Strait of Hormuz Tracker

Third US carrier in the Gulf as the Houthis take Bab al-Mandab and UBS puts Hormuz-plus-bypass flows at a November low

Both chokepoints hardened at once — CENTCOM confirmed that the USS Theodore Roosevelt had joined two other carriers in the Middle East on 11/16, while the Houthis are reported in full control of Bab al-Mandab and Iran's navy claimed a fourth tanker mined in 24 hours east of Hormuz — yet crude fell, with Brent at $91.8 in Asian trading on 11/17 and UBS's tracker at a November-low 10.1 mn b/d of combined Hormuz and bypass flows .

17 sources ~50 min

0. Weekly Arc

The week opened with a peace trade (11/09–11/10), was reversed by verified tanker fires and Iran’s first Gulf strikes (11/11–11/13), then settled into a claim-versus-measurement split in which daily mine-strike counts escalated while Washington’s escort ledger and a “near pre-war” flow read capped crude (11/14–11/16). The 11/17 batch breaks that balance in both directions: a third US carrier has arrived, the Houthis are reported in control of a second chokepoint, and UBS’s flow print has fallen to a November low — while Brent keeps sliding toward $91 on surplus arithmetic and 2027 forecasts.

1. Situation Overview

The past ~24 hours are an escalation in the water and on the ground set against a further softening in the flat price. On land, the Houthis forced the army of Yemen’s internationally recognised government to withdraw from the Red Sea coast to defend Aden and are reported in full control of Bab al-Mandab and the nearby offshore islands, placing a second chokepoint inside the same proxy network already striking Saudi export infrastructure [1][2]. At sea, CENTCOM said in a social media post on 11/16 that a third American carrier had arrived in the Middle East, with the USS Theodore Roosevelt joining the USS George H.W. Bush and USS George Washington in maintaining a naval blockade of Iranian shipping [3][4][5]; Iran’s army navy said four oil tankers struck mines and caught fire in the eastern strait within 24 hours [6][7], its Revolutionary Guard navy said half a dozen tankers have been hit since Sunday by mines or projectiles [8][3], and UKMTO reported a tanker struck by an unidentified projectile in the strait on 11/17 that caught fire [6]. Tehran also claimed a six-drone attack on the US air-defence radar at Bahrain’s Riffa air base on 11/15, its second attack on the kingdom in three days [6], which Bahrain’s military said it intercepted and CENTCOM said was not successful [6][8]. Prices moved the other way: Brent fell 2% to $93.90 on 11/16 and traded at $91.8, down 0.7%, in Asian hours on 11/17 [6][9], while UBS put combined Hormuz-plus-bypass flows at 10.1 mn b/d, the lowest in November [10], and Lloyd’s List assessments put strait traffic below a third of prewar levels [3][4].

