Minutes turn December into a floor, not a decision; Waller stands alone on 50bp
The October minutes converted an already-priced December hike into a near-unanimous commitment to keep going — "almost all" participants saw further increases as appropriate and a couple floated more than 25bp — while Waller alone argued for a half-point "shock", leaving a hawkish-but-gradualist Fed, a dollar pressing toward 104 and an indiscriminate metals liquidation as the cross-asset signature .
0. Weekly Arc
Six sessions ago December was a priced decision; today it became the floor of a path. Nov 13–14 moved the argument from the December move to the cumulative sequence, with BofA adding January and the Fed’s stability report flagging AI valuations and leverage. Nov 15–16 handed the calendar to the minutes while Deutsche Bank raised its neutral rate and Morgan Stanley published a 2027 hold. Nov 17 made consecutive hikes an explicit voter preference and put an equity-valuation downturn into official scenarios. Today the minutes landed on the hawkish side of that build, and the marginal fight moved from direction to size and speed.
1. Policy Narrative & Expectations
The past 24h did not reprice December — they reclassified it. The minutes of the October 27–28 meeting, released Wednesday, showed “almost all” participants judging that further increases in the target range would likely be appropriate under their baseline outlook, a couple raising the possibility of a move larger than 25bp if inflation data disappointed, and a few arguing policy may need to shift to a “more restrictive” stance than currently expected [1][2]. That is the language of a sequence, not a single meeting, and it arrives with December already close to fully priced — 95% for a quarter-point on CME’s tracker [3], replicated at 92%/8% split between 25bp and 50bp on a second read [4], with a 50bp tail still priced in single digits [5]. The distributional question is where the sell side now sits: Barclays keeps December and January to 4.25–4.50% and a long hold, reads the 10–2 vote as understating the committee’s tightening bias, and is openly sceptical that a 50bp move commands support [6]; Goldman Sachs keeps December and March for three hikes to a 4.25–4.50% peak while flagging the risk that the third arrives in January or that more than three are needed [7]; Morgan Stanley keeps December and March and puts a high bar on 50bp, requiring renewed oil pressure plus clear labour-market overheating [8]; Citi calls a December quarter-point “highly probable” unless there is a sharp financial-market pullback, with January also likely and three consecutive core upside surprises as the trigger [9]; HSBC is the outlier on the dovish side, seeing December to 4.00–4.25% and then no change through 2027 [10]; BofA carries three consecutive hikes from December [11]; and JPMorgan reads the minutes as pointing clearly to at least 25bp in December while noting market pricing has already run slightly ahead of its own path [12]. The net: direction is settled, size is not, and the only official arguing for the larger move is a single governor.
1.1 FOMC Officials’ Remarks
- [ESCALATED] Hawkish — Governor Christopher Waller: the marginal escalation is that he has converted a conditional preference into a menu and attached a behavioural argument to it. He said a half-percentage-point hike “is likely necessary” at the December 8–9 meeting, that the Fed “may need to reverse last year’s three-quarter-point reduction and do more”, and that “I’m very, very concerned about inflation. It’s kind of headed in the wrong direction, and it’s spreading out” [3]. The mechanism he named is psychology rather than arithmetic: firms increasingly believe customers can absorb roughly 3% price increases, which is “the kind of inflation psychology that needs to be broken” [13], and it may be necessary to “shock people” — explicitly so if the Fed does not signal another increase in January [14]. His two-option framing is either a 50bp December move or a clear signal that the pace accelerates through 2027 [4], and he is reported as the only voting member making this case publicly [13].
- [NEW] Hawkish — St. Louis Fed President Alberto Musalem (no vote in this period): the most explicit cumulative-path call in the batch. He said the economy will likely need multiple increases before spring 2027, with cumulative tightening of as much as a full percentage point, and that the real policy rate must rise from the low end of the 1–1.5% range to 2–2.5% [13][15]. His justification is a growth read — activity near or above potential, consumption strong and AI capex keeping the labour market solid — which is why he treats the current 3.75–4.00% range as still accommodative rather than restrictive [15].
