Fed Watch

Jackson Hole Eve: Pricing Splits Wide Open — FedWatch Holds September at 58.6% vs a 41.4% Hike While Deutsche Bank Reads ~60% Hike Odds; Buyback Credibility Fails Again (30Y 5.237%), Dollar Breaks Below 98, Gold Turns Crowded

On the eve of Warsh's Jackson Hole debut, the rate path is genuinely contested — FedWatch prices a 58.6% September hold while Deutsche Bank reads ~60% hike odds with December fully priced — and with the Treasury buyback again failing to hold the long end (30Y at 5.237%) , the dollar below 98 and a gold complex now crowded after starting the month underweight are the pressure valves .

39 sources ~52 min

0. Weekly Arc

The week’s arc tightened around a single node: Warsh’s Friday keynote. The post-payrolls dovish repricing gave way to a hawkish drift as the July minutes kept hikes live, debt crossed $40tn, and the long end hit 2007 highs, forcing Bessent’s surprise buyback doubling on Aug 19 — relief that reversed within two days. Gold surged on dollar-debasement logic, then turned crowded; the dollar broke below 98. Disinflationary data (import prices, claims) now collide with supply/fiscal term-premium pressure, leaving the August 28 speech, the core PCE print and Nvidia earnings as the arbiters.

1. Policy Narrative & Expectations

The past ~24h sharpened a genuine split in rate-path pricing rather than resolving it. CME FedWatch still puts the September hold at 58.6% with a 41.4% hike and prices the next hike only in early 2027 [1][2], yet Deutsche Bank reads market pricing as implying about a 60% probability of a September hike with December fully priced — versus its own baseline of two hikes this year — making the September FOMC a key reassessment point [3]. The macro body is bifurcating in sync: J.P. Morgan sees developed-market growth cyclically reaccelerating at a four-year-high PMI with sticky core-PCE momentum that keeps the Fed data-dependent [4], while Barclays reads the data as broadly supporting a September hold [5], and HSBC’s Ryan Wang sees softer activity pushing more FOMC members into wait-and-see [2]. Goldman provides a calming undertone on the expectations channel: actual inflation experience, not communication, drives expectations, so with core PCE forecast to return to target by end-2027, de-anchoring is not imminent [6].

1.1 FOMC Officials’ Remarks

  • [NEW] Hawkish: Musalem (St. Louis Fed President) — reiterated his preference for a July hike, views policy as neutral or accommodative, calls underlying inflation of 2.5%–3.0% too high, and wants a return to the 2% target within 18 months [3]. The marginal addition vs his prior stance is the explicit timeline.
  • [NEW] Neutral/swing: Daly (San Francisco Fed President) — policy is slightly restrictive, there is no need for a preventive hike, and temporary inflation shocks should dissipate; but if multiple shocks compound and worsen inflation dynamics, tighter policy would be needed [3].
  • [NEW] Chair Kevin Warsh (listed separately): no fresh remarks; the eve-of-speech collage is dense. BofA expects him to reiterate the 2% PCE commitment and stress rates as the main tool — but emphasizes he is in a passive position and must stabilize sentiment through communication or face further bond-market punishment [7]. Citi expects him to reiterate opposition to forward guidance with risks skewed dovish: mentioning cooling core inflation, September methodology-driven downward revisions to core PCE, or broader inflation measures would be read as dovish [8]. Stifel expects no clear rate-direction signal [9]; J.P. Morgan sees a reform agenda as the likely focus with no directional guidance [4]. On substance: per Krishna Guha, Warsh holds the unconventional view that the Fed should step back and let the market form the yield curve, implying long-end tightening is preferable to short-end hikes [10]; Hu Jie notes he prefers firm balance-sheet reduction but has found it hard to accelerate, engaging instead in specific short-dated operations [11]; Nomura flags his QT stance as the live risk — a signaled continuation of runoff could tighten liquidity and pressure equities [2]. The 8-meetings-to-6 proposal stays unimplemented [12]. (Speech: 8/28 10:00 ET / 22:00 Beijing; symposium Aug 27–29, theme “Financial Innovation: Implications for Payments and Policy” [7][13][14].)

