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Strait of Hormuz Tracker

Houthis press on Bab el-Mandeb as Brent logs its first weekly close above $100 since mid-May

Escalation broadened to a second chokepoint — the Houthis took Yemen's Red Sea port of Mokha and pushed toward the Bab el-Mandeb, helping drive Brent to an intraday $108.42 and US diesel above $6 a gallon for the first time ever — but two counter-signals appeared: a Gulf–Iran foreign-ministers meeting set for Salalah on Sept 14 and a Houthi announcement that fighting on Yemen's western Red Sea coast has stopped .

34 sources ~45 min

0. Weekly Arc

After the Sep 5 US strikes on three Iranian tankers capped a week of intensifying US–Iran maritime attacks, the arc ran one way: Iran declared a Chabahar-to-Arabian-Sea “sanctioned area,” the Houthis captured Mocha on Sep 10 and pushed toward the Bab el-Mandeb, and Brent broke $100, then $107, capping Friday with its first weekly close above $100 since mid-May. Sep 11 delivered the first genuine counter-signals — a Gulf–Iran foreign-ministers meeting scheduled for Salalah on Sep 14 and a Houthi ceasefire declaration on Yemen’s western coast — against a still-tightening physical picture.

1. Situation Overview

The past ~24 hours are a continued escalation on the physical and price layers, with the first diplomatic and proxy de-escalation signals emerging alongside it. The Houthis seized Yemen’s Red Sea port of Mokha on Thursday, a city about 75 km north of the Bab el-Mandeb [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]; Yemeni government sources said the group also reached the Hanish Islands while Saudi-backed forces withdrew south toward Dhubab [4]. Attacks from Yemen on Saudi energy facilities are being read as an escalation beyond Iran and the Strait of Hormuz [9]. Prices confirmed the widening: Brent settled up $6.42 (+6.34%) at $107.63 for November and WTI up $6.43 (+6.69%) at $102.48 for October, both their highest since May 19 and the largest single-day gains in nearly two months [10][11]; Brent spiked as high as $108.42 intraday [10], briefly pushed above $110 [12], and both benchmarks were on track to close the week above $100 for the first time since mid-May with weekly gains near 13%, the steepest since the week ended July 17 [1][9]. By 0045 GMT Friday Brent was $108.68 (+1%) and WTI $103.45 (+1%) [9], before easing in early European trade — Brent November 2.1% lower at $105.37 and WTI October 1.7% lower at $100.76 [1][13]. The IEA said global oil supply and demand will fall further than previously thought this year, with a return of normal Middle East flows delayed into 2027 [14][15]. Against that, Gulf foreign ministers plan to meet Iran’s foreign minister in Salalah on Sept 14 to seek a temporary Hormuz shipping arrangement [15][16][17], and the Houthi Supreme Political Council said fighting on the western Red Sea coast has stopped [16]. Net characterization: escalating — the shock now spans both chokepoints — with nascent, unverified de-escalation overtures [16][4][18].

