Iran widens strikes to Kuwait and Bahrain as Morgan Stanley puts Gulf crude at 70% of normal and Brent holds near $92
The kinetic layer widened geographically — Iran hit the Ali Al Salem air base in Kuwait and Bahrain again on 11/18 in retaliation for a US strike on Qeshm Island, while the Houthis completed their recapture of Bab al-Mandab — but the flat price traded the physical surplus instead, with Morgan Stanley's tracker #120 putting Gulf crude exports at about 70% of pre-war and products at 39% and LSEG saying normalisation at Hormuz is "still not possible under current conditions" .
0. Weekly Arc
The week ran from a contested premium to a surplus trade with a widening war behind it. Brent slid from the $96 area on 11/13 to roughly $92 by 11/17 even as Iran struck US facilities in Bahrain twice and the US kept three carriers in theatre; 11/16–11/17 produced the sharpest transit-data conflict of the series, with a wire “near pre-war” read set against tracking firms at under a third of normal, and the Houthis reported in control of Bab al-Mandab. 11/18–11/19 adds a third Gulf state to Iran’s target set while the flat price stays anchored on inventory builds and a Fed hike path.
1. Situation Overview
The past ~24 hours are an escalation in geography set against a further shift of oil pricing toward fundamentals. Iran widened its attacks on Gulf neighbours on 11/18, striking the Ali Al Salem air base in Kuwait with missiles and drones aimed at air-defence systems and launch platforms and mounting several attacks on Bahrain, in what appeared to be retaliation for the US strike the day before [1]; Kuwait’s air defences intercepted drone attacks without immediate damage reports, Bahrain said it intercepted a number of attacks, and it was Tehran’s first attack on Kuwait since September [1][2][3]. That followed a US fighter-jet strike on a Revolutionary Guard missile launch site on Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz on 11/17, itself retaliation for an Iranian attack on an American radar installation in Bahrain earlier that day [1][2][3]. Yemen’s Houthis recaptured the Bab el-Mandeb strait from Saudi-backed forces this week, are advancing on Aden and besieging Taiz, and on 11/17 launched five drones toward two pumping stations on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, the bypass route for Hormuz [2][3]. The physical and macro data kept pointing the other way: front-month Brent rose to $92.25 with WTI slipping to $83.21 [4], after Brent settled 1.28% lower at $91.95 and WTI 3.2% lower at $83.26 on 11/18, both on track for roughly 20% declines this month [3], against a 3.4 mn-barrel US crude build versus a 58,000-barrel expected rise [5][3] and Fed minutes that reinforced expectations of a December rate hike [5].
2. Key Parties’ Positions
- [NEW] Negotiation progress: The mediated track is alive but thin. Talks continued between Iran and mediators from Oman and Qatar even as attacks on ships intensified [3], and markets are awaiting a trilateral summit of the US, Chinese and Russian leaders for clues on prospects for a negotiated end to the US–Iran war [5]. Vice-President JD Vance said on 11/16 that the United States will not let the conflict become another forever war “or even a two-year commitment,” but gave no end date and his pledge covers only US involvement, not the wider conflict, while also saying the president is weighing more military and diplomatic pressure on Iran [2]. On the other side of the ledger, Saudi officials assume their conflict with the Iran-backed Houthis could stretch well into next year, with two Western officials briefed by Saudi officials telling Reuters the war may last up to six months; the Saudi Foreign Ministry declined to comment [2][3].
- [ESCALATED] US / main pressuring party: Washington’s messaging remains two-track. President Donald Trump has said new strikes are highly unlikely while simultaneously sending a third aircraft carrier and thousands more troops to the Middle East [1], predicted the war would end fairly soon, and also said the United States no longer needs a deal with Iran [2]; thus far he has resisted his ally’s push for US strikes on the Houthis [1]. Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao, testifying on 11/17 before a Senate committee on damage to the Navy’s regional headquarters in Bahrain, said he could not offer a full damage assessment because “it’s a nonpermissive area for us to go,” and told a reporter months ago that Iran “blew the hell out of Bahrain” [1]. Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry condemned the repeated Iranian attacks as “criminal,” saying they threatened the country’s security and stability [1].
