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Strait of Hormuz Tracker

Brent holds above $101 as Houthis seize Mocha and Iran declares a maritime "sanctioned area"

Escalation broadened on two new axes — the Houthis captured the Yemeni Red Sea port of Mocha and are pushing on the Bab el-Mandeb, while Iran's IRGC declared a new maritime "sanctioned area" running from Chabahar into the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea — leaving Brent above $101 a barrel in its first sustained spell above $100 since July .

33 sources ~49 min

0. Weekly Arc

The arc has run one way since Aug 30, when US strikes on IRGC launchers ended a month-long lull; Sep 1–2 brought the heaviest US–Iran exchanges since July and carried Brent through $96. A brief Sep 3 pause gave way to Sep 5–6 US strikes on three Iranian tankers, Tehran’s Sep 7 declaration of a planned Hormuz exclusion zone, Sep 8 Houthi strikes across southern Saudi Arabia, and Sep 9’s US sinking of five Iranian tankers with Iranian retaliation against a Jordan base and ships near Hormuz. Brent broke $100 on Sep 9 and has consolidated above $101.

1. Situation Overview

The past ~24 hours are a further escalation with prices consolidating above the $100 handle. Brent topped $101 a barrel for the first time since July and settled more than 3% higher in New York, with WTI near $96 [1]; prints ranged from $101.34 (+0.1%) at 01:07 GMT Sep 10 with WTI at $96.55 (+0.5%) [2], to $101.84 for November Brent (+0.62%) and $96.06 for October WTI (+1.01%) [3], with Axios quoting $100.93 [4]. At press time ICE November Brent was at $102.13/bbl and NYMEX October WTI at $97.21/bbl, both sharply higher since the start of September [5]; another relay put Brent up more than 1% at $102.4 [6]; WSJ reported Brent above $101, up modestly from the previous close [7]; Bloomberg noted WTI rose above $97 after jumping 3.3% in the prior session [8]. Three drivers layered on top of each other: US forces destroyed five Iranian oil tankers after attempted Iranian missile attacks on a US warship [3][9]; Iran’s IRGC said it had struck back at two US warships and eight oil tankers [9]; and the Houthis took the Yemeni Red Sea coastal city of Mocha, advancing toward the Bab el-Mandeb and seeking control of Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline [6]. Iran’s IRGC also announced a new maritime “sanctioned area” starting from Chabahar Port and extending into parts of the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, with coordinates to be published separately [10][9]. The US Energy Information Administration raised its oil price forecasts for this year and next as global stockpiles fall on lost Middle Eastern supply [2][11]. Asia’s oil industry, meeting at APPEC in Singapore, sees no political resolution soon and is preparing for prolonged disruption [12]. Net characterisation: escalating, with the shock now spreading from Hormuz to the Bab el-Mandeb corridor.