2. Key Parties’ Positions

  • [NEW] Negotiation progress: Gulf Cooperation Council foreign ministers plan to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi on Monday Sept 14 in the Omani coastal city of Salalah — the first meeting between senior GCC diplomats and senior Iranian officials since the US and Israel launched war in February — in an Oman-led push to win support for a temporary agreement regulating commercial ship passage through the Strait of Hormuz [15][16][17]. One informed person said meeting details are not final but multiple countries have confirmed attendance [16]. Per Wallstreetcn, the US has told mediators it will not return to the June memorandum of understanding and insists on a more comprehensive deal covering nuclear issues, while Iran insists that even with an Oman agreement it will allow full reopening only after Washington lifts the blockade on its ports, restores the exemption allowing it to sell oil, and permits use of part of its frozen overseas assets [16]. Diplomats caution the strait cannot fully reopen unless the US and Iran agree a deal [15][17]. Qatar reportedly sent a delegation to Tehran twice last week [16], and Iran’s Araqchi discussed de-escalation with Pakistani army chief Asim Munir [15]. Separately, the Houthi Supreme Political Council said fighting in Yemen’s western Red Sea coast provinces has stopped, called for pressure on Saudi Arabia to halt reinforcements to sensitive areas, and said Saudi forces mobilized against Yemen-related areas have been expelled [16]; Saudi Arabia had not responded as of publication [16].
  • [ESCALATED] US / main pressuring party: Washington declined a direct strike request. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called President Trump twice on Thursday urging US strikes on the Houthis as they closed on a vital Red Sea chokepoint; Trump declined, and a US official said the administration will instead provide Saudi Arabia with intelligence on the Houthis and targeting data [15][19][3]. A senior administration official said: “The United States is focused on protecting our core national security interests — such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea — while empowering our regional partners to take the lead in managing and resolving regional security challenges” [4]. Trump said the Iran war “ends right after the election,” adding in separate remarks that it could end before the midterms and will not last through the rest of his term [15], and argued Tehran is trying to influence November’s vote [20]. He also warned the US may hit Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain, near the damaged Natanz enrichment site [9]. Roughly 200 US military personnel are in Saudi Arabia providing non-kinetic support [3].
  • [ESCALATED] Iran / counterparty: Iran’s IRGC Navy commander said the Strait of Hormuz “has been blockaded by Iran” and is under “intelligence monitoring and smart control,” warning any hostile action will be struck [21]; the IRGC statement, relayed by state broadcaster IRIB, said the strait is “blocked and under our intelligent control and information dominance,” and that “any hostile presence in this strategic Strait will be targeted” [22]. The Revolutionary Guards separately warned they would sharply escalate their response to further attacks [20]. Iranian MP Amir Hayat-Moqaddam said the US blockade would be broken in a short time and that US vessels anywhere in the region could be targeted by Iranian missiles and drones, with Iran’s strategy shifted from a proportional to a deterrent and offensive response [15] (single source / unverified). Iran publicly denies directing Houthi operations [4].
  • [ONGOING] Israel: No update in the past 24h.

3. Military Actions

  • [ESCALATED] Proxies (Houthis / Red Sea front): The Houthis seized Mokha on Yemen’s Red Sea coast on Thursday [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]; Yemeni government sources said they also reached the Hanish Islands as Saudi-backed forces withdrew south toward Dhubab [4]. CNBC could not independently confirm the capture [1]. The advance followed the Houthis’ largest wave of direct attacks on Saudi territory since March 2022 on Sept 8 — dozens of drones and ballistic missiles toward Abha, Jizan, Najran and Khamis Mushait, injuring 73 people [4]; the Saudi Energy Ministry said strikes on oil facilities sparked fires that halted operations on Tuesday, and Saudi Arabia said more than 70 people were wounded [2]. The Houthis said the attacks responded to dozens of Saudi airstrikes, including one that killed civilians at a prison [2]. ACLED described it as the most serious escalation between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed camp since hostilities resumed in mid-July, recording at least 276 fatalities between Sept 3 and Sept 7 across al-Dali, al-Bayda, Marib, Shabwa, al-Jawf, al-Hudayda and Taizz [4][18], with at least 18,500 people displaced, per the UN’s International Organization for Migration [2]. Single-source / unverified: satellite imagery and fire-detection data raising questions over whether the Houthis struck Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline (no independent confirmation the pipeline itself was hit) [15]; and a local Yemeni government official telling AFP that the Houthis seized Mayun Island and completed control of the Bab el-Mandeb [15].
  • [ESCALATED] Saudi Arabia (Yemen front): Saudi forces launched at least 15 strikes against the Houthis between Sept 3 and Sept 7, mostly around Taizz — the highest number since Riyadh resumed military engagement in July [4] — and as many as 40 airstrikes on Houthi targets on Thursday [18]. The Houthis claimed the Saudi air force carried out 64 airstrikes in 24 hours on Taiz, Hodeidah, Marib and Jawf provinces and that they intercepted a combat formation over Taiz with surface-to-air missiles [10] (single source / unverified).
  • [ONGOING] US: The previously reported destruction of five Iranian oil tankers remains the confirmed core of US action [9].
  • [ONGOING] Iran: Iran said it attacked 10 ships near the strait on Wednesday [9] and continues targeting tankers in the Persian Gulf [23].

