Rate-Hike Pricing Eases to ~58–65% on Hormuz-Deal Hopes; Schmid and Paulson Stake Out the Hawkish/Centrist Poles; Warsh's Six-Meeting Reform Draws Liquidity Warnings

0. Weekly Arc

The post-FOMC credibility shock is consolidating rather than deepening: a 9-3 hold with three hawkish dissents and an opaque Warsh press conference triggered an EM-style credibility shock in the long end, but this week’s layer is stabilization. Oil has retreated on renewed Strait-of-Hormuz deal hopes, yields have fallen back toward pre-press-conference levels, and September pricing has slid from near two-thirds into a 58–65% band. Schmid presses the hawkish case, Paulson defines a centrist two-scenario path, and Warsh’s six-meeting reform hardens into an institutional theme with liquidity-functioning caveats. Direction: hawkish-doubt, tentatively easing into Friday’s payrolls.

1. Policy Narrative & Expectations

The net change over the past ~24h is an easing of rate-path pricing on the energy leg: September hike odds now read 58.4% on CME FedWatch ^[1], ~64% per FX-market analysis ^[2], and 65% per Chicago rate futures, which also show an 85% probability of cumulative hikes above 25bp this year ^[3] — down from ~67% yesterday and from the 90%+ pre-meeting peak. October pricing shows 53.9% for 25bp, 15.5% for 50bp, and 30.5% for no change ^[1], while the October 28 fed-funds-futures implied probability fell to 83.5% from 95% a day earlier ^[4]. The driver is oil: Treasury Secretary Bessent said a US-Iran deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz could come this week ^[5][6], and crude fell another ~5% ^[6]. The institutional split remains at cycle extremes — BofA sees three hikes (September/October/December) to a 4.25%–4.50% year-end range ^[7][8], Morgan Stanley sees the Fed on hold with a 3.625% year-end policy rate ^[9][10], China Post Securities expects no hike this year and reads Warsh’s hike hurdle as higher than markets assume ^[11], and Citi argues the curve steepening is real-rate driven with breakevens anchored near 2%, not a credibility signal ^[12].

1.1 FOMC Officials’ Remarks

• [NEW] Hawkish — Jeff Schmid (Kansas City Fed President): per Gelonghui, Schmid said that “when examining the economy, my focus is entirely on inflation, which remains too high,” and that despite June’s encouraging cooling, relying on a single data point “is premature” given renewed oil-price pressure that makes any energy relief uncertain ^[13]. Per Bloomberg, he “suggested higher interest rates are needed to achieve the Fed’s price stability goals, and reiterated that inflation is his primary concern” ^[14]. Additional single-source/social reports attribute to him: “tighter monetary policy is required to bring inflation back to the 2% target” ^[15], “current Fed policy stance is not tight” ^[16], and the warning that AI investment is “fueling inflation and the Fed should not overlook it” ^[17]. Marginal shift: first remarks in this cycle’s history — squarely hawkish, and the most explicit “not tight” counter to the hold camp.
• [ONGOING] Hawkish — Alberto Musalem (St. Louis Fed President): per NYT and FT, he “expressed a preference” for higher rates at the July meeting and is “the latest official to call for higher US interest rates” ^[18][19].
• [NEW] Neutral/swing — Anna Paulson (Philadelphia Fed President, 2026 FOMC voter; 8/4 12:19 UTC): “I am committed to keeping an open mind as I assess the evidence and determine the appropriate path for policy,” per Reuters ^[20]; she supported the hold (“it was not a close call” ^[21][22]) and sets core inflation — which she estimates at 2.4%–2.8% — as her key criterion ^[23][20]. She laid out two scenarios: current policy may already be “mildly restrictive” enough to return inflation to 2%, or core inflation staying stubbornly high would mean “the passage of time without progress would itself signal that more restrictive policy is needed” ^[18][23][20]. She said the Fed “cannot provide rate guidance now” ^[24][25], that forward guidance is appropriate “when rates are at zero” ^[24][26], that it is right to look through supply shocks ^[27], and that she wants to weigh the tradeoffs of 6 vs 8 FOMC meetings a year ^[24][28]. Marginal shift: first substantive appearance — a centrist data-dependent swing voter with a clearly stated hawkish tripwire.
• [ONGOING] Neutral — Tom Barkin (Richmond Fed President): called it a “close call” whether rates are high enough to bring inflation down ^[18].
• [ONGOING] Dovish — John Williams (NY Fed President): reiterated his personal forecast “for inflation to come down in the second half of this year and come down further next year,” and that it would “absolutely be appropriate to act” if price pressures do not abate as expected ^[29][18] (the ^[29] item is a single social source).
• [ESCALATED] Chair Kevin Warsh (listed separately): the institutional reform layer hardens — he has proposed cutting regular FOMC meetings to six rate-decision meetings plus two substantive economic-topic discussions per year ^[30][31]. On policy substance he remains hard-2%: “Where necessary and appropriate, we will not hesitate to act,” and “My commitment to you is to take sticky prices and to unstick them” ^[18]; he reiterated there is no “soft inflation target” ^[18][3], will reduce projections and forward guidance so markets price off actual data ^[3], and views AI infrastructure as a one-off supply-side phenomenon rather than persistent inflation ^[3]. The credibility-sensitive layer: he hinted “who knows, come after next January, what we might say about strategy” ^[18], and per the FT invoked Goodhart’s Law, warning that hitting the 2% PCE target “might not meet its underlying objective of stable prices” ^[19]. The FT column criticizes his communication as opaque and logically inconsistent, contrasting it with the Bank of England’s transparent post-meeting approach ^[19]. Marginal shift: no change in the hawkish-words/dovish-execution pattern; the six-meeting proposal transitions from rumor to analyzed policy risk (BofA) with Paulson now publicly weighing in.
• Note: Fed Governor Lisa Cook is listed as a Fed speaker for the rest of the week ^[32].