1.2 Policy Signals & Institutional Communication

  • [ONGOING] Treasury buyback expansion — per-operation cap raised from $2bn to at least $4bn on 10–20y/20–30y coupons, effective Sept 9–Nov 4 [11][14][15][16]; Bessent confirmed the Sept 9 start, said $4bn is not a “hard constraint,” and no adjustment before the early-November refunding announcement [17][14].
  • [NEW] Bessent: “we haven’t even bought a single bond yet” — at a press conference [10]; two senior Treasury officials said the Treasury could tap its nearly $1 trillion TGA account to fund the expanded buybacks [10]; CNBC relays prediction-market traders doubt the interventions will push yields lower and that Bessent could tap near $1tn from the TGA [18] (single source / unverified for the $1tn figure).
  • [NEW] CICC mechanics: buybacks cannot indefinitely consume the TGA — once exhausted, short-dated issuance refills it, an Operation-Twist-like maturity restructuring with limited real yield impact and mainly a signal effect [17]. Hu Jie adds the Fed is the only institution with genuine intervention tools; a marginal ~$40bn/month short-dated purchase is conceivable within the inflation constraint, but the policy boundary is set by inflation [11].
  • [ONGOING] Rate-path pricing: FedWatch September hold 58.6% / 25bp hike 41.4%; October 43.0% no-change / 46.0% +25bp / 11.0% +50bp; next hike priced for early 2027 [1][2]. Southwest Securities notes fed-funds futures price the target above 4.1% by end-2027, more than 50bp above the Fed’s June median projection of 3.6% [19].
  • [NEW] BofA’s OIS framing: September OIS-implied hike pricing is ~9bp; a hawkish Warsh speech could lift it to ~12.5bp (50/50) and raise total-cycle hike expectations from ~40bp to ~50bp — while a speech that only hits structural themes could be read as dovish and push long-end yields to test 5.5% or higher [7].
  • [NEW] Deutsche Bank’s divergent read: market pricing implies ~60% September hike probability and fully prices December; DB keeps its baseline of two 25bp hikes (Sept and Dec) [3]. This directly conflicts with FedWatch — see §6.
  • [NEW] Goldman on expectations anchoring: public perception of the Fed’s inflation target fell from above 8% in 2018 to about 3% in 2025, but actual high inflation outweighs communication; long-term household expectations have returned to pre-GFC levels with short-term measures only modestly higher on the oil shock — no imminent de-anchoring [6].
  • [ONGOING] July FOMC minutes: confirmed the committee’s existing reaction function; broad support for holding but many officials open to further tightening if inflation doesn’t ease [5][3]; AI capex is double-edged — supporting inflation via demand and financing, but valuation downgrades could trigger asset repricing [12].
  • [NEW] Huatai’s credibility critique: the buyback adjustment looks hasty and unplanned — 16 days after Q3 refinancing was raised to $739bn, with the deadline a day after the midterms — inviting speculation of political motives; if the market sees through the pattern, Treasury credibility is damaged [17].

2. Key Data & Market Read

  • [ONGOING] August flash PMIs (S&P Global): manufacturing came in below expectations (53.2 vs 53.9) while services beat sharply (56.8 vs 54) — the resilient-but-divergent read, with the services strength supporting Friday’s equity rebound but also lifting rate-hike odds [13][20][14].
  • [ONGOING] Initial jobless claims (week of Aug 15): below expectations, reinforcing labor resilience; continuing claims came in above expectations — a slight softening under the surface [13][20].
  • [NEW] July import prices: rose less than expected (below consensus m/m) — a disinflationary signal [13].
  • [NEW] July housing starts and industrial production: both below expectations, while the Conference Board leading index beat — a mixed growth picture [13].
  • [NEW] Atlanta Fed GDPNow: Q3 nowcast cut to ~4.0% annualized from 4.3% — a cooling growth path from a still-strong level [13].
  • [NEW] July core PCE previews (due 8/26, coinciding with the speech): Barclays projects a modest monthly gain with the three-month annualized pace slowing to near 2.7% [5]; Citi sees it relatively contained and flags a September methodology change on portfolio-management fees that could mechanically cut core PCE y/y by 20–30bp [8]; J.P. Morgan counters that core-PCE momentum remains sticky near 3% annualized even as core CPI cools, with core CPI expected back near its pre-pandemic norm by the September meeting [4][8]. Investor attention on the release is heightened because it lands alongside Warsh’s remarks [9].
  • [NEW] Developed-market reacceleration: August composite output PMI hit the highest in over four years, with the employment PMI jumping to its highest since 2023 (US component up sharply) — J.P. Morgan reads this as evidence of a cyclical upturn that offsets disappointing retail and payroll data [4].
  • [NEW] Japan July core CPI: rose for a second straight month, with core-core inflation accelerating for the first time in nine months on oil and yen pass-through — reinforcing BOJ tightening bets [2][5].
  • [NEW] Eurozone resilience: August composite PMI rose to 52.1 with manufacturing output at 53.4, helped by defense and AI-related investment; euro-area headline inflation is expected to accelerate in August [5].
  • [NEW] Australia July employment: fell contrary to expectations of an increase — supporting the RBA’s no-further-hikes stance [21].
  • [NEW] Narrative impact: the US mix keeps the “gradual cooling with contained inflation” narrative intact for the Fed [22], but J.P. Morgan’s PMI-based reacceleration read and oil above $90 contest it from opposite directions [4][23]; the disinflationary core-PCE path (Barclays, Citi) is the dovish anchor entering Friday, so the data’s market-moving weight is really about how Warsh frames it [5][8].