4. Strait of Hormuz Transit Status

  • [ESCALATED] Control-status change: The IRGC Navy commander’s declaration that Hormuz “has been blockaded by Iran” and is under “intelligence monitoring and smart control” formalizes the control claim first made as a “sanctioned area” [21][22]. Reuters’ Ron Bousso argues the battle for control of Hormuz has entered a dangerous new phase, with US demining operations and an expanding US-protected shipping corridor along Oman’s coastline enabling more vessels to enter and leave the Gulf — and with growing signs Tehran’s grip over Hormuz may be weakening after months of exchanges degraded its radar network and strike capabilities [20]. On the second chokepoint, the Houthi drive toward the Bab el-Mandeb poses what Hisham Al-Omeisy of the European Institute of Peace called a linked threat: “Now you have Iran on one side of the Arabian Peninsula controlling Hormuz, and now the Houthis controlling Bab el-Mandeb on the other side of the peninsula” [4]. Yemeni government sources told Reuters control of Dhubab and Perim would be critical to a stronger hold over the strait [4].
  • [ESCALATED] Transit data: Vessel transits at Hormuz fell to seven on Thursday from 11 the previous day, per preliminary ship-tracking data, well below the 10-day average of 15 [15]. Twelve ships passed through the strait on Wednesday, compared with more than 130 before the war [23], and traffic remains at just a fraction of pre-war levels [23], with ING noting flows remain well below pre-war [1]. The EIA put Hormuz flows at 4.9 million b/d in Q2 2026, down from 21.6 million b/d [4]. Bloomberg reported at least 1 million b/d of oil products still moving through Hormuz — a recovery pace too slow to prevent the fuel-price surge [24]. Per Kpler figures compiled by Homayoun Falakshahi: Iran’s oil exports fell from 1.85 million b/d last spring to around 255,000 b/d in August; non-Iranian exports rose from 300,000 b/d at the height of the war to 8.4 million b/d in September, or 10.8 million b/d including alternative routes, against roughly 14 million b/d pre-war [25][26]. Saudi oil passing the Bab el-Mandeb bound for Asia plunged from about 3.4 million b/d in June to 128,000 b/d in August, recovering slightly to some 700,000 b/d in September [25][26]. Crude and petroleum liquids moving through the Bab el-Mandeb averaged 8.1 million b/d in Q2 2026, up from 5.4 million b/d in Q4 2025 [4].
  • [ESCALATED] Shipping / insurance signals: Houthi attacks have forced Saudi Arabia onto a much longer and costlier route through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean and around Africa to reach Asian buyers, with Saudi tankers running a gauntlet past the Bab el-Mandeb [2]; Suez Canal traffic was up 28% in July–August versus last year, driven largely by rerouted tankers [23]. Saudi Arabia exported just 3.2 million b/d last month, its lowest in more than a decade, down from 4.7 million b/d in July [2][23]. Gulf Arab producers face growing budget deficits, in part due to attacks on ships in the strait [2]. Peter Sand of Xeneta said the threat to the southern Red Sea near Yemen is real: “The threat is real, and that’s why they keep shying away” [23]. No specific insurance-premium prints appeared in this batch.

5. Asset Implications

AssetDirectionHorizonDriverAnchoring fact
Brent crude↑ then range-firm above $100 (intraday ↓)days–weeksSupply shock: second chokepoint threatened simultaneously; first weekly close above $100 since mid-May§1 prices (settle $107.63; high $108.42); §4 Bab el-Mandeb
WTI crude↑ then range-firm (intraday ↓)daysMirrors Brent; first close above $100 since late May§1 ($102.48 settle; $103.45 at 0045 GMT)
Refined products (diesel / gasoline)↑↑days–weeksRecord US diesel above $6/gal; Middle East and Russian refinery losses; product flows still only ~1 million b/d§1 diesel/gasoline prints; §4 product-flow data
Gold / precious metals↑ (firm)daysHaven bid plus inflation-hedge demand; spot gold +1% to $4,357.59§1 escalation tape; §5 macro channel
Global equities / risk sentiment↓ (mixed, regionally split)daysRate-led de-rating from energy-driven inflation; Asia down ~2% while US futures pointed higher§5 rates/equity prints
USD / haven currencies→ (firm bias)daysOil-inflation channel keeps policy tightening risk alive; long-bond yields at multi-decade highs in the UK and multi-year highs in the US§5 bond-yield prints
Energy / shipping value chain↑↑weeks–monthsTwo chokepoints threatened at once, Suez rerouting +28%, Saudi exports at a decade low§4 shipping signals