- [ESCALATED] Hawkish — Governor Michael Barr: his earlier appearances in this batch were structural (AI, the labour share); today he supplied an explicit policy call. “Overall, the economy is strong, with low unemployment, solid consumer spending, and robust business investment,” but “inflation is too high making it hard for American families to make ends meet,” and “if the economy evolves as I currently forecast, I expect it will be appropriate to raise rates further to achieve that goal” [16]. Note the transcript is an AI speech-to-text rendering not reviewed by Reuters journalists [16].
- [ONGOING] Hawkish — Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee: warned the Fed risks losing credibility if it does not act [13].
- [ONGOING] Hawkish, gradualist — Cleveland Fed President Beth Hammack: dissented in October in favour of a quarter-point move [1], and remains the hawk who prefers 25bp increments over a jumbo [17].
- [NEW] Hawkish — Governor Lisa Cook: named in the minutes as the other October dissent, arguing inflation remained too high and policy was “not restrictive enough” [1][7].
- [EASED] Neutral/dovish — New York Fed President John Williams: he still concedes work remains to reach 2% in a timely way, but the marginal content is his pushback on size — there is no need for “dramatic action”, the gradual and data-driven framework is “working well”, and strong growth with above-target inflation builds a consensus for 25bp rather than 50bp [10][17]. He also framed the future pace as dependent on AI investment, the equity wealth effect and the inflation path [18].
- [EASED] Neutral — San Francisco Fed President Mary Daly: inflation is high but its path remains uncertain, and she supports continuing “in a prudent manner” rather than pre-committing to size [4].
- [ONGOING] Chair Kevin Warsh: no fresh public remarks; his October press conference gave little guidance on next moves [19], his doctrine remains that policy depends on strategy rather than a single data point and that there is no soft or hidden inflation target [20], and the minutes notably contain no record of the 2027 meeting-schedule change he had announced — an omission JPMorgan’s Feroli calls odd [21].
1.2 Policy Signals & Institutional Communication
- [ESCALATED] The minutes are the institutional confirmation, and the hawkish breadth is the story rather than the vote: almost all participants saw further tightening as likely appropriate and broadly consistent with the September SEP; a few who supported the hold called it a “close call” and joined a larger group in urging clarity that the pause did not weaken the commitment to 2% [1][2]; several warned that delay could entrench high inflation or require “larger and more destructive” tightening later [7]; and Barclays argues the 10–2 tally understates the committee’s bias because hawkish sentiment extends to non-voters [6].
- [NEW] The inflation diagnosis inside the minutes is breadth, not energy: most participants called pressures broad-based, with several noting tariff effects fading while energy and AI-buildout demand kept squeezing supply and pushing technology-goods prices higher, and several judging the pressure was spreading beyond data-centre-adjacent industries [2][7]. A separate detail matters for the model: several noted annual national-accounts revisions lowered measured inflation this year, but two stressed this did not reflect an improved underlying outlook [7].
- [ESCALATED] AI has become a two-sided official risk, not a productivity story: almost all participants discussed the scenario of disappointing AI investment returns and many explored the consequences of an AI-related asset repricing [22][21]; most flagged rapid growth in AI-related debt intermediated through complex and opaque structures, with a few noting concentration in a small number of firms [22][2]; staff warned that off-balance-sheet lease commitments and circular financing among AI-related firms could amplify losses, that bank vulnerabilities could emerge quickly, and that hedge-fund leverage and limited dealer intermediation are amplification channels [22]. The minutes are also more sceptical on AI productivity than the Chair’s press conference, with only “some” discussing productivity effects and “many” stressing uncertainty over timing, magnitude and distribution [8].
- [NEW] Citi makes the hike explicitly conditional on asset prices: a December quarter-point is highly probable “unless there is a sharp financial-market pullback”, January is also likely, and officials will not keep hiking aggressively if financial conditions tighten markedly or AI sentiment deteriorates — with AI asset prices and financing conditions named as variables for the policy path [9].
- [NEW] HSBC is the clearest dovish divergence in the batch: it reads the minutes as “cautious hiking” rather than an open-ended cycle, forecasts December to 4.00–4.25% and then no change through 2027, and is more dovish than market pricing on the Fed, ECB, BOE and BOJ [10][23].
- [ONGOING] JPMorgan’s Feroli: the minutes are “hawkish but paused” and point clearly to a 25bp December move, with the >25bp camp likely comprising Waller and one other member [21][24].