2. Key Parties’ Positions

  • [ESCALATED] Negotiation progress: The mediated channel has thinned rather than broken. Indirect talks between Washington and Tehran through Qatar have appeared to run into a stalemate as the two sides disagree over terms for a lasting peace deal [6], and Washington appears unwilling to accept several Iranian demands — including lifting the US naval blockade on Iran’s southern ports and lifting sanctions — while stressing that Iran cannot possess a nuclear weapon [6]. Trump told Vice-President JD Vance, a chief negotiator in earlier ceasefire talks, to focus instead on the administration’s domestic anti-fraud campaign targeting Democratic-controlled cities and states [3][4][5], and negotiations remain stalled over Iran’s nuclear programme, which Trump insists be part of any deal [3][4][5]; Iran wants the US first to agree to several core conditions, including lifting the naval blockade that is stopping its oil from reaching world markets [3][4][5]. UN Secretary-General António Guterres used a speech in Manila on 11/16 to call for a “serious diplomatic process” to break the impasse, warning the prolonged crisis is already inflicting “devastating consequences” on the global economy [8].
  • [ESCALATED] US: The declaratory line is now explicitly two-track. Trump has oscillated between threatening additional large-scale strikes and insisting the more than eight-month-old war “militarily is effectively over” [3][5]; he warned Iran that the US military is “locked and loaded” and that Washington was watching Pickaxe Mountain, a facility linked to Iran’s nuclear programme, for signs of activity [5], and told conservative broadcaster Hugh Hewitt on 11/12 that “if something does not work out, I would not hesitate” to act [3][4][5]. He also told reporters last week he believed it highly unlikely he would need to order new major strikes [3], declared the US no longer needs a deal with Tehran [3][4][5], and has signalled Washington will hold off on ordering fresh strikes provided there are no new attacks from Tehran or Yemen’s Houthi rebels [8]. A White House spokesperson said: “We remain vigilant, monitoring any and all potential threats, but at this time there are no credible threats to the homeland” [6]. Secretary of State Marco Rubio condemned the Bahrain attacks in a call with Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani and reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to the security of Bahrain and other Gulf partners [6].
  • [ESCALATED] Iran: Tehran has moved from claiming hits to publishing the terms of passage. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Navy warned shipping companies against using the US-backed southern route through the strait, describing it as fully closed and a “minefield of fire”, per regional media citing a statement from the force [6], and Brig. Gen. Mohammad Akrami-Nia, a spokesperson for the Iranian Army, said the strait would not reopen until “the enemy accepts Iran’s conditions” [6]. Iran’s army navy said safe passage requires compliance with the relevant regulations and coordination with the Iranian armed forces [7][11]. Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned on 11/15 that Iran would not remain trapped in a state of “neither war nor peace” and would not sit back and wait to be struck first [8], and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi argued that further US and Israeli aggression threatens wider regional stability [8].
  • [NEW] Israel: No Israeli official or military statement appears in this batch. Israel enters only through The Economist’s 2027 scenario, in which Binyamin Netanyahu is no longer prime minister but “still lurking”, with a government led by Gadi Eisenkot focused on settler violence in the West Bank and uninterested in engaging seriously with Israeli–Palestinian relations [12] (projection, scenario material).

3. Military Actions

  • [ESCALATED] US: Force posture reached a level last seen in April. CENTCOM said on 11/16 that the USS Theodore Roosevelt had arrived in the Middle East, joining the USS George H.W. Bush and USS George Washington and smaller Navy ships in the region to maintain a naval blockade of Iranian shipping [3][4][5]; CNBC reported the carrier reached the Gulf region on 11/15 [6]. According to the Navy, the Arabian Sea flotilla now includes 13 destroyers, two cruisers and a littoral combat ship, with two more destroyers in the Red Sea [3][4][5]; the Roosevelt deployed with the USS Makin Island amphibious readiness group, including the USS John P. Murtha and USS Anchorage and around 2,000 Marines, and those ships have yet to reach the region [3][4][5]. The Navy previously had three carrier strike groups in the Middle East in April, for the first time since 2003 [3][4][5]. CENTCOM also said it has redirected 150 merchant vessels and disabled five since June under the blockade [3][4][5], and the US has carried out limited strikes on Iranian targets near the strait while helping guide vessels through the contested waters [3][4][5].
  • [ESCALATED] Iran: The interdiction claims broadened from mines to projectiles and multiplied in count. Iran’s navy said four oil tankers had struck mines and caught fire in the eastern Strait of Hormuz over the previous 24 hours [6][7][11][13], with Iran’s army navy reporting the latest as the fourth vessel damaged in those waters in 24 hours and describing it as a violating tanker that both deviated from its approved route and switched off its navigation system [7][11][14]; counting from 23:00 local time the previous day, it said this was already the third violating tanker to strike a mine, catch fire and lose navigational capability [14]. The Revolutionary Guard’s navy said half a dozen tankers have been struck in the strait since Sunday, either by mines or projectiles, polluting the strait’s coastlines [3][4][5][8] (single source / belligerent-authored). Separately, Tehran said it launched six drones at a US air-defence radar at Bahrain’s Riffa air base on 11/15, the second attack it claims against the kingdom in three days [6]; Bahrain’s military said it intercepted and destroyed several Iranian aerial attacks [6], Bahrain’s foreign ministry condemned the resumption of attacks as “heinous aggression” and rejected Tehran’s “flimsy pretexts and baseless claims” [8], and CENTCOM rejected claims that the Iranian attacks were successful, with the Pentagon not formally commenting on Sunday’s strike [8].
  • [ESCALATED] Proxies (Houthis / Bab al-Mandab): The proxy war has produced a territorial, not just a missile, outcome. The Iran-backed Houthis who seized much of Yemen in 2014 have forced the army of the internationally recognised government to withdraw from the Red Sea coast to defend its interim capital Aden, are reported in full control of Bab al-Mandab and the nearby offshore islands, and seized the strait in September [1][2]. On land the Houthis seized the initiative and made a lightning dash down the Red Sea coast, sending the Yemeni army into headlong retreat, with a brief counter-offensive apparently failed [1][2]. After a cold truce between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis broke down in July, the Saudi East-West Pipeline was hit by drones and the rebels began firing missiles and drones at targets across Saudi Arabia [1][2]. The Houthis say they are no threat to maritime traffic [1][2].