Mechanism read: This is still a pure supply-shock tape, but the shock now has two physical legs operating as complements in risk rather than substitutes. The Hormuz leg remains impaired and formally contested — Iran claims it is “blockaded” and under “intelligent control,” while Washington’s demining and an Oman-coast corridor have let more vessels through, which is why the two sides’ descriptions of the same waterway diverge so sharply. The second leg is the Bab el-Mandeb: the Houthi capture of Mokha, the push toward Dhubab and Perim, and attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure strike precisely the route Riyadh adopted to bypass Hormuz, which is why Saudi exports fell to a decade-low 3.2 million b/d and why Suez traffic jumped 28%. The binding constraint remains products rather than crude: diesel above $6 a gallon for the first time ever, US gasoline up 44% since the war began, and only about 1 million b/d of oil products still moving through Hormuz.

The demand and policy channel is now the counterweight, and it is tightening. The IEA cut its supply-and-demand outlook and pushed a normalisation of Middle East flows into 2027; OPEC lowered its 2026 demand-growth forecast for a fifth straight month, to 380,000 b/d, while OPEC output fell 640,000 b/d in August. Higher oil is being transmitted into policy and consumer prices rather than being absorbed: UK gas rose above 200p a therm for the first time since end-2022 with European storage well below seasonal norms, UK 10-year gilt yields hit their highest since 2007 and 20–30-year yields levels unseen since 1998, the US 10-year Treasury yield jumped to 4.9%, and the ECB was expected to raise rates for the second time this year. Second-order pass-through is visible in food costs — fuel accounts for as much as 30% of US food costs — and in China, which will raise gasoline and diesel prices on Sept 12 under temporary controls, while at least two Asian refiners have asked Saudi Aramco to switch their long-term contract pricing basis to ICE Brent from Dubai.

6. Contrarian & Watch Signals

  • Contrarian & tail risks: The consensus now treats the conflict as intractable — Bloomberg’s framing is that markets see a war held open by Trump’s inability to extract the US and Iran’s unwillingness to cede Hormuz — but several things look mispriced on both sides. (1) The bearish case is being underweighted. Reuters’ own analysis flags growing signs that Tehran’s grip over Hormuz may be weakening, with US demining and the Oman corridor enabling more traffic; the same piece argues the uncertainty over actual flows is itself the premium, which means verified higher volumes would deflate it. (2) De-escalation could arrive faster than priced. A Houthi ceasefire statement, an Oman-brokered transit formula and a Sept 14 Salalah meeting are the first concrete off-ramp elements in weeks, and analysts argue Iran holds strong influence over the Houthis — the same channel that would let Tehran stop that front quickly. (3) The escalation case remains equally live. ING says Persian Gulf tensions show no credible path to de-escalation and that current signals point to further escalation; Capital Economics warns of still-higher energy prices; and former Israeli intelligence officer Danny Citrinowicz argues Iran will keep climbing the escalation ladder rather than back down, especially with US interceptor stocks strained. (4) Second-order and fiscal linkage. A war costing US taxpayers more than $37.5 billion with 18 service members dead is an electoral liability, and the Houthi advance is described as a serious setback for both the Trump administration and Riyadh; the announced Saudi–Pakistan–Turkey Mecca defence pact is now facing its first test. (5) Physical-versus-financial divergence. Houthi-aligned estimates of territory gained (2,320 sq miles) come from a single side and should not be read as verification of operational control of the strait.
  • Key watch signals: Whether Monday’s Salalah meeting produces substantive progress on a temporary Hormuz transit arrangement — the condition that would break the risk premium — and whether GCC consensus forms, US attitudes toward Iran’s conditions loosen, and the Houthi ceasefire statement is recognised and sustained by all parties. Full reopening of Hormuz still requires a US–Iran deal, so any resumption of direct or mediated talks is the single highest-value trigger. Daily Hormuz transits against the 10-day average of 15, and whether VLCC and Qatari LNG crossings cluster. Houthi movement on Dhubab and Perim, which Yemeni government sources call the key to a stronger hold on Bab el-Mandeb. Friday’s US inflation report as the input to next week’s Fed decision, and the ECB decision. IG’s Tony Sycamore flags a likely retest of WTI’s $119.48 high from early March, with China’s import appetite — recovering from June lows — the deciding variable for the rally’s durability. The UK Ofgem cap’s 3.6% October increase and its January reset are early read-outs of the political cost. Whether the Mecca defence agreement is activated and asks Pakistan and Turkey for forces, with Pakistan saying no military response is currently under discussion but that it will act under the agreement “when time comes.”
  • Source quality control: The Mokha capture is reported via the AP citing Yemeni and Houthi officials, and CNBC explicitly could not independently confirm it; the fall was also reported to Xinhua by an unnamed local government-army officer. The claim that the Houthis seized Mayun Island and completed control of Bab el-Mandeb rests on one local official speaking to AFP; the possible strike on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline has no independent confirmation that the pipeline itself was hit. The IRGC’s “blocked and under intelligent control” statement is a single-source claim relayed through Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, and the Iranian MP’s remarks about breaking the blockade come from an unverified social relay. The WSJ report that Iran has resumed ballistic missile production in underground facilities is flagged single-source. Houthi counts of 64 Saudi airstrikes and the interception of a combat formation are Houthi-sourced, and one Houthi-linked estimate of 2,320 sq miles gained is a single-source claim. Hormuz transit readings are preliminary and incomplete because some vessels sail with transponders off, and the flow dispute remains unresolved between official statements, Kpler-derived figures and analysts who arrive at sharply different conclusions; the Reuters Hormuz column is explicitly the author’s opinion, not the newsroom’s. Finally, note the direct contradiction between a social post on Sept 10 asserting the strait is “open and/or rapidly reopening” and the overwhelming weight of reporting describing it as effectively closed or severely constrained — volume of repetition is not confirmation in either direction.