2. Key Parties’ Positions

  • [ESCALATED] Negotiation progress: The APPEC consensus is that the only way to reopen the Strait of Hormuz is for President Trump to back down and leave the Gulf — with widespread recognition that this is unlikely and the conflict shows no sign of nearing a political resolution [12]. One delegate framed it bluntly: “We need a political settlement, but that will take regime change in Washington or Tehran,” with Washington judged the likelier venue; a delegate-projected timeline runs to Trump’s term ending, though a Democratic win in one or both houses in November could raise pressure [12]. Bank of America analysts said “reaching a durable deal before the U.S. midterm elections is increasingly unlikely, and it could remain elusive even beyond that” [13][14]. No official peace talks have been held for months [15]. The breakdown centred on Hormuz control: Iran insists it has the right to set terms and charge fees for ships passing off its coast, while the US wants passage to remain free and has used a naval blockade against Iranian ports and tankers [13][14].
  • [ESCALATED] US / main pressuring party: President Trump said on 9/9 that he expects the war with Iran to end after the November midterm elections, that “we do not seek negotiations with Iran,” and that “once the election is over, this war will end immediately”; he added that an oil-price fall will take somewhat longer than the midterms, while insisting prices will drop sharply once the war ends [9]. Per WSJ, Trump’s top White House advisers have privately raised with him the prospect the Iran conflict could drag on through the remainder of his term [7][3]. [ONGOING] The tanker-for-warship deterrence formula — Rubio’s line that “for every time they do that or try to do that, they’re going to lose tankers” — is unchanged [16].
  • [ESCALATED] Iran / counterparty: IRGC spokesman Muhibbi said on 9/9 that Iran will establish a new maritime “sanctioned area” beginning at Chabahar Port and extending to parts of the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, with coordinates to be announced separately; any vessel entering will be sanctioned and cut off from maritime, insurance and related guarantee services, and will also be denied such services for future Hormuz transits [9][10]. Muhibbi set out five conditions for ending the confrontation: a complete halt to military operations and no renewed threats; an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon; lifting the blockade on Yemen; unfreezing Iran’s $24.4bn in frozen assets; and an end to interference in Iran’s nuclear and missile R&D [9]. He also warned that if the enemy strikes two or three Iranian targets Iran will hit 20, and that no advanced technology can break Iran’s multi-layer monitoring of the strait [9]; the IRGC said it would escalate its response to any further attacks [2]. Iran’s Foreign Ministry condemned the 9/8 US attacks on its vessels, saying the armed forces will “not hesitate at all” in exercising legitimate self-defence and will respond resolutely to military aggression [9]. Per an anonymous senior Iranian official (single source / unverified), Iran is ready for a more intense war and will escalate counterstrikes if the US keeps hitting its territory and infrastructure, viewing the war as an existential threat with enough missiles for a lengthy conflict after rebuilding since April [15]. Iran’s leadership is split: officials including President Masoud Pezeshkian argue for negotiating to ease economic pressure, but demand the US first lift the blockade and return to the June Memorandum of Understanding [15]. Bloomberg Economics’ Dina Esfandiary says many leaders believe the Trump administration responds only to threats and escalation and is more sensitive before the midterms, and that Iran is refining how to retaliate faster and more efficiently from a menu of responses [15].
  • [ONGOING] Israel: No new Israeli statements or military actions in this batch; Iran’s stated conditions for ending the confrontation include an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon [9].

3. Military Actions

  • [NEW] US: US Navy SEALs have been carrying out a four-month mission to clear mines laid by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz [10]. FOX News, citing senior US officials, said the strikes on Iranian tankers are “part of a larger strategy to economically pressure Iran,” with tactics including sinking and paralysing Iranian crude transport vessels [10]. Per WSJ, Iran launched an undisclosed second attack on US warships on Monday, but no US ship was hit [10].
  • [ONGOING] US: CENTCOM’s 9/8 destruction of five Iranian oil tankers, after Iranian attempts to hit a US warship with ballistic missiles, remains the confirmed core of US action [3][9].
  • [ESCALATED] Iran (claims, largely unverified): The IRGC said it struck two US vessels, eight oil tankers and 10 “noncompliant vessels” near the strait — a likely reference to ships transiting without its permission [9][16] — while Iran said it attacked 10 ships near Hormuz in the biggest wave of attacks on commercial shipping since the war began [2][17]; Iran’s Foreign Ministry said its armed forces struck US military bases and facilities in the region and carried out “defensive strikes” on several US vessels [9]. Tehran fired around 20 missiles at a Jordanian airbase used by the US and attacked more US navy ships plus several commercial vessels [15]; Jordanian authorities said 18 were intercepted and two fell in unpopulated areas [16]. US Central Command denied its vessels were hit, saying all “attempted attacks failed” [16].
  • [ONGOING] Iran: Iran’s claim to have captured a US unmanned underwater vehicle at the strait entrance (imagery closely matching Anduril’s Dive-LD) is contested; CENTCOM’s Tim Hawkins said the craft had malfunctioned more than a day earlier and carried no sensitive data or classified equipment [9][10].
  • [ESCALATED] Proxies (Houthis / Red Sea front): Three Yemeni government sources said the Houthis have taken control of the Red Sea coastal city of Mocha, are advancing toward the Mocha–Dhubab area and are seeking control of Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline [6]. Saudi-led coalition spokesman Turki al-Maliki said on 9/9 that the Houthis launched ballistic missiles and drones at multiple Saudi locations including Khamis Mushait, Abha and Jazan; a day earlier the coalition said attacks on civilian and economic facilities in Abha, Jazan and Najran wounded 73 civilians including women and children [6]. The Houthis launched an offensive in south Yemen last week aimed at reaching the Red Sea [16], and have claimed at least seven attacks on ships headed to or from Saudi ports since announcing a Red Sea blockade on July 20 [18]. [NEW] Kpler found only two Saudi cargoes passed the Bab el-Mandeb to the Red Sea in the past week, and Leth Agencies recorded August as the fewest transits through the strait since July 2025, averaging 35 per day [18].

