Strait of Hormuz Tracker

Houthi missile hits Riyadh's tallest tower as Iran mines two more tankers and the IEA puts Hormuz crude near 90% of pre-war

The proxy layer escalated furthest in the past 24 hours, with a Houthi projectile striking Riyadh's tallest tower — the sovereign-wealth-fund headquarters — on 11/19 , while Iran's navy claimed two more tankers mined in Hormuz and Brent held near $92, on track for a third consecutive weekly decline, as the IEA put Hormuz crude flows at roughly 90% of pre-conflict levels excluding Iran .

10 sources ~40 min

0. Weekly Arc

Six sessions of a widening war traded as a surplus. 11/13: Brent re-inflated toward $96 as Iran hit Gulf US targets and Trump declared a deal unnecessary. 11/16–11/17: a split tape — belligerent mine claims against flow trackers, a third US carrier arriving and Bab al-Mandab reported lost. 11/18–11/19: strikes on Kuwait and Bahrain, Morgan Stanley’s 70%-of-normal export print and Brent near $92. 11/20: a Houthi strike on Riyadh’s financial district, a Trump–Xi–Putin “peace declaration”, and an IEA read putting Hormuz crude near 90% of pre-war while declining.

1. Situation Overview

The past ~24 hours are an escalation at the proxy and force-posture layers set against a continuing physical recovery that is now measured more tightly. The Houthis fired missiles at Riyadh on 11/19, and a projectile struck the Saudi capital’s tallest tower — the headquarters of the sovereign wealth fund — causing material damage to several floors and nearby buildings but no injuries, according to Saudi civil defence via the state news agency SPA [1][2][3][4]. Iran’s navy said two oil tankers struck naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz on 11/19 and “exploded”, a claim Reuters said it could not independently verify [1][3], while Iran’s Army Navy public-relations department said one non-compliant tanker was mined in the no-navigation zone east of the strait after switching off its navigation system and that another was mined and caught fire in the early hours of 11/20 [5]; attacks this week have left at least two crew members missing [6]. On the military ledger, the USS Theodore Roosevelt arrived in the region this week while the USS George Washington departed, apparently for its home port in Japan, with the USS George H.W. Bush remaining on station in the Arabian Sea, and Washington has added destroyers, strike aircraft and air-defence systems while moving forces to bases in Jordan, Israel and Cyprus, per King’s College London researchers cited by the FT [4]. The counterweight remains the physical print: the IEA’s 2026 World Energy Outlook puts Hormuz crude flows at about 90% of pre-conflict levels excluding Iran, though recently trending down [7], and Citi puts Middle East crude exports at about 15.7 mn b/d against roughly 17.4 mn b/d pre-war, with products at only about 3.85 mn b/d against 6 mn b/d [8].