3. Financial-Conditions Signals

  • [ONGOING] Rates: as of publication the 30Y is at 5.237% and the 10Y at 4.71%, versus recent peaks of 5.336% and 4.746% [17]; Monday’s long-end dip on TGA-funding expectations followed the now-familiar pattern of buyback relief fading within two days [10][14][5].
  • [ESCALATED] Driver decomposition — term premium, not the path: the long-end move is a repricing of duration-risk compensation. GF Securities: since late June almost all additional 10Y gains have come from term-premium expansion while the expected near-term rate component stopped rising [15]. Minmetals: a curve-steepening term-premium rerating driven by inflation tail risk, structural deficits, and AI capex demand — not runaway long-run inflation expectations [16]. Barclays: DM long-end rises are mainly term-premium-driven [24], and HSBC’s newly built “US Policy Scepticism Index” (2Y/10Y/30Y moves plus gold and EUR/USD) hit a notable high after the buyback, reflecting structural concern about US fiscal policy [25]. Fiscal anchors: debt above $40tn with public-held at $32tn and debt/GDP near 125%, CBO projecting above 135% in a decade [5][10][14]; CBO’s sensitivity math adds ~$379bn of deficits per 10bp sustained rate rise — roughly $3.8tn per 100bp [16]; interest expense has climbed to about 20% of federal tax revenue [11].
  • [ESCALATED] Dollar: broke below 98, the lowest since May, as the “dollar depreciation trade” re-emerged on debt worries and buyback news [14]; Barclays’ USD sentiment index has turned bearish and its month-end rebalancing model signals moderate dollar selling across all majors (strongest vs EUR, GBP, AUD) [23]; macro managers are taking a bearish USD view, per Bloomberg-aligned reporting [26]; BofA notes the dollar depreciated sharply after the buyback announcement and stays pressured by fiscal-dominance concerns even with wider rate differentials [7]. GF’s structural point: since mid-June, long-end yields and the dollar have diverged in step with the 10Y term spread — when yields rise on fiscal/credibility risk, they no longer attract inflows [15].
  • [ESCALATED] Gold — decoupled and crowded: the rally has separated from the rates-curve catalyst — the 2s30s narrowed on the buyback while gold kept rallying hard over the same stretch [27]. Positioning swung from underweight to crowded: speculators bought heavily into gold futures over three weeks (net longs at the 93rd percentile of the two-year range), with CTA buying far larger than expected; option skew has repriced from downside hedging to paying up for upside calls, and open interest confirms new risk capital rather than short covering [27]. J.P. Morgan reports precious-metals ETF inflows at a multi-month high on debasement worries and geopolitics, with CTAs adding energy/gold/agriculture longs [28]. GF expects gold to resume a higher price center after episodic consolidation, since term premia reflect fiscal/inflation/policy-credibility risk rather than growth strength [15]; Minmetals distinguishes growth-driven high rates (bearish for gold) from inflation/fiscal/credit-uncertainty-driven high rates (a medium-term hedge for gold) [16].
  • [NEW] Credit & banking: J.P. Morgan’s global BB&B USD corporate spread widened only marginally to 246.975bp — contained [13]; high-yield funds saw large redemptions with demand back in outflow territory, while TIPS and MBS funds kept inflows [29][28]; financials led sector outflows, and leveraged ETFs saw outflows for a third straight week [28]; the 30-year mortgage rate eased slightly to 6.65% with mortgage applications down [13]; bank securities holdings declined $2bn in the week to Aug 12 [29].
  • [NEW] Liquidity & plumbing: the TGA fell to about $935bn (week to Aug 19) [29]; Fed custody Treasury holdings declined only ~$10.7bn that week, a sharp slowdown from ~$30bn drops in the prior two weeks [29]; global money-market fund inflows shrank by over $24bn w/w to a low percentile — reduced defensive cash [30]; offshore USD swap bases little changed [13]. Dongwu warns larger, more frequent short-bill issuance expands the TGA and drains bank reserves — a passive tightening [14].
  • [NEW] Flows & positioning: US equity funds took in $33.94bn (90.6th percentile since 2025) and global equity funds $39.57bn (83.5th) [30]; fixed-income ETF/fund inflows were $14.2bn in five days to Aug 20 with investors extending duration — record inflows into the long-zero UST ETF, medium-term government fund demand at the 90th percentile [29]; US Treasuries attracted their largest inflows since May 2026 [22]; Japanese private investors net bought foreign bonds for a second week [29]; S&P 500 ERP at the 2nd percentile remains a valuation caution [20].