- [ESCALATED] Iran / counterparty: Tehran frames the widening strikes as counter-escalation. Iran said its recent attacks — including those on other US facilities in Bahrain on Sunday and Friday — were a response to US drone surveillance operations and an attack on Iranian communications towers [1], and its navy said three oil tankers sailing east of the Strait of Hormuz were disabled by mines, per Iranian media on 11/18 [5].
- [NEW] Israel: Israel appears through the command channel rather than through a statement of its own: the commander of US Central Command, Adm. Brad Cooper, met in Tel Aviv on 11/18 with Israel’s military chief of staff Eyal Zamir and Mossad director Roman Gofman [1].
3. Military Actions
- [ESCALATED] US: A US fighter jet struck a Revolutionary Guard missile launch site on Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz on 11/17, in retaliation for an Iranian attack on an American radar installation in Bahrain earlier that day [1][2][3].
- [ESCALATED] Iran: Iran widened its attacks on Gulf neighbours on 11/18, firing at air-defence systems and drone and missile launch platforms at the Ali Al Salem air base in Kuwait per Iran’s state broadcaster [1]; Kuwait’s military said its air defences intercepted drone attacks and did not immediately report damage [1], and this was Tehran’s first attack on the US-allied Gulf state since September [2][3]. Bahrain’s military said it intercepted a number of attacks from Iran after two shelter alerts and an all clear, giving no information on damage or casualties [1], and Bahrain says it has now intercepted Iranian attacks three times in a week [2]. An Associated Press analysis found Ali Al Salem has been struck at least 30 times during the war, damaging or destroying at least 15 aircraft hangars, numerous warehouses and 10 buildings near a residential area, and that through August more than 115 drone or missile strikes claimed by Iran or Iranian-backed militias damaged or destroyed structures on 26 military bases and other sites with US equipment, with early-warning systems targeted first and billions of dollars in equipment damage [1]. The US military did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the latest attacks [1].
- [ESCALATED] Proxies (Houthis): The Houthis recaptured the Bab el-Mandeb strait from Saudi-backed forces this week and have advanced against the internationally recognised government in Aden, are besieging Taiz, and have attacked Saudi airports and oil infrastructure and fired on ships in the Red Sea [2]; they control a significant swath of Yemen including Sanaa and have made territorial gains along the Red Sea coast [1]. On 11/17 they said they launched five drones toward two pumping stations along Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, which has been used to bypass the Strait of Hormuz [3].
4. Strait of Hormuz Transit Status
- [ESCALATED] Control-status change: The regime is blockade-plus-escort, contested by attack. Iran’s economy is suffering under a US naval blockade while American military escorts help restore tanker passages through the strait [1], yet Iran has continued to attack tankers as they attempt to transit despite that protection [1]. LSEG analysts said that “although regional supply may continue to recover through alternative routes, the latest vessel data suggests that normalization of flows through Hormuz is still not possible under current conditions” [3][6], and Iraq is still moving oil overland via Syria, indicating its exports have not returned to pre-war levels [6].
- [ESCALATED] Transit data: Morgan Stanley’s tracker #120 (week ended 11/15) said “Middle East crude exports were preliminarily estimated at only 12.2 mb/d, roughly 70% of the pre-war normal level, while refined product flows were weaker still at about 39% of normal” [7]; the prior week was revised up by 3 mn b/d to 16.9 mn b/d against a pre-war normal of about 18 mn b/d [7]. Vortexa data cited in the same note put the 7-day moving average of departing vessels — oil tankers, LPG and LNG carriers included — at 8 per day, down week-on-week, with a single-day peak of 15 on 11/11 against a pre-war norm of about 35 per day, and the vessel mix skewed toward VLCCs carrying crude while the small product tanker share declined [7]. Oil-on-water in the Middle East Gulf behind the strait rose to 181 mn barrels, driven mainly by a 2.2 mn-barrel crude build [7]. Separately, satellite and ship-tracking data suggest possibly only two LNG carriers left the strait in the past week [8]. This stands against Reuters’ statement that crude shipments through the Strait of Hormuz have returned to roughly pre-war levels [5].