1.2 Policy Signals & Institutional Communication

• [ESCALATED] FOMC meeting-frequency reform: Warsh’s proposal of six rate decisions plus two economic meetings per year ^[30][31] now carries a market-functioning analysis: BofA says the market may accept it, but the Fed must signal the change well in advance — at least a six-month transition — or dealer willingness to make markets in 2027 FOMC OIS could decline and Fed-funds-futures liquidity could suffer ^[30]. BofA notes most major central banks (ECB, BoE, RBA) hold ~8 meetings and gave 6–13 months of notice when changing schedules, with the SNB the exception at four ^[30]; legal minimum is four per year ^[30][31]; the eight-meeting convention dates to 1981 ^[31]. BofA warns that with inflation still high, a rapid change could make markets doubt the disinflation path and price greater policy-volatility risk ^[30]. The proposal remains media-reported, not officially confirmed ^[30].
• [NEW] Treasury Secretary Bessent’s reaction function: per Nick Timiraos, Bessent’s policy reaction function has shifted to being “less dovish” — he defended Warsh’s refusal to articulate a reaction function (“every meeting should be open, market participants should judge for themselves”), while himself floating a dovish-leaning reaction function that ignores near-term shocks, describing underlying/core inflation as “very mild… very stable” ^[33]; earlier he cited models putting the Fed’s rate 25–100+bp above neutral ^[33]. He also expressed confidence the Fed “will balance growth and inflation mandates” ^[34] and characterized a Fed facility as meant “to keep volatility offshore” ^[35] (both single-source).
• [NEW] Treasury refunding preview (auction announcement this week): bond dealers expect the Treasury to need increases in at least some fixed-rate program sizes next year but is unlikely to signal the shift yet ^[36]. JPMorgan views it as prudent to remove the “at least” language maintaining nominal-coupon and FRN auction sizes, citing a funding gap beginning FY2027, with the 3y/10y/30y auctions expected unchanged at $58bn/$42bn/$25bn ^[6]. JPMorgan sees a high risk that guidance stays unchanged — altering it would pull forward duration-supply expectations and push up term premium, with midterm elections less than three months away ^[6].
• [ONGOING] September/October pricing dispersion: 58.4% September (CME FedWatch) ^[1] vs ~64% ^[2] vs 65% (Chicago futures, with 85% for cumulative >25bp this year) ^[3]; October 53.9%/15.5%/30.5% ^[1].
• [ONGOING] BofA’s three-hike path: maintained — 25bp hikes in September, October and December to a 4.25%–4.50% year-end range ^[7][8]; a September hike is “imperative” to restore credibility absent a run of dovish data ^[37][8]. New: BofA recommends long 5y5y inflation swaps ^[7], adding duration as the 10-year approaches/exceeds 4.8% ^[8], and holding a long USD hedge against a hawkish pivot ^[8].
• [NEW] Morgan Stanley: forecasts the Fed on hold through 2026 with a year-end policy rate of 3.625% ^[9][10]; markets price ~36bp of Fed hikes by end-2026 ^[10]; sees inflation undershooting and policy proving more accommodative than priced, steepening curves ^[9].
• [NEW] Citi’s counter-read: the recent steepening is “almost entirely” real-rate driven with breakevens around 2%, so it is not an inflation-expectations or credibility signal ^[12]; core PCE at 3.3% is overstated by methodology, while trimmed-mean/median PCE are falling and core CPI at 2.6% should reach 2.3% by the September meeting ^[12].
• [NEW] China Post Securities (Zhongyou Securities): expects no Fed hike this year; Warsh’s emphasis on long-term trends implies his hurdle for hikes is higher than markets previously expected ^[11].
• [NEW] HSBC: expects Fed officials speaking this week to lean toward holding rates steady, with any dovish remarks potentially boosting gold ^[5].