2. Key Parties’ Positions

  • [ONGOING] Negotiation progress: Deadlock persists — Iran insists the US meet seven conditions before a temporary deal, Qatar-led mediators are still talking to both sides, Qatari and Omani officials met Iranian counterparts this week, and both sides believe they have time on their side [4].
  • [NEW] Gulf states (mediation pressure): Gulf states worried about Iranian retaliation if the US and Israel launch a new intense round of war have been urging Trump to give diplomacy more time [4], while a Saudi shipping official said that despite the continuing attacks Saudi Arabia has no choice but to keep moving oil through Hormuz [6].
  • [ESCALATED] US / main pressuring party: Washington produced both a symbolic de-escalatory gesture and an unexplained deadline. At an unprecedented three-way meeting on 11/19, Trump, Xi Jinping and Putin agreed a symbolic “peace declaration”, reaffirmed that nuclear war should never be fought and pledged to increase fuel products for all countries, with Trump saying both he and Xi felt strongly about “oil having to flow through the Strait of Hormuz” [3]; separately he said the US would “see what happens” in its conflict with Iran after January 1 “without explaining what the significance of that date might be” [3]. The FT records the oscillation — Trump “has given mixed signals on a fresh attack”, said last week that Washington did not need a deal and would instead maintain its naval blockade in the expectation it would force the regime to submit, and told a pre-midterm rally on 11/01 that “at some point we’re going to have to give them the hammer” [4]. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said Washington is considering ramping up diesel and oil exports to Europe, where the US has become the leading supplier since the war began [3].
  • [ESCALATED] Iran / counterparty: Tehran is codifying the permission regime and widening its threat set. Its military required all vessels planning to pass through Hormuz to coordinate in advance with Iran’s armed forces, transit via approved routes and keep identification, tracking and navigation systems on throughout [5]; its foreign ministry warned regional countries on 11/19 that allowing US bases on their territory to be used in attacks would make them legitimate targets [4], and Iran has vowed a ferocious response if the US and Israel launch a new intense round of strikes [4], after top security official Mohsen Rezaei warned last week that “every military base involved in the aggression — from West Asia to Europe — will be a legitimate target” [4]. Citi’s read is that if no deal is reached within one to two weeks, Iran’s incentive to break through or bypass the blockade rises markedly as domestic revenue shrinks [8].
  • [ESCALATED] Israel: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been pushing for a joint campaign [4], and one signal flagged as possibly indicating an impending joint operation is CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper’s 11/18 visit to Israel to meet senior military and intelligence leaders, followed by a visit to Riyadh on 11/19 [4]. Sima Shine of Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies said “There is a combination of different developments in the region … that worries me that we are very close to major escalation” [4].

3. Military Actions

  • [ESCALATED] US: Force posture is being thickened and redistributed rather than drawn down — beyond the destroyers, strike aircraft and air-defence systems added to the region and the moves to bases in Jordan, Israel and Cyprus, this week’s carrier rotation left the USS Theodore Roosevelt newly arrived, the USS George Washington departing and the USS George H.W. Bush on station in the Arabian Sea [4]. General Joseph Votel, former CENTCOM commander, said that “Even after nine months, there are still vulnerabilities that could be exploited in the Gulf” [4].
  • [ONGOING] US (strike and counter-strike): American jets struck an Iranian missile launch site on Qeshm island in the Strait of Hormuz after Iranian forces targeted US Patriot defence systems at Ali Al Salem air base in Kuwait on 11/18 [4].
  • [ESCALATED] Iran: Beyond the two mined tankers claimed on 11/19–11/20 [1][3][5], Iran has launched four attacks on Bahrain in recent days including on a US radar installation, and has stepped up attacks on tankers transiting the strait [4]; UKMTO has logged attacks this month averaging about one a day, of which about 14 occurred in Hormuz, and Bloomberg reports the tempo rose in October and continued higher in November [6][9].
  • [NEW] Proxies (Houthis, Saudi front): A projectile from Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthis struck the tallest tower in Riyadh on 11/19 — the sovereign wealth fund headquarters — damaging several floors and nearby buildings with no injuries reported, per Saudi civil defence via SPA [2][3][4]; the Houthis also fired missiles at the Saudi capital [1][3], and the kingdom has been grappling with weeks of strikes from the rebels, including this month on Aramco’s Riyadh office [4]. The WSJ reads the tower strike as underscoring “the challenge the kingdom faces as it struggles to organize forces in Yemen to fight” [2], and two Western officials briefed by the Saudis expect a war against the Houthis to stretch well into next year [3].