- [ESCALATED] Shipping / insurance signals: The cost layer remains extreme. War-risk quotes for Hormuz run at 6% to 9% of ship value, with ports farther south reaching 7% [2]; a week’s cover could cost about $3 million from Yanbu and $7 million from the southern ports or Hormuz, against at least $100,000 before the war [2], and a quote for a tanker loading at Yanbu had already reached about 3% of ship value in September versus less than 1% in early July [2]. Casualties reached a named operator: ADNOC L&S of the UAE said one crew member was missing and 11 injured after one of its vessels was attacked in the strait on 11/18, with the injured receiving medical care [3][1], and an LPG tanker was struck by a projectile off the coast of Oman on 11/17, prompting its crew to evacuate [3]. On the other side, shipping rates have plummeted, which CNBC read as a signal of rising exports from the Middle East [3].
5. Asset Implications
| Asset | Direction | Horizon | Driver | Anchoring fact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brent crude | range-soft | days–weeks | Inventory builds, a December Fed hike path and an IEA surplus against a widening but non-volume war | §1 — Brent $92.25 / $92.12 GMT vs a $91.95 settle (−1.28%) [4][5][3]; §4 — crude exports ~70% of normal [7] |
| Gold / precious metals | range, firm bias | days | No metals print in the batch; the bid transmits through strike-range expansion across three Gulf states rather than a measured supply loss | §1 — Kuwait and Bahrain attacks [1]; §3 — Qeshm retaliation cycle [1][2] |
| Global equities / risk sentiment | range-soft | days | Pricing logic rotating from geopolitical premium to fundamentals, with a rate-hike overhang | §1 — Fed October minutes lifted December hike odds [5]; §5 note — “deep shift in pricing logic” [6] |
| USD / haven currencies | firm bias | days | Fed hike expectations (and the debate over size) support the dollar and cap any oil rally | §1 — PVM: softer oil relieves inflation but the question is “by how much,” supporting the dollar and hindering a rally [5] |
| Energy / shipping value chain | ↑ structural | weeks–months | War-risk cover at 6–9% of hull value and a second captured chokepoint are contracted costs the flat price does not carry | §4 — $7 mn/week cover from Hormuz vs $100,000 pre-war [2]; §3 — Bab al-Mandeb recaptured [2] |
| Refining margins / products | ↑ firm | weeks–months | Product flows at ~39% of normal and an LNG carrier count near two a week as northern-hemisphere winter begins | §4 — products at 39%, VLCC-skewed mix [7]; possible two LNG carriers in a week [8] |
Mechanism read. This is a supply-shock tape being traded as a demand-and-inventory tape. The physical layer is now worse than the flat price implies: crude at roughly 70% of pre-war, products at 39%, vessel departures at 8 a day against a 35-a-day norm, and only perhaps two LNG carriers out of the strait in a week as winter heating demand arrives [8][7]. The paper layer is doing something else entirely — a 3.4 mn-barrel US crude build against a 58,000-barrel expected rise, a 5.2 mn-barrel gasoline build, distillates at 104.9 mn barrels, record US output, and IEA demand revised down 2.7 mn b/d year-on-year to 102.3 mn b/d with Q4 2026 supply exceeding demand by 1.7 mn b/d [5][6][3]. When the deliverable barrel is scarce but the priced barrel is long, the spread between flat price and delivered cost widens rather than the flat price rising, and the war-risk ledger — 6–9% of hull value, $7 mn a week from Hormuz against $100,000 before the war — is where that spread is actually collected [2].
The second mechanism is that the war has moved from volumes to reputational capital, and that is a slower, stickier shock. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook says the Iran war has permanently changed the global energy system, that Hormuz’s reputation as a reliable corridor has suffered a fundamental blow, and models Hormuz flows falling below 2 mn b/d by 2035 from about 20 mn if the passage stays severely disrupted [9][10]. That is not tradeable in the front month, but it is the reason bypass economics — Yanbu and Fujairah at about 3.0 mn b/d each — cannot fully replace normal Hormuz throughput [7] and why the marginal barrel carries a term premium even on days when Brent fades. The mirror risk is positioning: Brent is still about $22 a barrel above pre-war levels and has fallen 21% this month with short positions heavily accumulated, so a confirmed tanker sinking or a fresh supply interruption would trigger short covering disproportionate to the underlying fundamentals [6]. ING makes the symmetric point — further Hormuz disruption remains an important upside risk even as supply recovery loosens the balance and limits sustained rebounds [6].
