseness read. And whether Brent trades up to UBS’s $100 Q4 mark or Deutsche Bank’s $70 2H2027 assumption first — the two houses are now 30 dollars apart on the same curve.
  • Source quality control: The 11/20–11/21 strike record is only partly attributable. The two 11/21 incidents and the 11/20 incident rest on UKMTO notices relayed second-hand, with the projectile type unidentified, no attacker named, no claim of responsibility, casualties nil and environmental impact explicitly unconfirmed [1][2][3][4]. The IRGC’s account — a mine strike at Khasab port entrance by a “violating” tanker and a second blast off Qarnayn Island [5][6] — is single-source and belligerent-authored, and it conflicts in mechanism with UKMTO’s “unidentified projectile” framing while overlapping in place and time; the two should be carried side by side, not merged. The IRGC’s claim of a large-scale US air operation is likewise single-source and unattributed by any US statement in this batch [5]. The attack-frequency data conflict directly: Rystad’s 1 to 1.5 a day with heavy under-reporting [7] against IMO and UKMTO data cited by Deutsche Bank showing a decline [11]. UBS’s tracker and forecast material is a partial citation of two reports — a 27-page Hormuz tracker and a 155-page global outlook, both dated 2026-11-20 — with the Iranian blockade-testing item attributed only to unspecified media reports [12][10]. The CBS and Axios strike-planning reports are single-outlet, source-based and explicitly leave the scale and the US decision undetermined, with Axios reaching the record via a Xinhua relay [9]. The Gulf partial-bargain construct is a single unnamed Middle Eastern diplomat’s description of a proposal, not an agreed framework [8]. Deutsche Bank’s $70 2H2027 base and its fourth scenario are house projections, not observations, as are UBS’s demand and supply forecasts [11][12]. Trump’s remarks reach the record through AP renderings without a transcript [8]. The $64mn insurance figure is an acting Navy secretary’s testimony, single-source [7], and the repair-timeline detail rests on one unnamed tanker industry executive [7]. Iran’s Qeshm casualty and damage picture is unpublished by Iranian officials, and the “US-Israeli enemy” attribution is Tasnim’s, not a confirmed finding [9].

This report is intelligence & mechanism analysis, not investment advice.

30-day review of this series 10/22 – 11/21
  • Physical recovery outran the war: Trans-Hormuz and bypass flows moved from the war’s sub-1 mb/d nadir and conflicting ~70%-of-normal reads in mid-November to the IEA’s ~90% of pre-conflict levels excluding Iran by 11/20, even as tanker-mine claims continued.
  • Diplomacy cycled from bridge text to symbolic declaration: Qatari two-day proposals and Iran’s seven conditions gave way to stalemate, then to a Trump–Xi–Putin “peace declaration” that added headlines but no ratified mechanism.
  • Hormuz control shifted from contested lanes to a codified permission regime: The US-escorted southern route and IRGC “unauthorized route” claims hardened into Iran’s three-part rule—advance coordination, approved routes, transponders on—enforced by mines and warnings.
  • Escalation migrated to proxies and Gulf hosts: Attacks widened from Kuwait and Bahrain to Houthi strikes on Saudi infrastructure and Riyadh’s tallest tower, while Bab al-Mandab fell under Houthi control and mediation pressure grew.
  • Cost structure outlasted the flat-price premium: Freight and war-risk cover remained near 10x normal and products/LNG lagged crude’s recovery, so Brent’s slide from late-October highs near $118 to about $92 by 11/20 did not normalise delivered costs.
  • Force posture and tail pricing diverged from the tape: A third carrier and strike-window speculation gave way to carrier rotation, basing dispersal and an unexplained post-January-1 reference, leaving tail risk priced more in freight, options and products than in crude.

Sources12

  1. 两艘油轮接连在驶出霍尔木兹海峡时遇袭 格隆汇快讯 Score 69
  2. 两艘油轮接连在驶出霍尔木兹海峡时遇袭 财联社-加红电报 Score 69
  3. 一小时内,阿曼附近霍尔木兹海峡两艘油轮遭不明飞行物袭击 格隆汇快讯 Score 68
  4. 英国海上贸易行动办公室:一艘油轮在霍尔木兹海峡遭袭起火 格隆汇快讯 Score 67
  5. 伊朗称美军掩护油轮非法通行 霍尔木兹海峡触雷事故不断 格隆汇快讯 Score 69
  6. 伊朗革命卫队:一艘违规油轮在霍尔木兹海峡触雷后爆炸起火 格隆汇快讯 Score 67
  7. Oil shipped through Hormuz falls as Iranian strikes increase Financial Times Score 72
  8. Trump insists Iran won't make an 'acceptable' deal as concerns grow about next steps AP News Score 66
  9. 伊朗格什姆岛又传遭袭,美媒称美以考虑短期内对伊发动新一轮打击 华尔街见闻 Score 66
  10. 霍尔木兹追踪:第264-265天:承诺增加产品出口;伊朗可能尝试出口 外资研报 Score 71
  11. 库存增加:稳定性如何? 外资研报 Score 68
  12. 全球石油、天然气和炼油市场展望 外资研报 Score 67