4. Strait of Hormuz Transit Status

  • [ESCALATED] Control-status change: Tehran has now published a closure doctrine with a named lane and a named condition. The Revolutionary Guards Navy told shipping companies the US-backed southern route is fully closed and a “minefield of fire” [6]; the army spokesperson tied reopening to “the enemy accepts Iran’s conditions” [6]; Iran’s army navy made safe passage conditional on compliance with regulations and coordination with Iran’s armed forces [7][11]; and Iranian state TV, quoting the Revolutionary Guard’s naval arm and the army, warned shipping companies on 11/16 that a US-supported route through the waterway is dangerous because of mines [4][5]. The US counter-description is operational: Washington is helping guide vessels through the contested waters [3][4][5] and is running a blockade under which CENTCOM has redirected 150 merchant vessels and disabled five since June [3][4][5].
  • [REVERSED] Transit data: The “near pre-war” read carried in this series on 11/16 does not survive this batch. Independent assessments from Lloyd’s List, a maritime tracking and analysis firm, show traffic through the strait remains at less than a third of prewar levels [3][4][5]. UBS’s day-259–261 tracker puts total crude and refined-product flows via the strait and bypass routes at a 7-day rolling average of 10.1 mn b/d, the lowest in November and about 10.8 mn b/d below the pre-conflict baseline [10]; flows through the strait alone averaged 8.1 mn b/d against a 20.9 mn b/d baseline, with bypass adding 1.9 mn b/d to reach total exports of 12.5 mn b/d on that basis [10] (the two totals in the same note are not reconciled). Gulf crude loadings excluding Iran averaged 7.2 mn b/d over the past week at the low end of the recent range, with November month-to-date at 7.6 mn b/d against October’s 8.4 mn b/d; Iranian crude loadings were zero versus 1.8 mn b/d pre-conflict; Yanbu averaged 2.4 mn b/d (October 2.6) and Yanbu plus Fujairah 4.4 mn b/d (October 4.7) [10]. Product loadings were especially weak at below 1 mn b/d against a normal above 3 mn b/d, and LNG flows leaving the Gulf of Oman recovered to about 15% of pre-conflict levels with the loading rate near 40%, per Refinitiv data [10]. Jefferies reports transit volumes “still in a fluctuating state” and transit speed slowing because Iran is adopting new maritime attack tactics [15].
  • [ESCALATED] Shipping / insurance signals: The incident stream is now running on projectiles as well as mines. UKMTO said a tanker was struck by an unidentified projectile in the Strait of Hormuz on 11/17 and subsequently caught fire [6], having earlier confirmed a vessel hit at around 06:00 GMT on 11/16 with all crew safe and the extent of structural damage unclear [8], and reported at 11/16 21:35 UTC a third-party account of an attack that disabled a tanker and caused an engine room fire [16]; UKMTO urged vessels to transit with caution and report suspicious activity [6]. UBS notes that dark-transit volumes account for a non-trivial share of flows, adding uncertainty to estimates of actual flows, and that earlier upward revisions had pushed flows close to 12 mn b/d before the latest data fell back to a low [10]. No fresh war-risk premium or freight-rate print appears in this batch.