4. Strait of Hormuz Transit Status

  • [ESCALATED] Control-status change: Iran has moved from threat to declared jurisdiction — the IRGC’s Chabahar-to-Arabian-Sea “sanctioned area,” backed by an insurance-and-services cut-off for any vessel entering it, with coordinates to follow [9][10]; the IRGC also said it would release maps of a much larger area it considers forbidden to ships, extending as far as the Gulf off Chabahar for the first time [16]. The White House claims it controls the strait [4], while Iran continues to insist it has the right to manage traffic through it [15]. Reuters: “Will the Strait of Hormuz fully reopen? Nobody knows” [17]. HSBC said the market is adjusting to a disrupted “new normal” in which the strait is neither fully closed nor fully open but persistently impaired [4], while Bank of America still expected shipping through the strait to gradually pick up [13][14]. Pre-conflict, the waterway carried roughly a fifth of global oil and gas supplies, and nearly 20% of global crude/products plus a similar share of LNG [12][2][16][19].
  • [ESCALATED] Transit data: Hormuz commodity-vessel crossings fell below 10 on Wednesday, under the roughly 14 crossings/day averaged over the prior 10 days, per a single-source social relay of tracker data [20]; Kpler’s preliminary data showed only six merchant vessels transiting on 9/8, below nine the previous day and below the ~12 ten-day daily average [9]. Morgan Stanley’s weekly tracker put the seven-day moving average of outbound energy-tanker transits at five per day, down from seven the prior week, with inbound transits at seven per day and transit efficiency only about a quarter of normal, versus 25–30 vessels per day in each direction pre-conflict [21]. Goldman Sachs estimated total Gulf oil exports including “dark crossings” at roughly 15–16 million b/d, about two-thirds of pre-war levels [22]; Vortexa put total August Gulf exports at 15 million b/d, still down 10 million b/d from pre-war, with Hormuz volumes on a seven-day moving average around 8 million b/d [22]; Gulf crude exports reached as much as 14 million b/d on some days in early September [22]. Reuters notes even the most optimistic figures are around 75% of pre-war levels, implying the global market is short about 5 million b/d of crude and refined fuels, while Vortexa estimates about 10 million b/d of exports — roughly 10% of world oil demand — are still missing [12][23]. Morgan Stanley measured Middle East crude exports at 13.4 million b/d for the week ending Sep 6, down 0.6 million b/d week-on-week, below the pre-conflict ~18 million b/d but well above the 6 million b/d March/April trough, and reported oil-on-water inventories stranded west of Hormuz jumping 36 million barrels in a single week to 156 million barrels, the highest since late June [21]. UBS notes about 20–30% of global oil trade normally moves through the strait [24]. Iran’s own loadings have collapsed, with August loadings down roughly 80% year-on-year and some trackers estimating zero exports escaped the Persian Gulf (single source / unverified) [25].
  • [NEW] Alternative-route data: As Bab el-Mandeb flows resumed, Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu crude loadings recovered, with the seven-day moving average back up to 4 million b/d [21] — but Kpler found only two Saudi cargoes crossing the Bab el-Mandeb in the past week, and Saudi oil exports fell last month to 3.2 million b/d, the lowest in at least 13 years [18].
  • [ESCALATED] Shipping / insurance signals: Insurance for loading crude inside the Strait of Hormuz has jumped from around 5 US cents a barrel pre-conflict to around $2.50 currently, and the freight cost from the Gulf to North Asia is around $30 a barrel versus around $6 — meaning the headline Brent price is well below the actual cost of securing cargoes [12]. A single-source social post claimed Platts Dated Brent rallied to $114.26/b amid heating-up conflict, with sour exports down 65% and VLCC rates at a record $161.93/mt (single source / unverified) [26]. Iranian media, relayed by Saudi outlet Al-Hadath, reported an oil tanker was attacked in the Strait of Hormuz (single source / unverified) [27][28]. Iraqi officials said a tanker in Iraqi waters carrying 2 million barrels of fuel oil was struck by a drone, with no reported crew casualties or oil leaks [16]; the Guardian separately reported at least one sailor killed and another missing [16]. Shipping analyst Peter Sand of Xeneta said whatever comfort companies found using the Red Sea before the latest escalation “has clearly soured” [18], and Marisks’ Dimitris Maniatis said the immediate concern is not the number of attacks but the expansion of targeting criteria and geography, with the threat to Saudi ships extending beyond the waters near Yemen [18].