2. Key Data & Market Read
- [NEW] US October retail sales: nominal sales beat expectations with upward revisions, but combined with lower utilities output real consumption was roughly unchanged, and goods consumption tracking steps down from the mid-single-digit pace of Q2–Q3 to about half that in Q4 — still solid, clearly decelerating [12].
- [NEW] US housing: single-family starts rebounded month-on-month yet remain down year-on-year, permits fell to a post-pandemic low, pending sales dropped again and builder confidence hit a 14-year low, with mortgage rates above 7% cited as the operative drag [12][19]. Market read: the one sector where tightening is unambiguously working, and it is working harder than the models assumed.
- [NEW] UK October CPI: below Bank of England forecasts across headline, core, goods and services, with second-round energy effects still limited — read as removing the case for a faster BOE and keeping February as the next move [12].
- [NEW] Euro-area October final HICP: the final print was barely revised and the detail showed greater energy spillovers with lagged pass-through still to come, keeping core risks skewed to the upside and December plus March live for the ECB [12].
- [NEW] Global demand is cooling outside the US: Q3 real retail sales growth largely reflected China, ex-China momentum slowed sharply and developed markets decelerated markedly, while JPMorgan’s QED nowcasts sit below forecast for both global and US GDP [12].
- [ONGOING] October CPI remains the reference print, with core up for a third consecutive month and no year-on-year figure because the 2025 shutdown left no base [25][13].
- [NEW] Activity and surprise data still favour the hawkish read at the margin: the US economic surprise index sits at historic highs alongside an unemployment rate of 4.1% and core PCE of 3.1% [11], and the minutes cite September headline PCE at 3.6% with core at 3.1% [22].
- [NEW] Narrative impact: the data no longer arbitrate cleanly. Price data confirm the hawkish case, but the growth side has started to bifurcate — US consumption tracking slower, housing at post-pandemic lows, developed-market retail decelerating — which means the “no landing” premise behind a three-hike path now rests on AI capex and the US consumer alone, while the disinflation leg still has no print behind it.
3. Financial-Conditions Signals
- [ESCALATED] Liquidity and financial conditions — the market has already delivered a meaningful part of the tightening: Goldman’s US financial-conditions index has tightened 31.9bp since Nov 9 to 99.22, the real measure 31.7bp to 98.98, driven by the equity decline and the higher 10-year yield, even as its Q4 GDP tracking holds at +2.4%, its activity indicator at +3.1% and its surprise index slips to +0.53 [26]. Morgan Stanley’s FRB/US-based index tightened 26bp between the September and October meetings and a further 37bp since, first through dollar appreciation and then through equities, with signs of stress also appearing in the AI sector [8]. On the plumbing, BofA’s front-end model has the fed funds–SOFR spread moving from roughly zero in December 2026 to about +2bp by mid-2027 as debt-ceiling dynamics bite, with October financing conditions tighter but mild [27].
- [ESCALATED] Dollar & rates — the driver is the policy path and real rates, and the dollar is now overshooting it: the dollar is pressing toward the 104 handle [28] after a sixth consecutive session at a 19-month intraday high [4]. Deutsche Bank attributes the move to the hawkish repricing widening rate differentials plus record foreign dip-buying of US equities over the past two weeks, judges the dollar to have overshot what differentials imply, and doubts either support survives continued market turmoil [29]. BofA’s read is that the oil–dollar link has broken down in favour of rate differentials and keeps a long-dollar view into the first half of 2027 [11]. The decomposition still says real rates rather than inflation compensation: Deutsche Bank notes market inflation expectations repriced sharply lower while Fed rhetoric did not soften at all [30], Jefferies puts the nominal 10-year at 5.16% against a 1.34% real yield and a 5.48% 30-year [31], and BofA’s model has the 10-year roughly 45bp above macro fair value, with breakevens 20–25bp cheap and real yields 75–80bp cheap [27].
- [ESCALATED] Credit & banking: BofA argues credit volatility remains underpriced relative to equity volatility, with credit acting as the canary that has already priced downside equities have not, and recommends long credit volatility, especially in the US, where CDX IG trades richer than iTraxx Main and European high-yield positioning is the more bearish of the two [32]. The minutes describe the transmission already under way — wider spreads for riskier and AI-related borrowers, reduced lower-rated issuance and more selective bank lending hitting housing, commercial real estate and small businesses [6].