2. Key Data & Market Read

• [EASED] Oil & the Hormuz-deal channel: Bessent said a US-Iran deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz could be reached Tuesday or Wednesday ^[5][6]; Iran signaled willingness to let European countries help clear mines in the strait ^[6]; oil fell a further ~5% on the geopolitical-risk decline, and Treasuries outperformed other DM bonds on the move ^[6]. Context: Brent surged 23.6% in July and briefly exceeded $100/bbl ^[38], and one China-based house argues the medium-term price center of oil has already shifted higher even as tensions ease ^[39]. Narrative impact: removes near-term fuel from the credibility-hike case, but the cooling-inflation consensus rests on earlier oil declines and ceasefire durability remains in question ^[40].
• [NEW] July ISM manufacturing PMI: a near-four-year high pointing to resilient US economic activity ^[2].
• [ONGOING] June PCE: cooled — headline fell month-over-month and core eased, per Bloomberg ^[40][23]; real consumer spending rose at the strongest pace since last July ^[23]; the Atlanta Fed dashboard shows core CPI at 2.6% and core PCE at 3.3%, most indicators above target but trending down ^[9]. Narrative impact: supports the hold camp, but core remains sticky well above target.
• [ONGOING] Q2 GDP: below expectations at 1.5% annualized, but consumption and business investment kept domestic momentum solid, with final private domestic demand growing strongly ^[40][37][8].
• [NEW] High-frequency activity & labor: initial jobless claims jumped while continued claims eased ^[41]; an online job-openings index stabilized ^[41]; a weekly economic index slipped ^[41]; regional Fed manufacturing surveys diverged; durable goods and income missed while house prices beat and inflation expectations eased ^[41]. Narrative impact: mixed — mild cooling momentum versus a resilient core, leaving the payrolls report as the arbiter.
• [NEW] July payrolls preview (due 8/7): consensus expects a rebound (~83k vs prior 57k) ^[2]; BofA forecasts slightly below consensus with unemployment ticking up on participation ^[7][8]; HSBC forecasts below consensus ^[5]; Citi expects June JOLTS to ease and the June trade deficit to narrow, consistent with cooling ^[12]. Narrative impact: the pivotal test of whether the ~58–65% September pricing resolves hawkish or collapses.
• [NEW] CPI preview (next week): will be particularly important because it captures the period after the Iran war flared again and oil revisited recent highs ^[18].