4. Global Central-Bank Linkages

  • [ESCALATED] BOJ: the September-hike case has hardened across the board. OIS prices about an 80% probability of a September 18 hike with three more hikes priced to a 1.75% terminal rate [2]; HSBC pulled its expected hike forward from December to September, adding another in Q1 2027 [21]; J.P. Morgan sees September and December hikes to 1.5% by end-2026 [4]; Barclays keeps September, then January and July 2027 to 1.75% [5]. Former board member Adachi says the BOJ is “basically cornered” — markets have almost fully priced the hike, and standing pat risks renewed yen selling and faster import inflation [2]; Bessent has expressed the wish that Governor Ueda raise rates [2]; Japan’s 10Y briefly reached about 2.95%, the highest since 1996 [15]. Nomura sees favorable JGB supply-demand this week (no auction) but flags next week’s 10Y/30J auctions as the risk [31].
  • [ONGOING] ECB: Barclays expects a 25bp September hike and then possibly a hold, on resilient activity and August headline inflation seen accelerating [5]; survey consensus has the ECB hiking again this year with euro-area 2026 inflation averaging above target [2].
  • [ONGOING] BOE: held at 3.75% in July (6–3); the August survey has nearly 90% of economists expecting no change all year, with cooling services inflation and limited second-round effects the stated reasons [2].
  • [NEW] RBA: the cash rate is near the top of model- and market-based estimates of neutral, though the estimates are uncertain [32]; July’s surprise employment decline supports the no-further-hikes stance [21].
  • [NEW] Asia: HSBC expects the Bank of Korea to hold this week with possible internal dissent, and a hike by no later than October [21]; J.P. Morgan expects the BoK to hike for a second consecutive meeting, the Philippine central bank a third straight hike, Thailand to stay accommodative, and Indonesia to postpone its next hike to December [4]; HSBC sees the Philippines raising on sticky elevated inflation [21].
  • [NEW] Canada: US-Canada trade talks broke down and the US imposed 50% new tariffs on about C$20bn of Canadian imports — weakening expectations for Bank of Canada hikes early next year and adding second-order US inflation risk if the trade war intensifies [4].
  • [NEW] Structural: central banks’ continued exit from bond markets is one factor jointly lifting term premia globally [15], and reserve managers keep raising gold and non-dollar allocations, implying structurally weaker official dollar demand [20]; the 10Y US-Japan yield spread widened to 183.6bp while US-German narrowed to 150bp [13].

5. Asset Implications

This section is inference — anchored to the facts above.