5. Asset Implications

AssetDirectionHorizonDriverAnchoring fact
Brent crude↑ (range-firm above $100)daysSupply shock: tanker war plus Houthi push on the Red Sea lifeboat; futures converging on physical prices that were already above $100§1 (prints $101.34–$102.4); §4 transit/freight
WTI crude↑daysMirrors Brent; selloff since June–July fully unwound§1 (WTI $96.06–$97.21)
Refined products (diesel / gasoline)↑↑days–weeksRecord US diesel, lost Middle East and Russian refining capacity, Asia distillate imports ~30% below pre-conflict; the tight leg of the barrel§4 insurance/freight; §1
European gas / LNG↑days–weeksQatar force majeure extended through autumn, UK gas at 197p/therm (highest since Dec 2022), European storage below seasonal average§4 shipping signals
Gold / precious metals→ (firm bias)daysHaven bid from a widening conflict versus the oil-inflation and rate headwind; no fresh metal prints in this batch§1 escalation tape
Global equities / risk sentiment↓daysWall Street stocks fell; S&P 500 futures at 7,653.50 (−0.4%); 10-year US Treasury yield above 4.8%, highest since Oct 2023, pressures multiples§1
USD / haven currencies→ (firm bias)daysOil-inflation channel keeps Fed-hike risk alive and supports the dollar; Friday’s CPI is the swing input§1 / §6
Energy / shipping value chain↑↑weeks–monthsInsurance on in-strait loadings from ~5 cents to ~$2.50/bbl, Gulf–North Asia freight from ~$6 to ~$30/bbl, Saudi exports at a 13-year low; rerouting and shadow-fleet economics repriced§4

Mechanism read: This remains a pure supply-shock tape, and the shock now has a second physical leg. The Hormuz leg is measured but impaired — roughly a quarter of normal transit efficiency, oil-on-water west of Hormuz at 156 million barrels, and headline Brent trading well below the all-in cost of moving a barrel once ~$2.50/bbl insurance and ~$30/bbl freight are added. The new leg is the Bab el-Mandeb/Yanbu corridor, which had been absorbing rerouted barrels; the Houthi capture of Mocha and the advance toward Dhubab directly threaten the valve, which is why Saudi exports hit a 13-year low of 3.2 million b/d and why traders describe the two chokepoints as complements in risk rather than substitutes. The binding constraint is products, not crude: Asia’s light and middle distillate imports are nearly 30% below pre-conflict levels, and diesel — already at a record — is the barrel that drives freight, farming and construction costs.