4. Strait of Hormuz Transit Status

  • [ESCALATED] Control-status change: The permission regime is now stated as a standing three-part rule — advance coordination with Iran’s armed forces, approved routes only, and transponders on for the whole transit — enforced by mines against vessels that switch off their navigation systems [5], alongside IRGC claims that two tankers “exploded” and are burning after hitting mines on 11/19 [1][3].
  • [REVERSED] Transit data: Yesterday’s ~70%-of-normal read is displaced by higher measurements with different bases. The IEA puts Hormuz crude flows at about 90% of pre-conflict levels excluding Iran, though recently trending down [7], and Reuters reports crude shipments through the strait have returned to roughly pre-war levels [1]; Citi puts Middle East crude exports at about 15.7 mn b/d versus roughly 17.4 mn b/d pre-war, products at about 3.85 mn b/d versus 6 mn b/d, with Red Sea route exports up from about 0.2 mn b/d pre-war to an average 2.2 mn b/d since March and Egypt’s Sidi Kerir terminal from 0.7 to about 1.1 mn b/d [8]. It also flags distortion: cargo loadings near Fujairah once reached 9.75 mn b/d against terminal loading capacity under 2 mn b/d, implying large-scale ship-to-ship transfers [8].
  • [ESCALATED] Shipping / insurance signals: The cost layer is easing from a spike but remains far above normal — AG-Singapore 260,000-tonne crude freight has fallen from a peak above $35/bbl to slightly above $20/bbl, still about 10x the historical norm of $1.5–2/bbl [8] — while the incident stream is the constraint: inbound tanker counts have fallen and the frequency of vessels attacked while transiting has risen [8], and UKMTO notes many companies do not report incidents at all, making counts uncertain [6].

5. Asset Implications

AssetDirectionHorizonDriverAnchoring fact
Brent cruderange-softdays–weeksPhysical recovery plus a third weekly decline, against a live proxy escalation and mine stream§1/§4 — Brent $92.22 (+0.3%) at 0118 GMT 11/20 but −3.5% on the week, third straight weekly fall, Dec WTI −6% [1]; §4 — IEA ~90% of pre-conflict [7]
Gold / precious metalsrange, firm biasdaysNo metals print; the bid transmits through the widening of the target set to Gulf hosts and Europe, not a measured supply loss§2 — Iran’s foreign-ministry legitimacy warning and Rezaei’s Europe threat [4]; §3 — Riyadh tower strike [2][3]
Global equities / risk sentimentrange-softdaysA “peace declaration” headline against a force build-up and a Houthi strike on the Saudi financial district§2 — three-way summit declaration [3]; §3 — PIF HQ damage [2][3][4]
USD / haven currenciesrangedaysNo FX print; growth-negative regional risk against disinflationary barrel arithmetic§4 — 15.7 vs 17.4 mn b/d crude, 3.85 vs 6 mn b/d products [8]; §5 note — demand-destruction channel
Energy / shipping value chain↑ structuralweeks–monthsFreight at ~10x normal and a formal three-condition transit rule are contracted costs the flat price does not carry§4 — freight just above $20/bbl vs $1.5–2 norm [8]; §4 — coordination/approved-route/transponder rule [5]
Refining margins / products↑ firmweeks–monthsThe product leg remains the lagging one in every dataset, with Gulf product exports near two-thirds of pre-war§4 — products 3.85 vs 6 mn b/d; Qatar and Kuwait product exports almost disappeared [8]; §5 note — diesel retail $5.96/gal, +57% y/y [8]

Mechanism read. This is a supply-shock tape being priced off a recovery measurement rather than off the war. The bearish inputs are strong and now come from multiple houses: Hormuz crude near 90% of pre-conflict, Middle East crude back to roughly 15.7 mn b/d, freight halving from its peak, a third consecutive weekly decline in both benchmarks and a “peace declaration” headline to trade against [1][3][7][8]. The bullish inputs sit one layer down and are not in the flat price: products still about 2.1 mn b/d below pre-war with Qatari and Kuwaiti product exports effectively gone, diesel retail at $5.96/gallon and up 57% year-on-year, freight still ten times normal, and a transit regime that makes dark passage a mineable offence [8][5]. The correct expression of that divergence is long the delivered-cost complex and short vol on the flat barrel, not a directional crude call.

The second mechanism is that escalation is now being generated by actors with the least to lose from a settlement. A Houthi strike on Riyadh’s tallest tower, Iran’s four attacks on Bahrain and its warning that host countries become legitimate targets, and a US carrier rotation plus dispersal to Jordan, Israel and Cyprus together describe a ladder climbing while the negotiators talk past each other [3][4]. That matters for pricing because it makes the tail two-sided in a way the surplus arithmetic ignores: Citi explicitly argues the path to a Hormuz reopening carries extremely high risk and recommends buying both ends of energy options rather than a direction [8], which is the cleanest statement that the market’s central case (reopening in 2–3 months) and its tail case (blockade-breaking by a revenue-starved Iran) are both live inside the same instrument.