Appendix: Further Reading

  • [27] Jinshi Data — Pakistan’s strategic dilemma between its mutual defence pact and mediating the US–Iran conflict
  • [28] Foreign Affairs — James Jeffrey argues a continuing US blockade of Hormuz could bring Iran back to the table
  • [29] The Washington Post — Red Sea coast fighting lifts the global average barrel price to $102
  • [30]/[31] BBC — UK gas above 200p/therm and gilt yields at multi-decade highs; Ofgem cap up 3.6% in October
  • [32] SPGEnergyOil — crude futures volatility has eased since the war began, but positioning stays cautious
  • [33] EconBerger — contrarian social post asserting the strait is open or rapidly reopening, alongside CNBC’s $100 US crude headline
  • [34] Sinolink Securities (Aug 5) — two fee-collection blueprints for a Hormuz arrangement, and the Fed-hike implication if oil falls

This report is intelligence & mechanism analysis, not investment advice.

30-day review of this series 8/20 – 9/19

  • Military escalation and the second front — From calibrated US–Iran tanker strikes in late August to the 10–12 September shutdown of Saudi Arabia’s East‑West pipeline, the Yanbu loading halt, and the Houthi Red Sea coast offensive. The seizure of Mocha, Perim and the Hanish islands shifted the shock from Hormuz alone to Saudi export infrastructure and Bab el‑Mandeb.

  • Hormuz control and transit — From the late‑August dark‑fleet escort corridor and partial flow recovery after the Iran–Oman corridor proposal to an effectively closed, contested waterway by mid‑September. The turning point was the resumed strikes and IRGC “smart control” claims; outbound tankers later rose from 5 to 9 a day but remained far below pre‑conflict norms, with fresh vessel‑strike risk.

  • Diplomacy — From Iran–Oman corridor hopes and a planned GCC–Iran Salalah meeting to the meeting’s postponement and then cancellation by 14–15 September. By 18 September, a Saudi two‑week ceasefire proposal via Oman surfaced, but the Houthis demanded a comprehensive settlement and Iran tied regional peace to ending US and Israeli military action.

  • Saudi workarounds and export logistics — From Yanbu’s shutdown and the East‑West pipeline outage to Aramco targeting a partial restart, Ras Tanura/Hormuz diversions, and ship‑to‑ship transfers off Oman. These relocated barrels rather than restored the old route, while Yanbu loadings receded to about 1 million barrels a day.

  • Products, demand and macro transmission — From a crude‑led geopolitical premium to a product‑led squeeze, with record diesel, tight LNG and inflation pressure feeding into policy and bond markets. By mid‑September, a large US crude build and demand contraction helped soften futures even as physical and refined‑product tightness persisted.