The demand and policy channel is the counterweight. The EIA raised its forecast precisely because inventories are drawing: 2026 Brent spot is now seen averaging about $91 and WTI $84.65 (both ~5% higher than before), with Q4 shifted to a 1.7 million b/d draw from an expected 0.6 million b/d surplus and Middle East shut-ins averaging around 5.7 million b/d [24][9][11]. UBS flags the other side: higher Gulf output loosens the 2026 balance and 2027 still faces oversupply, with demand growth downgraded largely on China [24]. The inflation pass-through is already political — euro area energy inflation at 14.3%, UK gas and pump prices climbing, US 30-year mortgage rates at 6.85%, and a 10-year Treasury yield at a two-year-plus high. That combination, plus the November midterms, is the channel through which this supply shock will be fought.

6. Contrarian & Watch Signals

  • Contrarian & tail risks: The consensus now prices persistence, but several things look underpriced on both sides. (1) The loosening case is being ignored. UBS explicitly notes the 2026 balance trends looser on higher Gulf output, with 2027 facing oversupply; Kpler’s Muyu Xu told Reuters oil is still flowing through the strait, the fundamental picture is better than months ago, and prices could retreat. (2) Goldman’s own reasoning is modest. Its $5 upgrade assumes shipping disruptions continue, yet it justifies the restraint by pointing out developed-market commercial fuel inventories have barely declined and Middle East shipments should slowly recover — a reminder that the premium rests on expected, not realised, inventory loss. (3) The IEA’s inventory pushback. It argues total global stocks look fairly comfortable — with the caveat, itself a premium source, that much of that oil is in transit, committed to buyers, or held in countries with opaque disclosure such as China. (4) Upside tails are the mirror image. Goldman warns of above-$120 if attacks intensify; Bank of America sees $95–120 if skirmishes keep a chokehold and up to $150 if major energy infrastructure is damaged; HSBC’s stalemate case sees $120 into 2027. (5) Measurement opacity is itself the premium. Reuters calculates dark crossings at a minimum 500 million barrels in June–August, worth at least $40 billion, and describes the world’s largest clandestine tanker operation; estimates differ by millions of barrels per day, so the market is paying for uncertainty as much as for barrels. (6) Second-order risks: Gulf political exhaustion (“the region cannot remain in a state of neither war nor peace indefinitely,” per the UAE’s Anwar Gargash), the US having expended a significant share of its interceptor missiles and being wary of further fuel-price rises before the Nov 3 midterms, and Iran’s ~90% inflation and memory of a deadly crackdown on late-2025 protests. (7) The winter gas leg — Qatar’s force majeure through autumn and below-average European storage — is a slower-burning but harder-to-substitute risk than crude.
  • Key watch signals: Whether Brent sustains above $100–$102 rather than fading after headline spikes — options now imply a 25% probability Brent stays above $100 in March 2027, up from 6% a month ago. Publication of the IRGC’s “sanctioned area” coordinates and the first enforcement action — a detention, fine or named vessel would convert declaratory jurisdiction into a physical transit cost. Daily Hormuz crossings: continued sub-10 readings against the ~14 ten-day average confirm impairment, while a cluster of VLCC or Qatari LNG crossings would validate the higher official flow claims. Bab el-Mandeb/Yanbu transits — Houthi movement on Dhubab would close the alternative outlet that has capped Brent. The IRGC’s stated conditions and whether any is addressed. Friday’s US CPI (3.3% expected) and PPI (5.4% versus 4.7%) and the Fed reaction function. The Nov 3 midterms as the pivot Trump himself has flagged. EIA’s Q4 balance — a 1.7 million b/d draw versus the previously expected surplus — and China’s domestic retail price adjustment window reopening on 9/11, which locks the war into Chinese consumer inflation.
  • Source quality control: Iran’s military claims — two US warships, eight oil tankers, 10 “noncompliant vessels” — are unverified and directly denied by US Central Command, which said all attempted attacks failed. The new “sanctioned area” rests on an IRGC spokesman relayed through Iranian state channels, with no coordinates yet. The reported tanker attack in the Strait of Hormuz comes from a single-source social relay of Iranian media via Al-Hadath. The Dated Brent $114.26, VLCC $161.93/mt and 65% sour-export drop figures, and the claim that August Iranian loadings fell ~80% year-on-year with some trackers showing zero exports, are single-source social posts, not verified data. The senior Iranian official describing Tehran’s war posture spoke anonymously and is a single source. The EIA’s forecast was finalised on September 3, before the latest escalation. Transit counts systematically understate traffic because vessels sail with transponders off, and daily readings swing widely — Vortexa’s own analyst cautions that spikes and troughs are normal, so single-day prints should not be over-read. Price prints differ by venue and timestamp ($101.34 versus $102.4 versus $102.13), and UBS’s own note flags an internal inconsistency in its demand wording.