5. Asset Implications

AssetDirectionHorizonDriverAnchoring fact
Brent cruderange-softdaysSurplus arithmetic and a bearish 2027 curve against a two-chokepoint risk layer that has not yet produced a verified volume loss§1 — Brent $93.90 (−2%) on 11/16, $91.8 (−0.7%) in Asian trade 11/17 [6][9]; §4 — Lloyd’s List traffic under a third of prewar, UBS 10.1 mn b/d [3][10]
Gold / precious metalsrange, firm biasdaysNo metals print in the batch; the bid transmits through escalation of the target set rather than a measured supply event§2 — reported intelligence on Iran developing options against US officials [6]; §3 — second drone attack on Bahrain in three days [6][8]
Global equities / risk sentimentrange-softdaysWar-driven inflation into a midterm-driven political constraint, with energy positioning already crowded§2 — Guterres’ “devastating consequences” warning [8]; §5 note — energy ETF net inflows 17.2% of assets YTD, materials 26.4%, utilities −0.5% [15]
USD / haven currenciesrange-firm biasdaysA security shock (alleged plot, capital relocation) layered on a disinflationary crude print§2 — Bessent’s relocation to military housing after Iranian threats [6]; §1 — crude lower [6][9]
Energy / shipping value chain↑ structuralweeks–monthsSlower transits, dark transits, escort dependence and a second seized chokepoint are contracted costs the flat price does not carry§4 — transit speed slowing on new Iranian tactics [15]; §3 — Bab al-Mandab under Houthi control [1][2]
Refining margins / productstwo-sided / rangeweeks–monthsProduct loadings under a third of normal against diesel prices still drifting lower§4 — product loadings below 1 mn b/d vs a normal above 3 mn b/d [10]; §5 note — diesel prices continuing to move lower [15]

Mechanism read. This is the first session in the series in which the supply-shock and growth-shock mechanisms point the same way for delivered energy and opposite ways for the paper barrel. The physical layer is unambiguous: two chokepoints are simultaneously impaired, one by a permission regime enforced with mines and projectiles (Hormuz) and one by territorial capture (Bab al-Mandab, normally around 12% of global trade with 70–150 ship transits a day) [1][2]; transit speeds are falling; product loadings are below a third of normal; and a third US carrier plus a 13-destroyer Arabian Sea flotilla is the response. That is a cost-structure shock — freight, cover, rerouting and escort dependence — and it is not reversible by any headline. The paper layer is doing something different: it is trading the IEA’s Q4 2026 surplus projection, Goldman’s $88 average for 2027 and $78 by December 2027, and the flow-print noise in UBS’s own note [10][9]. When the same tape contains a hardening physical constraint and a softening forward curve, the correct read is a wider spread between flat price and delivered cost, not a directional call on “oil”.

The second mechanism is that Bab al-Mandab changes the geography of the hedge, not just the risk. The Saudi bypass — the East-West Pipeline to Yanbu — is the system that has been substituting for Hormuz throughput this series, and it terminates on the Red Sea side of exactly the water the Houthis now reportedly control [1][2]; Yanbu loadings were already 2.4 mn b/d over the past week, down from October [10]. If the bypass’s outlet is itself inside a hostile maritime zone, then the market’s implicit assumption that two chokepoints diversify each other fails, and the marginal barrel becomes scarce in precisely the way the forward curve denies. That argues for a firmer skew in freight, war-risk cover and product cracks than in the front month, and it argues against reading a falling Brent print as a de-escalation signal.