3. Financial-Conditions Signals

• [EASED] Rates: Treasury yields fell 4–6bp with medium maturities outperforming ^[6], or 3–4bp across maturities per Bloomberg ^[42]; the 10-year at ~4.63% (down ~5.7bp on the day, +47.4bp YTD), 2-year at 4.19%, 30-year at 5.19% ^[6]; per the WSJ, the 10-year is back around its level before Warsh’s press conference ^[43]. One later read has the 30-year still at 5.239% and the 10-year at 4.693% ^[44].
• [NEW] Driver-narrative debate — Citi’s counter-read: the long-end rise is “almost entirely” real-rate driven, breakevens stayed around 2%, so the curve steepening is not an inflation-expectations signal ^[12]; Fidelity’s Timmer separately notes real rates at 2.45% with breakevens very low at 2.29%, and argues a less transparent Fed “inevitably leads to a higher term premium” ^[45].
• [ESCALATED] BofA’s credibility-shock read: bear steepening, sharply higher breakevens during the press conference, and higher risk premia — “typically associated with credibility shocks faced by central banks in emerging markets” ^[18][37][8]; post-FOMC, the 30-year and 5-30y breakevens each moved more than two standard deviations ^[8].
• [ESCALATED] Volatility & long-end hedging: the ICE BofA MOVE index climbed to a ~10-week high ^[46]; one-month put skew on the long-duration Treasury ETF surged to its highest since the 2008 crisis ^[44]; traders are spending heavily on options hedging long-end declines, a dynamic that risks amplifying turbulence ^[46].
• [NEW] Liquidity/funding (Citi): the TGA balance is elevated while bank reserves have fallen and RRP usage is near zero; SOFR is expected to run near or above IORB in August on TGA drain plus rising T-bill supply ^[47]; TGA is forecast to stay in the $900–950bn range, with September easing temporarily and Q4 tightening again ^[47]; global central-bank liquidity metrics declined again this month, and the liquidity–S&P 500 correlation remains above its long-term average ^[47].
• [ONGOING] Dollar: DXY is back at the 100 level after the yen-intervention washout ^[2]; July saw a 1.3% DXY decline, weaker against all G10 currencies ^[38]; the 2-year US vs non-US rate differential (~150bp) is broadly fair ^[2]; the author sees limited near-term downside at 100 and no strong dollar in H2 ^[2].
• [ONGOING] Intervention layer: the US Treasury and Japan’s MoF conducted their first coordinated FX intervention since 1998 on July 30–31 ^[38]; some analysts read the US motive as partly preventing a fresh Treasury-volatility flare-up ^[44]; Citi estimates a potential Japan MoF intervention could add ~$60bn of reserves via FIMA repo and ~$160bn of deposits via foreign RRP — relatively limited in size ^[47].
• [NEW] Credit: high-yield spreads widened ~19bp week-over-week to 287bp, and AI data-center bond spreads have widened more than 100bp since June, with HY AI bonds trading at a 110bp premium over non-AI peers ^[8]; IG and HY spreads widened in July mainly on AI-related supply ^[8]. Flows remain supportive at the margin — global equity funds took in $63.7bn and IG bond funds posted a 17th consecutive weekly inflow ^[8]. Mortgage rates rose to 6.66% with applications falling ^[41].
• [NEW] Commodities: the broad CRB-style index fell on the week while US retail gasoline kept rising ^[41]; gold at $4,084.20/oz at the Aug 4 fix, with resilient Shanghai premiums and firm forward buying ^[5][48]; HSBC sees gold potentially breaking above $4,200/oz if Middle East risk fades further, trimmed silver forecasts, and favors PGMs ^[5]; HSBC notes gold’s historically positive correlation with oil has turned inverse ^[5]. Copper traded above $14,000 intraday, driven in part by AI demand ^[49].

4. Global Central-Bank Linkages

• [NEW] BOJ: minutes show some members stressed the bank should uphold guidance to continue raising rates if the economy and prices align with projections ^[50]; the BOJ has turned hawkish on yen depreciation and import-price pass-through, explicitly citing FX in its July Outlook Report ^[10]; Morgan Stanley expects hikes in October 2026 and March 2027 with a terminal rate of only 1.5%, below market pricing near 1.8% ^[10].
• [ONGOING] BOE: held at 3.75% on a 6-3 vote with the chief economist among the three hikers ^[40][19]; markets still price one hike this year ^[40]; BoE staff scenarios show the outlook highly dependent on the Middle East conflict, with energy futures near the adverse scenario ^[19].
• [NEW] PBoC/China: the July Politburo retained “more proactive fiscal policy and moderately loose monetary policy” but shifted emphasis to implementation, domestic-demand expansion and structural transformation ^[51]; SPDB International expects structural PBoC tools near term, with a possible 10bp rate cut and 50bp RRR cut if momentum weakens ^[51]; Q2 real GDP grew below expectations while nominal growth improved to 5.9% on price recovery ^[51]; USD/CNY is expected to remain stable with a mild appreciation bias in H2 ^[51].
• [NEW] RBNZ: hiked 25bp to 2.5%, lifting NZD/USD by 3.5% ^[38].
• [NEW] Asia divergence (Morgan Stanley): most Asian central banks will raise rates but slower and smaller than market pricing, with four of ten hikes counter-cyclical on strong growth ^[10]; the BSP faces the region’s highest inflation and is expected to hike further; Korea’s terminal rate is seen at 3.5% versus market pricing near 4%; Taiwan’s CBC is expected to start a moderate hiking cycle; India’s credit growth at a 14-year high could pull RBI hikes forward; RBA cuts are expected in 2027 ^[10].
• [NEW] Bank of Korea gold buying: the BOK’s return to the gold market adds support for gold ^[5].