6. Contrarian & Watch Signals

  • Contrarian & tail risks: (1) The consensus that the war is a fading premium is falsified fastest by the proxy layer, not the strait: a strike on the Saudi sovereign fund’s headquarters in the financial district is a reputational and FDI event with no barrel attached, and the Saudi read is a war stretching into next year. (2) The structural tail is now official: the IEA calls this the biggest disruption ever to global oil and gas trade and models a scenario in which accelerated electrification, efficiency and fuel-switching cut world oil demand by more than 4% by 2035 — a bearish-demand, bullish-security-spending configuration that favours energy-services equities over the barrel itself. (3) The most under-priced asymmetry is the January 1 reference and the political calendar around it: a US president citing an unexplained date, an incoming Democratic Congress in January, and a CENTCOM commander touring Israel and Riyadh in sequence is a strike-window configuration, not a de-escalation one. (4) The blockade-breaking branch is live: an Iran whose revenue is shrinking and whose internal pressure is rising may prefer breaking or bypassing the blockade to waiting for better terms, which converts a slow squeeze into a discrete event. (5) The demand side of the ledger is quietly deteriorating in the background — US commercial crude stocks up 3.4 mn barrels to 417.8 mn, gasoline up 5.2 mn to 215.9 mn, production at 14.032 mn b/d — which caps rallies even as the tail premium widens. (6) The Russia leg is a second, separate energy shock: Ukrainian drone attacks cut Russian refining throughput 45% since late October, and Putin has dropped any moratorium on attacking energy sectors and shipping, which tightens product markets independently of Hormuz.
  • Key watch signals: Whether the IEA’s ~90% Hormuz recovery survives its own “recently trending down” caveat in the next monthly print — a fall back toward Citi’s 15.7 mn b/d would end the surplus trade. Whether any flag state, insurer, owner or UKMTO entry corroborates the 11/19–11/20 mine claims and the “at least two crew missing” count, which remain belligerent-authored or unattributed. Whether the Saudi tower strike produces any loading or insurance change at Yanbu or Ras Tanura, the cleanest test of whether the proxy layer has become functional rather than symbolic. Whether a formal US or Iranian readout attaches substance to the “peace declaration”, and whether Trump’s post-January-1 language is followed by force movement. Whether Admiral Cooper’s Riyadh leg is followed by a joint-operation announcement — the trigger Shine flags. Whether Brent holds the $92 area or breaks below $90 to confirm a third negative week, and whether WTI’s steeper weekly loss (−6%) keeps widening the Brent–WTI spread. Whether OPEC+ on 11/29 extends coordinated cuts, which Yoshida cites as current price support. And whether the Strait reopens within Citi’s 2–3 month window or the blockade-breaking branch fires first.
  • Source quality control: The kinetic record is again partly belligerent-authored: the 11/19 two-tanker mine report rests on Iran’s navy and the Revolutionary Guards Navy via state media, and Reuters states explicitly that it could not independently verify it [1][3]; the 11/20 second mining and the coordination demand rest on Iran’s Army Navy public-relations department as a single source [5]. The Riyadh tower strike is the best-corroborated item in the batch — three independent outlets plus Saudi civil defence via SPA for the damage and the absence of injuries [2][3][4] — but the attribution to the Houthis and the “tallest tower / sovereign wealth fund headquarters” identification come from those outlets, not from a Houthi claim in this batch. Transit figures conflict by construction and must be carried with their bases: the IEA’s ~90% excludes Iran and is a projection-bearing Outlook assessment relayed to the record partly through UBS’s 15-page analyst note [7]; Reuters’ “roughly pre-war” is a characterisation without a stated basket [1]; Citi’s 17.4 mn b/d pre-war and 15.7 mn b/d current are house estimates from ship-tracking [8]. The 9.75 mn b/d Fujairah loading figure is presented as a past observation implying ship-to-ship transfers, not a current flow [8]. UKMTO’s ~one-attack-a-day, ~14-in-Hormuz count is explicitly incomplete — many companies do not report, and Gulf producers rarely publicise attacks [6]. All IEA World Energy Outlook numbers (90% recovery, 2.8 bn barrels of oil and 60 bcm of gas of cumulative loss, 2035 demand scenarios, pipeline bypass economics at 7 mn b/d and ~$40bn) are modelled or projected, not observed [1][3][7], and the OPEC+ output decision, the Saudi “into next year” war expectation, and the Citi reopening window are projections [1][3][8]. Vaez, Votel, Shine and Yoshida are analyst or former-official judgements [1][4]. Trump’s Truth Social and rally remarks and Rezaei’s post reach the record as outlet renderings without transcripts [4], and the significance of the January 1 date is unexplained in the source itself [3].