6. Contrarian & Watch Signals

  • Contrarian & tail risks: (1) The consensus that underprices most is that chokepoint risk is substitutable — the whole bypass architecture (Yanbu, Fujairah, ship-to-ship transfers) is treated as a diversification, when the Houthi seizure of Bab al-Mandab puts the Red Sea outlet of that architecture inside the same proxy campaign; a market pricing one chokepoint is mispricing a correlated pair. (2) The most credible bear-on-the-blockade argument in the batch is Eurasia Group’s: the presumption that Iran will eventually cave to economic pressure and accept better terms is a misread of the Iranian leadership and its capacity to resist, with intensified disruption of Hormuz shipping expected over the coming year and an expanded US blockade on Iran’s maritime and inland trade routes as the likely response — an escalation ladder, not a squeeze that terminates. (3) The opposite tail is that the reported intelligence on Iranian planning against US officials is characterised as option development rather than evidence of an imminent attack, and an unverified report of this kind can function as a political licence for a strike round that the oil tape is not pricing; CNBC states it cannot verify the report. (4) The Economist’s structural read is the one the trading horizon ignores: fewer battles in 2027 but no peace, with Gulf workarounds for Hormuz making economies more resilient while making the underlying instability more durable by easing the pressure for a settlement — a permanently embedded risk premium with no terminal catalyst. (5) Domestic politics is now a two-sided variable rather than a constraint: the midterm defeat, and Vance’s public break with Trump on the grounds that the war is why the party lost, caps escalation politically but also raises the value of a foreign-policy “win”, while Trump’s hold-off is explicitly conditional on no new attacks from Tehran or the Houthis — a condition the Houthis have been violating on a different front for months. (6) The product complex is splitting against the crude complex: diesel prices continue to move lower even as Gulf product loadings sit below a third of normal — either the product market is genuinely clearing through inventory drawdown, or it is the next place the squeeze reasserts.
  • Key watch signals: Whether any flag state, owner, hull insurer or UKMTO entry names the hulls behind the “four in 24 hours” and “half a dozen since Sunday” counts — without it the counts remain pricing instruments. Whether the 11/17 projectile strike and the 11/16 21:35 UTC disabling report are the same incident or two, which the batch does not resolve. Whether Lloyd’s List’s “less than a third of prewar” assessment is repeated or revised against UBS’s 10.1/12.5 mn b/d prints, and whether next week’s UBS print confirms a November-low trend or reverts toward the near-12 mn b/d level its earlier revisions produced. Whether Houthi control of Bab al-Mandab is followed by any actual interference with transits out of Yanbu — “no threat to maritime traffic” is the Houthi claim, and any Saudi tanker rerouting or suspension falsifies it. Whether Aden falls, the trigger both analysts flag as the regional escalation point. Whether the reported intelligence on Iranian planning produces a US strike package, and whether Pickaxe Mountain shows the activity Trump says Washington is watching for. Whether Trump’s conditional hold-off survives the next Iranian or Houthi attack, and whether the Thursday meeting with Xi Jinping and Putin — cited in weekend reports as a reason to defer action — passes without a strike decision. Whether Brent breaks below $90 or reclaims the $93.90 Monday level, and whether Goldman’s $88 2027 average starts to appear in the front of the curve rather than the back.
  • Source quality control: The kinetic record remains belligerent-authored and single-sourced. The four-tankers-in-24-hours and third-violating-tanker counts rest on Iran’s army navy via Gelonghui and The Paper, flagged single-source, with no flag state, owner, cargo or casualty detail [7][11][13][14]; the “half a dozen since Sunday” figure is the Revolutionary Guard’s navy’s own [3][4][5][8], and its coastline-pollution claim is uncorroborated. The Bahrain drone raid is confirmed only as a launch and interception — Tehran claims six drones at a radar, Bahrain’s military claims destruction of several aerial attacks, and CENTCOM rejects the claim of success [6][8] — so the two sides are describing different outcomes of the same raid. The reported US intelligence on an Iranian plot is relayed from CNN by CNBC, which states it cannot immediately verify the report, and CNN’s own sourcing characterises it as options development rather than an imminent threat [6]; it should not be treated as an established fact about Iranian intentions. UKMTO material is third-party reported and advisory in nature, with no attacker, hull, flag or owner identified, and no damage assessment in the 11/16 21:35 UTC case [16][8]. The flow data conflict by construction and must be quoted with their coverage: UBS’s own note carries two unreconciled totals — 10.1 mn b/d on the combined Hormuz-plus-bypass series and 12.5 mn b/d on the strait-alone-plus-bypass split — is flagged single-source, explicitly warns that dark transits add uncertainty to flow estimates, and has a documented history of upward revision to near 12 mn b/d before reverting [10]; Lloyd’s List’s “less than a third of prewar” is a tracking firm’s assessment [3][4][5] and stands against CNBC’s own characterisation that Hormuz shipments are “recovering” [9], which cannot be averaged with it. Price prints must be carried with their timestamps: $93.90 on 11/16 (−2%) and ~$87 WTI [9], against $91.8 and $85.1 in Asian trading on 11/17 (−0.7%) [6], and the same CNBC file also carries a Wednesday reference to prices rising after two-month lows [9] — an internal inconsistency, not a fresh print. The Economist material is explicitly a 2027 scenario exercise with flagged projections [12]; Jefferies’ note is a secondary compilation of a single analyst report [15]; the IEA surplus and Goldman forecasts are projections, not observations [9]; and the Bremmer, Hopton, al-Basha and Smailes judgements are analyst projections, not reported events [6][1][2].