6. Contrarian & Watch Signals
- Contrarian & tail risks: (1) The consensus being priced is that the war is a fading premium; the falsifier is that the same 24 hours produced a new Gulf state in Iran’s target set, a US strike on Qeshm, a Houthi recapture of Bab el-Mandeb and two named-vessel casualty events — an accumulation that Hamidreza Azizi of the International Crisis Group argues raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation beyond what either side intended. (2) Danny Citrinowicz’s read of Iran’s intent is the most useful frame in the batch: “The objective is not necessarily to trigger an all-out war, but to steadily increase the military, economic, and political costs of maintaining the blockade,” with Washington trapped between a limited response that invites further pushes and a stronger one that accelerates escalation, and only two exits — a negotiated agreement or a US decision to lift the blockade. (3) The most under-priced asymmetry is short crowding: with shorts heavily accumulated and Brent still $22 above pre-war, a confirmed sinking in Hormuz would trigger covering that “could far exceed what fundamentals can support.” (4) The physical-versus-paper gap is the structural trade: products at 39% of normal and LNG departures near two a week into winter are a delivered-cost problem the crude curve does not express, and Morgan Stanley itself flags product shortage risk as potentially higher than for crude. (5) QatarEnergy chief Saad al-Kaabi’s line — “if the Strait of Hormuz closes again, prices will spike” — is the cleanest statement of the tail the surplus arithmetic ignores. (6) The bear case is equally live: Gelber & Associates argues shipping risk has provided only limited support against a growing surplus expectation, and the pricing-logic shift toward fundamentals is being described as a regime change rather than a dip. (7) The second-order fiscal effect is now visible in Saudi planning — a war expected to run into next year, an airport largely closed since October, schools shut and flagship events postponed — which is demand destruction inside the region that funds the export side.
- Key watch signals: Whether Brent holds the ~$92 area or breaks back below $90, the level that framed the August 26 WTI low referenced in the selloff; whether WTI’s steeper correction (Sparta Commodities’ June Goh: “WTI arbitrage trades have been shut to Asia and Northwest Europe, thus WTI correcting more than Brent is the expected price movement to allow the arbitrage window to open again”) continues to widen the Brent/WTI spread beyond its two-week high. Whether a flag state, hull insurer, owner or UKMTO entry corroborates Iran’s three-tanker mine claim east of the strait — still absent. Whether Morgan Stanley’s 70%-of-normal crude and 39% product prints are revised as sharply as last week’s +3 mn b/d revision, which would say the tracker is too noisy to trade. Whether Reuters’ “roughly pre-war” crude-shipment characterisation is repeated or contradicted by the next flow print — the cleanest falsifier of the surplus trade. Whether the Houthi advance on Aden converts into an assault, and whether the East-West pipeline pumping stations hit on 11/17 produce loading losses at Yanbu. Whether the US–China–Russia trilateral summit delivers any negotiated path. Whether the Fed delivers the December hike and at what size. And whether Polymarket’s roughly 70% odds of two strike-free weeks by 12/31/2026 — down about 11 percentage points in a week — keep deteriorating, remembering these are bets, not expert forecasts.
- Source quality control: The transit numbers conflict by construction and must be carried with their coverage. Morgan Stanley’s #120 is a primary tracker but preliminarily estimated and demonstrably revision-prone (the prior week was revised up 3 mn b/d), and its own note is internally inconsistent on the oil-on-water build: the English fact line reads 2.9 mn barrels week-on-week to 181 mn barrels while the underlying Chinese text reads 2,900万桶 (29 mn), so the magnitude should not be traded [7]. Reuters’ statement that crude shipments through Hormuz “have returned to roughly pre-war levels” stands directly against Morgan Stanley’s ~70% and LSEG’s “normalization … still not possible,” and cannot be averaged with either [5][7][6][3]. The IEA’s 2035 Hormuz projection and its two post-war pathways are explicitly modelled projections, not observations [9][10], and the 1.7 mn b/d Q4 surplus and the −2.7 mn b/d demand revision are forecasts [6]. The kinetic record is again belligerent-authored in part: the three-tanker mine claim rests on Iran’s navy via Iranian media with no flag, owner or casualty detail [5], and Iran’s retaliation rationale (US drone surveillance and an attack on communications towers) is Tehran’s own account [1]. The Kuwait and Bahrain damage picture is one-sided — Kuwait and Bahrain confirm only that they intercepted, with no damage or casualty detail, and the US military did not respond to requests for comment [1]. The AP base-damage tallies are third-party analysis through August, not current battle-damage assessments [1]. The Saudi “up to six months” figure rests on two unnamed Western officials briefed by Saudi officials, is single-source and is a projection; the Saudi Foreign Ministry declined to comment [2][3]. Trump’s mixed messaging and his “war will end fairly soon” prediction are paraphrases, not transcripts [1][2]. The Citrinowicz and Azizi judgements are analyst projections [1]. Polymarket odds are gambling prices, and the Reuters piece itself states they are bets, not expert forecasts [2]. Price prints must carry their windows: $92.25 Brent and $83.21 WTI (WSJ, 11/19), $92.12 and $83.17 at 02:37 GMT (Reuters), and the 11/18 settles of $91.95 and $83.26 — different snapshots, not contradictions [4][5][3]. The shipping-rate “plummeting” signal and the “rising exports” inference built on it are CNBC’s characterisation [3].