5. Asset Implications

This section is inference — no [N]. Anchored to the facts above.

Quadrant	Current probability tilt	Key asset implication	Anchoring narrative
Growth↑ + Inflation↑	Falling	The energy leg is unwinding on Hormuz-deal hopes (oil −5%, yields −4-6bp); breakevens near 2% cap the inflation-compensation trade, so express residual inflation risk via TIPS and 5y5y swaps; copper’s break above $14,000 keeps the industrials/AI-demand reflation channel alive	§1.2; §2; §3
Growth↑ + Inflation↓	Rising	The Goldilocks window is widening: near-four-year-high ISM, resilient real spending, cooling PCE, and Morgan Stanley’s inflation-undershoot/hold thesis; front-end and belly duration favored; BofA’s September-hike-imperative is the main obstacle, and equities fundamentals look strong (record margins, solid breadth, un-frothy ex-semis sentiment)	§1.2; §2; §3; §4
Growth↓ + Inflation↑	Falling but non-zero	The stagflation tail eased with oil, but the credibility-shock premium persists: MOVE at 10-week highs, TLT put skew at 2008 extremes, AI-data-center credit >100bp wider; gold’s inverse-oil correlation makes it the two-sided hedge; the FX-intervention layer keeps carry-unwind risk live in JPY crosses	§1.2; §3; §6
Growth↓ + Inflation↓	Unchanged	A disinflation-led bond rally is front-end led until credibility is restored: the 10-year has retraced to pre-presser levels, TD’s base case is no hikes this year or next, and the NYT notes Fed officials still see a plausible case that inflation retreats to 2% on its own; the long end stays term-premium-blocked until the refunding and payrolls resolve	§1.2; §2; §3; §6

Stock-bond correlation call: The regime is in transition from inflation-driven positive correlation toward growth-driven negative correlation, but the transition is untested. The oil-led rally in bonds, Citi’s evidence that the long-end move was real-rate rather than breakeven driven, and sliding September hike odds all point to a growth-driven regime where bonds hedge equities. The counterweight is BofA’s EM-style credibility-shock framing — bear steepening plus rising breakevens is precisely the inflation-driven format in which stocks and long bonds fall together. Directional call: negative correlation strengthens into Friday’s payrolls if the print is soft and the Hormuz deal holds; positive correlation reasserts if next week’s CPI (capturing the oil re-spike) prints hot or if Warsh’s September silence forces the credibility premium higher again. The stock market’s resilience (around new highs per the NYT) alongside a 4.63% 10-year shows the market is currently pricing the growth-driven interpretation.

Risk-budget implication: Overweight front-end and belly duration — the ~58–65% September premium remains vulnerable to another hold surprise, quantified by HSBC’s below-consensus payrolls forecast and China Post’s no-hike call. Underweight long-end nominal duration: BofA’s technical target at 4.80% and the refunding guidance risk argue for expressing long-duration inflation via TIPS and 5y5y inflation swaps, with BofA recommending duration adds near/above 4.8%. In credit, favor IG over HY and avoid AI-data-center HY (110bp premium, >100bp widening); the 17-week IG inflow streak can turn on a refunding surprise. Overweight gold tactically — $4,084 with firm Shanghai physical demand, an inverse oil correlation, BOK official buying, and HSBC’s $4,200 breakout call; size for the risk that a hawkish September surprise caps it. In FX, hold the dollar as a hedge (BofA) but express JPY strength via structures given intervention-distorted vol (JPY-call skew at the 0th percentile); BofA recommends selective GBP-cross vol over broad G10 vol longs into the next FOMC.