Appendix: Further Reading

  • [12] The Economist — 2027 outlook: fewer battles, no peace; Hormuz workarounds make Gulf economies resilient and the region’s instability more durable
  • [1] BBC — Yemen deep-dive: how the Houthi advance took the Red Sea coast and Bab al-Mandab, and why Saudi Red Sea exports are exposed
  • [15] Jefferies — transit speeds slowing on new Iranian attack tactics; inventory path to mid-2027 under a logistics-constrained scenario
  • [17] Gelonghui — Razan Hilal’s two oil scenarios: sharp fall toward pre-war levels if risk eases, continued short-term rebound if it persists

This report is intelligence & mechanism analysis, not investment advice.

30-day review of this series 10/15 – 11/14
  • Diplomacy to denial: The arc began with Qatari-mediated bridge texts and a conditional two-day Hormuz reopening, then reversed into mutual denial — Tehran demanding seven conditions while Washington declared a deal unnecessary, removing the de-escalation branch that earlier price action had been built on.

  • Claims to corroboration: Iranian mine-claim streams dominated late October, but the record shifted once Reuters-verified footage showed the Navig8 Messi ablaze and UKMTO logs accumulated, converting belligerent assertions into a measurable attack tempo that set new monthly highs.

  • Barrel to logistics: The binding constraint migrated from crude availability to freight, insurance and refined products, with the IMO declining to certify mine clearance and cover costs settling near ten times pre-war levels even as crude flows partly recovered.

  • Proxy front widening: Houthi strikes progressed from Saudi airports to Aramco’s Riyadh building, the East-West pipeline and Yanbu, moving the threat from symbolic targets toward the bypass infrastructure meant to substitute for Hormuz.

  • Price versus mechanism: Brent traced a $118-to-sub-$90 round trip and back toward $96 on alternating deal and strike headlines, while outbound tanker counts fell to an eight-per-day average and regional exports ran near three-quarters of pre-war levels.

Sources17

  1. Houthi rebel advance in Yemen may further destabilise global economy BBC Score 65
  2. Houthi rebel advance in Yemen may further destabilise global economy BBC Score 65
  3. Third US aircraft carrier arrives in the Middle East as Trump keeps options open in the Iran war Seattle Times Score 66
  4. Third U.S. aircraft carrier arrives in the Middle East as Trump keeps options open in the Iran war LA Times Score 66
  5. Third US aircraft carrier brings thousands more troops to Middle East The Guardian Score 65
  6. Third U.S. carrier arrives, stoking concerns about renewed conflicts with Iran CNBC Score 71
  7. 伊朗称一油轮在霍尔木兹海峡触雷起火,已是24小时内第四艘 澎湃新闻 Score 68
  8. Iran warns sixth oil tanker in Strait of Hormuz struck as regional tensions escalate The Independent Score 69
  9. U.S. crude oil declines to $87 a barrel on recovering Middle East exports CNBC Score 69
  10. 霍尔木兹追踪:第259-261天:中美俄会议前局势相似 外资研报 Score 74
  11. 伊朗称一油轮在霍尔木兹海峡触雷起火 已是24小时内第四艘 格隆汇快讯 Score 70
  12. There will be less war in the Middle East in 2027 -- but little real peace The Economist Score 66
  13. 格隆汇11月17日|据伊通社(IRNA):伊朗海军称,一艘油轮在霍尔木兹海峡触雷起火,这是过去24小时内第四艘受影响船只。 格隆汇快讯 Score 66
  14. 伊朗军队称24小时内第三艘油轮在霍尔木兹海峡触雷起火 格隆汇快讯 Score 65
  15. 上周值得关注的10张图表 外资研报 Score 67
  16. UKMTO: Third party reported attack involving tanker transiting Strait of Hormuz, disabling the vessel and resulting in an engine room fire Twitter·财经快讯 Score 66
  17. 原油本周开局走低,市场消化全球供应转为过剩的预期 格隆汇快讯 Score 66