Appendix: Further Reading
- [9] WSJ — Hormuz confidence shattered; IEA sees strait flows potentially under 2 mn b/d by 2035 from about 20 mn
- [10] Jin10 / World Energy Outlook — the Iran war has permanently changed the global energy system; two post-war pathways modelled
- [8] Jin10 — satellite and ship-tracking data suggest possibly only two LNG carriers left the strait in the past week as winter gas risk returns
- [6] Wall Street View — pricing logic shifting from geopolitical premium to supply-demand fundamentals, with short-covering risk on a confirmed Hormuz sinking
This report is intelligence & mechanism analysis, not investment advice.
30-day review of this series 10/22 – 11/21
- Physical recovery outran the war: Trans-Hormuz and bypass flows moved from the war’s sub-1 mb/d nadir and conflicting ~70%-of-normal reads in mid-November to the IEA’s ~90% of pre-conflict levels excluding Iran by 11/20, even as tanker-mine claims continued.
- Diplomacy cycled from bridge text to symbolic declaration: Qatari two-day proposals and Iran’s seven conditions gave way to stalemate, then to a Trump–Xi–Putin “peace declaration” that added headlines but no ratified mechanism.
- Hormuz control shifted from contested lanes to a codified permission regime: The US-escorted southern route and IRGC “unauthorized route” claims hardened into Iran’s three-part rule—advance coordination, approved routes, transponders on—enforced by mines and warnings.
- Escalation migrated to proxies and Gulf hosts: Attacks widened from Kuwait and Bahrain to Houthi strikes on Saudi infrastructure and Riyadh’s tallest tower, while Bab al-Mandab fell under Houthi control and mediation pressure grew.
- Cost structure outlasted the flat-price premium: Freight and war-risk cover remained near 10x normal and products/LNG lagged crude’s recovery, so Brent’s slide from late-October highs near $118 to about $92 by 11/20 did not normalise delivered costs.
- Force posture and tail pricing diverged from the tape: A third carrier and strike-window speculation gave way to carrier rotation, basing dispersal and an unexplained post-January-1 reference, leaving tail risk priced more in freight, options and products than in crude.
Sources10
- Iran widens Gulf attacks by targeting a U.S. air base in Kuwait and sites in Bahrain
- NEWSLETTER: Gulf conflict end date? Depends on who you ask
- Oil prices tumble as traders weigh surplus supply outlook
- Oil Prices Mixed as Traders Weigh Supply Outlook, Middle East Shipping Risks
- Oil prices steady as supply surplus softens sentiment though Gulf war supports
- 油价延续下跌:美国原油库存连续第二周增加,产量创历史新高,市场定价转向供需
- 霍尔木兹海峡与曼德海峡 - 周度追踪 #120
- 霍尔木兹海峡近期袭击事件增多,卫星及船舶追踪数据显示,过去一周驶离海峡的LNG运输船可能仅有两艘。随着北半球进入冬季,天然气供应风险再次受到关注。点击查...
- The Iran War Could Permanently Slash Reliance on Hormuz, IEA Says
- 最新《世界能源展望》报告警告,伊朗战争已永久改变全球能源体系,霍尔木兹海峡作为可靠能源通道的声誉遭受根本性冲击。最新报告模拟了战争后的两种能源发展路径...