Sources34

  1. Houthis seize key Yemeni port city as Iran pushes for new foothold on Red Sea coast CNBC Score 66
  2. Why Houthi military gains in Yemen may further increase gas prices NPR Score 66
  3. Saudi crown prince urged Trump to strike Houthis amid Red Sea threat Axios Score 66
  4. Iran-backed terror group's latest territorial grab threatens second global shipping chokepoint Fox News Score 68
  5. Houthi-Saudi Fighting Escalates as Rebels Push Toward Key Strait Bloomberg Score 71
  6. 胡塞武装向关键海峡推进，与沙特的冲突升级 格隆汇快讯 Score 66
  7. Yemen risks a return to civil war as Iran-backed rebels target a vital oil shipping route LA Times Score 66
  8. Iranian-backed Houthis fight to block Red Sea passage for Saudi oil Washington Post Score 65
  9. Oil prices set to end week over $100 for first time in nearly 4 months Reuters Score 67
  10. 胡塞武装攻占红海重要港口、沙特冲突升级，伊朗被曝恢复产弹道导弹，原油盘中涨超7% 华尔街见闻 Score 69
  11. 美、布两油双双“破百”，中东冲突扩大引发供应担忧 格隆汇快讯 Score 70
  12. Oil Keeps Rising and Diesel Hits $6 a Gallon as Middle East Tensions Mount NYT Score 73
  13. Oil Prices Slip After Recent Surge Amid Supply Risks WSJ Score 68
  14. U.S.-Iran Escalation to Delay Oil Flow Recovery Into Next Year, IEA Says WSJ Score 68
  15. ICYMI O/N (tgif hagw!!) IRAN: Gulf foreign ministers plan to meet their Iranian counterpart on Monday in Salalah in a push by Oman and Iran to secure ... Twitter·宏观市场 Score 68
  16. 油价异动！伊朗将与海湾六国会晤、红海西海岸停火，中东局势现缓和信号 华尔街见闻 Score 73
  17. Transcript: Oil hits $108 ahead of Iran's meeting with Gulf states Financial Times Score 66
  18. Houthis seize key Yemeni port of Mocha in drive to take control of Red Sea coast The Guardian Score 67
  19. 胡塞武装沿红海海岸推进之际，沙特王储周四两度致电特朗普，敦促美国直接军事打击胡塞，但遭拒。伊朗与海湾国家计划下周举行会谈，推动霍尔木兹海峡临时航运协议... 金十-快讯 Score 65
  20. COMMENTARY: ENERGY WATCH: Flying blind Reuters Score 76
  21. 格隆汇9月11日｜据伊朗媒体Fars News：伊朗革命卫队海军司令称，霍尔木兹海峡已被伊朗封锁，并处于情报监控与智能管控之下，任何敌对行动都将遭到打击。 格隆汇快讯 Score 66
  22. IRGC: Strait of Hormuz is blocked and under our intelligent control and information dominance, and any hostile presence in this strategic Strait will ... Twitter·财经快讯 Score 66
  23. Oil Prices Surge as Fighting in Middle East Escalates NYT Score 75
  24. Hormuz Fuel Exports' Slow Recovery Keeps Prices Near Record Bloomberg Score 65
  25. The US has made progress in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, but the Iran war is far from over The Independent Score 73
  26. The US has loosened Iran's grip on the Strait of Hormuz, but the costly war is far from over AP News Score 73
  27. 随着伊朗支持的也门胡塞武装与沙特军队在本周爆发激烈交火，巴基斯坦正面临一场严峻的战略大考：要履行共同防务协议，还是继续调停美伊冲突？点击查看... 金十-快讯 Score 66
  28. An ongoing U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could bring Iran back to the negotiating table, argues James Jeffrey. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/... Twitter·地缘外交 Score 67
  29. Tracking Trump: Red Sea fighting raises oil prices; suit seeks to block ICE from polls; Trump's $5k promise to Americans; and more Washington Post Score 65
  30. Oil, gas and borrowing costs surge as fears over Middle East escalate BBC Score 70
  31. Oil, gas and borrowing costs surge as fears over Middle East escalate BBC Score 70
  32. #crude oil futures volatility has eased since the start of the US-Iran war, but positioning data indicates the market remains cautious of potential pr... Twitter·大宗商品 Score 66
  33. the Strait is open and/or rapidly reopening Twitter·宏观市场 Score 68
  34. 海峡大结局？（国金宏观赵宏鹤） 雪涛宏观笔记 Score 66