Appendix: Further Reading

  • [29] Bloomberg — Iran’s economic-cost strategy against the US, with the Houthis raising the stakes further
  • [30] Christophe Barraud — social relay of the Reuters headline on the largest wave of shipping attacks since the war began
  • [31] WSJ — Iran has fired missiles at US warships at least three times in the past week to break the Hormuz stalemate
  • [32] WSJ — ANZ on the five-tanker strike and the risk of worsening regional supply disruption
  • [15] Los Angeles Times — Iran’s leadership split, the reality of a seventh-month stalemate, and US interceptor depletion
  • [33] The Independent — charts on the war’s economic damage: Brent, UK gas, inflation, bond yields and mortgage rates
  • [25] Daniel Lacalle — the collapse of Iranian exports under the renewed blockade

This report is intelligence & mechanism analysis, not investment advice.

30-day review of this series 8/6 – 9/5

  • Military escalation arc: The standoff swung from the post-MOU stalemate of mid-August through a brief de-escalation on Aug 25–28, then reversed sharply when US strikes on Larak Island (Aug 30) and the heaviest US–Iran exchanges since July (Sep 1–2) replaced calibrated punishment with direct state-on-state fire and contested civilian casualties, before a tentative pause settled in by Sep 3–4.

  • The Hormuz data war: The core dispute evolved from US “~9 mb/d” claims versus tracker-estimated ~4–6 mb/d to a standstill narrative — six-vessel visible days and a “mostly at standstill” NYT description — and finally to an explicit clash between Energy Secretary Wright’s wartime-record “17 million barrels in a day” and trackers showing single-digit commodity transits, a gap that kept the premium embedded in both directions.

  • Flow reconfiguration: Shipping adapted in layers: dark-fleet flows held total Hormuz volumes near 6–7 mb/d, non-Iranian Gulf loadings hit conflict highs, and by September Iraqi exports on Iranian-cleared tankers emerged as the sanctioned channel, jumping from ~1.35 to ~2.34 mb/d — while Saudi exports fell to a record low as both Hormuz and Red Sea routes closed.

  • Product and inflation squeeze: The crude shock migrated downstream: US diesel hit a record $5.85 a gallon, diesel cracks exceeded $100, Gulf and Russian refining damage tightened products globally, and the oil-inflation channel revived market bets on a September Fed hike, transmitting the war into rates and discount rates rather than only energy earnings.

  • Diplomatic whipsaw: The June MOU expired with no successor, the Iran–Oman corridor proposal of Aug 25 briefly broke Brent below $90, and Pakistan/Qatar mediation plus Israel–Lebanon releases kept side-channels alive — but Vance’s no-talks-unless precondition and Iran’s wait-for-concession posture left no imminent US–Iran agreement.