6. Contrarian & Tail Risks

• Consensus fragility — the “market hiked for him” loop requires validation: Perkins argues the market has effectively delivered the hike, “but eventually you have to validate those expectations. Otherwise inflation expectations rise and real yields fall back” ^[52]. Hatzius warns that with fewer Fed clues, markets will act on “less information and potentially more inaccurate beliefs,” risking under-reaction to Fed-relevant data or over-reaction to Fed-irrelevant data ^[53]. A September hold without a credibility-restoring signal would entrench the doubt; a September hike would hit duration and equities together.
• Consensus fragility — September pricing is internally inconsistent: 58.4% (CME FedWatch) ^[1] vs ~64% ^[2] vs 65% (Chicago futures) ^[3], with the Fed-funds-futures October-28 probability at 83.5% and falling ^[4]. The dispersion itself signals a market unsure whether Warsh converts words into action.
• Consensus fragility — two incompatible reads of the same steepening: Citi argues breakevens at ~2% prove the steepening is benign ^[12]; BofA reads rising breakevens and bear steepening as an EM-style credibility shock ^[37][8]. One of these is wrong, and the payrolls/CPI pair will decide which. Timmer’s framing — real rates at 2.45%, breakevens at 2.29% — sits between the two.
• Consensus fragility — the meeting-reform risk is under-appreciated: BofA warns rapid implementation could reduce dealer market-making in 2027 FOMC OIS and cut Fed-funds-futures liquidity, and with inflation still high could make markets doubt the disinflation path ^[30]; other observers warn fewer meetings make short-end rates, growth-stock valuations and the curve more prone to sharp swings ^[31]; the proposal remains unconfirmed media reporting ^[30].
• Falsifiable assumptions: (1) the Hormuz deal materializes — Bessent says Tuesday/Wednesday, but the ceasefire was already interrupted once and one house notes oil’s medium-term center has lifted ^[5][6][39]; (2) payrolls print near or below consensus — the very low June survey response rate makes an upward revision a live hawkish trigger ^[2][7][8]; (3) breakevens stay anchored near 2% — a hot CPI capturing the oil re-spike breaks Citi’s read ^[18][12]; (4) Warsh does not clarify his reaction function before Jackson Hole ^[2].
• Second-order — refunding/term-premium channel: the August refunding announcement is a live supply event at a 5.19% 30-year; JPMorgan notes changing the “at least” auction-size guidance would pull forward duration supply and push up term premium with midterms under three months away ^[6], and dealers see size increases coming next year regardless ^[36]. Any upside surprise could trigger another round of bond volatility ^[44].
• Second-order — AI-credit and equity fragility: AI data-center HY spreads widened >100bp since June, and the volatility market is pricing long-dated AI boom-bust extremes ^[7][8]; Bob Elliott of Unlimited Funds says it is hard to tell how long equities can hold at current rate levels ^[44]; a hyperscaler capex disappointment would cut both the AI-credit and the copper/AI-demand legs at once.
• Second-order — intervention and carry: the coordinated US-Japan operation institutionalized a new policy layer; Citi sizes the FIMA/foreign-RRP capacity as real but limited ^[47]; BofA flags that intervention risk raises the probability of sharp reversals and carry-trade unwinds, with USD/JPY near-dated vol skew at the 0th percentile of three-year history ^[54].
• Source quality control: all Schmid remarks in this batch are single-source/social or secondary paraphrase ^{[55][13][14][56][15][17][16]}; several Paulson remarks are single-source/social flashes confirmed only by the Reuters/Bloomberg items ^[24][28]-^[57] vs ^[58][59][20]; the Warsh meeting-frequency proposal is media-reported, not officially confirmed ^[30]; Bessent’s “balance mandates” and “keep volatility offshore” remarks are single-source ^[34][35]; September-hike probabilities conflict across instruments (58.4% vs 64% vs 65%) — treat as a range; Citi’s methodological defense of core PCE is one house’s view against the 3.3% official reading.

Appendix: Additional Sources

• ^[40] Dongfang Jincheng — weekly wrap: July FOMC, June PCE, Q2 GDP, global markets
• ^[11] China Post Securities (Zhongyou Securities) — July FOMC review; no-hike call; hike-hurdle read on Warsh
• ^[44] Wallstreetcn (Huaerjie Jianwen) — Treasury-market stress transmission; MOVE; TLT skew; refunding preview
• ^[41] Huachuang Securities Research — US weekly data dashboard; financial conditions; credit
• ^[54] BofA Merrill Lynch — FX volatility note: selective vol around hiking windows
• ^[47] Citi — CB liquidity flash; TGA/SOFR; global liquidity-S&P correlation
• ^[38] HSBC — July FX review: dollar, BOJ, RBNZ, coordinated intervention
• ^[39] Guotou Futures — monthly macro: dollar-liquidity pressure, Warsh’s low inflation tolerance, oil center lifted
• ^[3] CEB International Capital — July FOMC recap; rate-path uncertainty; Jackson Hole preview
• ^[48] Datong Securities — nonferrous-metals weekly: Fed rate-hike expectations cooling; gold range; copper structural deficit

This report is a macro-mechanism analysis, not investment advice.