QuadrantCurrent probability tiltKey asset implicationAnchoring narrative
Growth↑ + Inflation↑Steady-to-risingDM PMI at a four-year high, oil above $90 and sticky ~3% core-PCE momentum keep a reflation bid; commodities, TIPS and gold are the cleaner expressions while long nominal bonds stay blocked by the term-premium wall§1.2 / §2 / §3
Growth↑ + Inflation↓FallingDisinflationary import prices, the slowing core-PCE path and ~59% hold pricing support front-end/belly duration and steepeners; earnings-driven equities continue, but 2nd-percentile ERP caps index beta§1.2 / §2 / §3
Growth↓ + Inflation↑Rising (tail)Fiscal dominance, $40tn+ debt, Middle East/El Niño inflation tails and a crowded gold complex; gold is still the hedge but now carries unwind risk if Warsh surprises hawkish; long bonds do not hedge§2 / §3 / §6
Growth↓ + Inflation↓RisingHold pricing into 2027, a methodology-driven core-PCE downward revision and HSBC/Goldman’s positive-catalyst framing open front-end carry, 2027 cut optionality and gold as the two-sided hedge§1.2 / §2

Stock-bond correlation call: the regime is in the configuration hardest for risk parity. Barclays notes stock-bond negative correlation is near historical extremes, so a further rapid rise in long-end yields — especially if French political risk adds fuel — would pose significant risk to equities. The long-end move is being driven by term-premium/fiscal repricing, not the policy path, which means stocks and long bonds fall together whenever supply or credibility dominates; the front end still trades the growth/data format with hold pricing near 59%. The dollar has become the shock absorber and gold the hedge of choice; the buyback’s repeated failure to hold the long end is the cleanest evidence that nominal duration has lost hedging value while the policy risk migrates into FX, gold and crypto flows (HSBC’s “policy scepticism” construct and J.P. Morgan’s debasement-demand flows capture the same trade).

Risk-budget implication: Overweight gold, but respect the crowding — net longs at the 93rd percentile, upside-call skew repriced, and a hawkish Warsh surprise is the named near-term unwind catalyst, so size it as a hedge rather than a momentum position. Overweight front-end/belly duration and steepeners — hold pricing plus BofA’s warning that a structural-only speech reads dovish; BofA’s explicit pay-January-FOMC-OIS trade (3.94%, target 4.4%) is the clean way to express the hawkish tail rather than fight it. Underweight long-end nominal duration — the term-premium wall (GF, Minmetals, Barclays) and CBO’s rate-sensitivity math argue against fighting supply; express the fiscal hedge through gold, copper and non-USD FX instead. In equities, keep beta moderate and prefer cash-flow-protected AI leaders over valuation-driven segments — Nvidia’s report (Aug 26) and the speech land within days, and small-cap IWM options are underpricing Jackson Hole move risk. Express the dollar view through commodities and select Asian FX rather than a naked USD short.

6. Contrarian & Tail Risks

  • [ESCALATED] Consensus fragility: the market prices a ~59% September hold (FedWatch) while Deutsche Bank reads ~60% hike odds with December fully priced — the two pricing benchmarks disagree, which is itself a fragility flag. Deeper pillars: (1) the buyback is a credible backstop — Huatai calls it hasty and politically timed, Bessent admits not a single bond has been bought, and the TGA drawdown would shrink the debt-ceiling cash buffer; Wells Fargo sees no catalyst for lower long-end yields without macro-level change; (2) Warsh stabilizes expectations Friday — BofA warns a structural-only speech could be read as dovish and push the 10Y toward 5.5%, while Citi sees dovish-skewed risk in any mention of cooling core inflation or the methodology revision; (3) foreign demand stabilizes — TIC shows foreign official holdings at their lowest since February 2024 with Japan shifting from buyer to periodic seller; (4) the September-hike tail stays contained — DB’s read and the OIS path say otherwise; (5) gold’s rally is fundamental — it has become momentum/CTA-driven and crowded, vulnerable to exactly the hawkish surprise the market is pricing at only ~40–50%.
  • [ESCALATED] Second-order transmission: the short-end/long-end double squeeze — Slok’s warning that shifting to short-term funding raises fiscal sensitivity to Fed hikes; if inflation or fiscal doubts resurface, short-end pressure and long-end yields could rise together. Japan is the swing factor: its FX-intervention ammunition comes from selling roughly $1.2tn of Treasury holdings, and Hu Jie reads the Treasury’s move as a signal asking Japan to show restraint — a Japan-driven UST-selling shock on top of term-premium stress is the live tail. QT is the under-priced second leg of Friday’s speech: if Warsh signals continued balance-sheet runoff, financial conditions tighten and equities take the hit. Fiscal dominance (Barclays) means a credibility-restoring hike could backfire into deeper fiscal-interest worries (Dongwu). France adds a European aggravator: OAT spreads near post-pandemic highs and election risk premia are accumulating in CAC/EuroStoxx volatility structures. TGA depletion also reduces the government’s buffer if the debt-ceiling impasse (limit at $41.1tn, just above current debt) erupts again.
  • [NEW] Source quality control: single-source / unverified items include Lacalle’s Yellen-era intervention contrast and the “not QE, global debt repricing” post, El-Erian’s intervention-critique posts (shaky track record; markets dictating official action), the CNBC relay of prediction-market doubts and the ~$1tn TGA-tap figure, and Bob Elliott’s macro-manager USD-behavior note. Direct conflicts: Deutsche Bank (market ~60% September hike, December fully priced) versus CME FedWatch (58.6% hold); gold’s driver is split between “debasement/fiscal demand” (J.P. Morgan, GF) and “momentum/crowding fragility” (Wallstreetcn). September hike odds are a band, not a point — 41.4% (FedWatch), ~50/50 under a hawkish speech (BofA OIS path). Flow data carry EPFR coverage caveats (private funds, insurance, retail direct), and Michigan’s methodology change partly explains its elevated inflation-expectations reading versus the NY Fed.