Sources33

  1. Oil Climbs as China Crude Purchases Rise Bloomberg Score 66
  2. Brent holds above $100 as tanker attacks deepen supply fear Reuters Score 67
  3. Oil extends gains, with Brent above $101 after U.S. destroys Iranian oil tankers CNBC Score 71
  4. Oil's "new normal" is looking more expensive Axios Score 71
  5. 油市地缘风险再起，国内油价将迎年内第十二涨 澎湃新闻 Score 67
  6. 布油急拉！胡塞武装拿下红海沿岸城市穆哈，曼德海峡控制权生变 华尔街见闻 Score 71
  7. Stock Market Today: Dow Futures Gain, What to Watch -- Live Updates WSJ Score 67
  8. Oil Extends Rally as Iran Says Ready for More Intense Conflict Bloomberg Score 71
  9. 美伊海上“报复循环”加剧 特朗普预告战事将终结 伊朗开出条件 华尔街见闻 Score 67
  10. 伊朗称将设立新的海上“制裁区域” 华尔街见闻 Score 71
  11. US EIA hikes oil price forecasts as Iran war drains global stockpile Reuters Score 67
  12. COMMENTARY: Asia's oil industry wants Trump to leave the Gulf, but expects he won't Reuters Score 67
  13. Oil rises past $100 a barrel after the latest wave of Middle East attacks LA Times Score 68
  14. Oil rises past $100 a barrel after the latest wave of Middle East attacks Chicago Tribune Score 66
  15. Iran ready for more intense war and won't relent, official says LA Times Score 66
  16. Iran claims to have attacked 10 ships near strait of Hormuz after US strikes The Guardian Score 74
  17. NEWSLETTER: The Gulf of uncertainty Reuters Score 72
  18. Saudi Arabia Runs Out of Easy Routes for Oil to Bypass Iran War NYT Score 69
  19. Oil prices could hit $120, analysis finds, as Americans absorb $100 billion fuel hit CBS News Score 67
  20. Strait of Hormuz commodity vessel crossings below 10 on Wednesday, less than 10-day average of about 14, data shows Twitter·财经快讯 Score 67
  21. 霍尔木兹海峡与曼德海峡周报：中东原油出口降至1340万桶/日，水上库存创6月以来新高 外资研报 Score 72
  22. One third of Gulf oil is still missing despite 'dark crossings', data shows Reuters Score 70
  23. Brent oil tops $100 as Middle East conflict intensifies, stoking supply fears Reuters Score 67
  24. 瑞银：霍尔木兹海峡中断风险持续，EIA上调2026年下半年布伦特原油价格预测至90美元/桶 外资研报 Score 67
  25. "Winning". Iran’s oil exports have effectively collapsed under the renewed U.S. blockade, with August loadings down roughly 80% year-on-year, and som... Twitter·宏观市场 Score 65
  26. FACTBOX: Platts Dated Brent rallies to $114.26/b as US-Iran war heats up ▪️Hormuz traffic drops; sour exports fall 65% ▪️VLCC rates hit record $16... Twitter·大宗商品 Score 70
  27. 格隆汇9月10日｜据沙特媒体哈达斯(Alhadath)，伊朗媒体称，一艘油轮在霍尔木兹海峡遭到袭击。 格隆汇快讯 Score 70
  28. Iranian media: Reports of an oil tanker being targeted in the Strait of Hormuz - Al-Hadath Twitter·财经快讯 Score 68
  29. How Yemen's Houthis Are Raising the Stakes in the Iran War Bloomberg Score 70
  30. 🇺🇸 🇮🇷 Iran and US hit tankers in biggest wave of attacks on shipping since war began - Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/i... Twitter·宏观市场 Score 67
  31. With Close Calls on U.S. Warships, Iran Shows New Appetite for Escalation WSJ Score 70
  32. Oil Rises Amid Escalation in Mideast Conflict WSJ Score 72
  33. Five charts that lay bare economic disaster caused by Trump's war in Iran The Independent Score 68