Appendix: Further Reading

  • [10] Bloomberg — oil edges higher after a volatile session but futures head for a third weekly decline as traders weigh renewed US strikes against ample supply
  • [9] Bloomberg — Iranian tanker attacks intensified in October and stayed at a higher tempo in November even as prices fell on a flood of Middle East supply
  • [7] UBS — IEA 2026 WEO “Additional Response Case”: reduced Hormuz dependence, higher domestic production, faster electrification; energy-services names rated Buy
  • [2] WSJ — the Riyadh tower strike underscores the kingdom’s difficulty organising forces in Yemen

This report is intelligence & mechanism analysis, not investment advice.

30-day review of this series 10/22 – 11/21
  • Physical recovery outran the war: Trans-Hormuz and bypass flows moved from the war’s sub-1 mb/d nadir and conflicting ~70%-of-normal reads in mid-November to the IEA’s ~90% of pre-conflict levels excluding Iran by 11/20, even as tanker-mine claims continued.
  • Diplomacy cycled from bridge text to symbolic declaration: Qatari two-day proposals and Iran’s seven conditions gave way to stalemate, then to a Trump–Xi–Putin “peace declaration” that added headlines but no ratified mechanism.
  • Hormuz control shifted from contested lanes to a codified permission regime: The US-escorted southern route and IRGC “unauthorized route” claims hardened into Iran’s three-part rule—advance coordination, approved routes, transponders on—enforced by mines and warnings.
  • Escalation migrated to proxies and Gulf hosts: Attacks widened from Kuwait and Bahrain to Houthi strikes on Saudi infrastructure and Riyadh’s tallest tower, while Bab al-Mandab fell under Houthi control and mediation pressure grew.
  • Cost structure outlasted the flat-price premium: Freight and war-risk cover remained near 10x normal and products/LNG lagged crude’s recovery, so Brent’s slide from late-October highs near $118 to about $92 by 11/20 did not normalise delivered costs.
  • Force posture and tail pricing diverged from the tape: A third carrier and strike-window speculation gave way to carrier rotation, basing dispersal and an unexplained post-January-1 reference, leaving tail risk priced more in freight, options and products than in crude.

Sources10

  1. Oil prices edge higher as Houthi attacks on Riyadh raise supply concerns Reuters Score 69
  2. Oil Rises Amid Middle East Tensions WSJ Score 67
  3. Oil prices inch up as tanker disruptions offset surplus supply outlook CNBC Score 70
  4. Gulf flare-up stokes fears of return to Iran war Financial Times Score 69
  5. 伊朗军方:霍尔木兹海峡东部一艘违规油轮起火 格隆汇快讯 Score 67
  6. 油价下跌之际 伊朗加大对霍尔木兹海峡油轮的袭击 格隆汇快讯 Score 75
  7. 国际能源署2026年世界能源展望:冲突后不同的能源市场 外资研报 Score 65
  8. 石油监测:尽管油价回落,地缘政治紧张局势犹存;中东石油出口尚未可持续恢复至战前水平 外资研报 Score 68
  9. Iran Intensifies Hormuz Tanker Attacks Just as Oil Prices Slide Bloomberg Score 75
  10. Oil Set for Third Weekly Drop as Ample Supply Counters Iran Risk Bloomberg Score 65