Appendix: Additional Sources

  • [33] Daniel Lacalle — selective outrage over Treasury debt-market intervention; Yellen-era precedent
  • [34] Daniel Lacalle — “U.S. Treasury Bond Strategy Is Not QE — A Global Debt Repricing”
  • [35] Daily Chartbook — fiscal-space yield-curve steepening and short-dated issuance
  • [36] CICC — dollar’s central status fundamentally shaken; RMB internationalization
  • [37] Century Securities — global long-end rate acceleration; tail-risk warnings
  • [38] El-Erian — Treasury drawn deeper into bond price determination; intervention track record
  • [39] El-Erian — “bond markets testing the Fed” narrative questioned; object of the test is the federal budget

This report is a macro-mechanism analysis, not investment advice.

30-day review of this series 7/23 – 8/22
  • Hike odds collapsed from the FOMC hangover to a dovish front-end: The 9-3 hawkish hold kept September tightening near two-thirds, but four soft data legs—contracting payrolls, benign CPI/PPI, a retail-sales miss—dragged hike odds to about 27-36%, pushed the fully priced move into early next year, and flipped Citi to a cut forecast.

  • The long end became the regime’s battleground: The 30-year climbed to its highest since 2007 on term-premium and fiscal-supply pressures, then the Treasury’s surprise buyback doubling crushed yields and lifted gold toward $4,600—only for the “Bessent put” to unwind within a day as the 30Y snapped back near 5.25%.

  • Credibility replaced the rate level as the core variable: Warsh’s no-guidance regime made every release a mini-FOMC; market doubt that the Fed would match hawkish words with action—visible in the term-premium surge and “hawkish hold” aftermath—evolved into a split between a quiet, data-led Fed and an activist Treasury capping long yields.

  • The dollar and gold became the safety valves: The dollar slid to three-month lows as yield suppression and Fed-independence worries mounted, while gold consolidated near record territory on de-dollarization and central-bank buying, briefly spiking toward $4,600 on the buyback news.

  • Energy re-inflation stayed the live tail: Oil’s Iran/Hormuz-driven surge kept inflation risks skewed upward even as hard data cooled; the July CPI window missed the late-July oil spike, leaving August prints as the decisive test for the disinflation narrative.

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  33. When Yellen’s Treasury tilted most issuance toward short-term bills while buying back billions of long-dated Treasuries, and the Fed delayed QT befor... Twitter·宏观市场 Score 60
  34. The U.S. Treasury Bond Strategy Is Not QE. A Global Debt Repricing. https://youtu.be/JZtJMSDJ4M4?si=_l-8rWx9v3ctfBIU via @YouTube Twitter·宏观市场 Score 61
  35. "When countries run out of fiscal space, the yield curve steepens, so gov'ts issue more short-term debt. They also claim markets are irrationally push... Twitter·宏观市场 Score 60
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  38. Here are two reasons why I am less than comfortable with the US Treasury being drawn deeper into price determination in the government bond market: Fi... Twitter·宏观市场 Score 62
  39. Good morning. In the run-up to Friday’s Jackson Hole remarks by Chair Warsh, we are likely to hear several market commentators state that bond market... Twitter·宏观市场 Score 68