- [ESCALATED] Gold and metals — the real-rate channel has become a liquidation: spot gold broke below $3,750 intraday to its lowest since September 2025, silver fell more than 5% toward $44 and LME copper closed about 5.7% lower at $12,471, its weakest close since early April, despite a record-high Chinese cathode premium and a historic Shanghai squeeze [4]. Deutsche Bank calls it indiscriminate selling that has decoupled prices from fundamentals, catalysed by falling inflation expectations against unchanged hawkish rhetoric, with gold’s non-commercial longs at historic lows, discrete shorts still holding room to add, ETF holdings showing no 2013-style redemptions, and copper net length at its lowest since March 2022 [33].
4. Global Central-Bank Linkages
- [NEW] BOJ: Governor Ueda said FX swings could influence price changes more than before, affecting long-term inflation expectations and core inflation — a framing that ties BOJ timing to the yen channel (single source / unverified) [34].
- [ESCALATED] ECB — the December direction is shared, the terminal is not: JPMorgan keeps one 25bp hike each in December and March with risks still slightly to the upside [12], while HSBC runs a more dovish path — deposit rate 2.50% now, 2.75% by Q4 2026 and 3.00% by Q4 2027 — and argues the French OAT-driven safe-haven episode broke the link between Bund yields and gas prices, implying yields and rate expectations may have peaked [23].
- [NEW] BOE: Governor Bailey stressed data dependence, reinforcing JPMorgan’s view that the next hike waits until February [12].
- [NEW] Others: Bank Indonesia hiked 25bp against market expectations of no change, showing the exchange rate is its priority, with another FX-driven move expected in December and the cycle possibly extending into 2027 if the Fed keeps tightening; Malaysia is in the hiking-on-strength camp with Q3 growth revised up on AI-related exports; South Africa is judged to have finished and is expected on hold; Australian wage growth in the low-to-mid 3% range is consistent with the RBA’s target [12].
- [ONGOING] PBoC: the FX deposit reserve requirement ratio was raised 2 percentage points effective 15 November to cool appreciation expectations, with further short-term renminbi appreciation judged limited, and HSBC keeps the mainland policy rate at 1.25% through 2027 [35][23].
5. Asset Implications
| Quadrant | Current probability tilt | Key asset implication | Anchoring narrative |
|---|---|---|---|
| Growth↑ + Inflation↑ | Rising | commodities mixed, TIPS↑, nominal long bonds↓ — minutes near-unanimous for further hikes, AI capex named as both demand and price source, surprise data at historic highs | §1.2 / §2 |
| Growth↑ + Inflation↓ | Falling | stocks↑, long bonds↑, gold↓ — requires the 60bp of market-driven tightening and the AI-sentiment channel to do the Fed’s work, and HSBC’s hold-through-2027 path to win | §1.2 / §3 |
| Growth↓ + Inflation↑ | Rising modestly | commodities↑, gold↑, stocks↓ — AI debt intermediated opaquely, credit acting as the canary, oil-linked cost pass-through still in the pipeline | §1.2 / §3 |
| Growth↓ + Inflation↓ | Rising | long bonds↑↑, stocks↓, credit spreads↑ — AI-return disappointment is now an official scenario, housing at post-pandemic lows and DM retail decelerating | §1.2 / §2 |
Stock-bond correlation call: still positive and policy-path driven, and today’s batch strengthens the call rather than complicating it. The bond sleeve is losing money through real rates with inflation compensation falling — Deutsche Bank’s core observation is that inflation expectations repriced materially lower while Fed rhetoric did not budge — which is the precise configuration in which duration provides no offset to an equity drawdown. The one genuinely new structural element is that the reaction function now contains asset prices: Citi’s “highly probable unless there is a sharp financial-market pullback” is not a throwaway caveat, it is the market-conditioned clause that historically flips the sign, and the minutes’ AI-stability discussion supplies the channel. My call is that positive correlation persists through the December 8–9 meeting, because the market is trading the size and speed of a sequence that no single print can falsify, and because the fastest-moving tightening in this batch is coming from the dollar and from credit spreads rather than from the funds rate. But the negative-correlation window is now closer than it was a week ago: it opens not on a disinflation print but on an equity- or credit-led accident, and — per Deutsche Bank — a reversal signal delivered by market cracks rather than by dovish Fed wording would produce the more violent move of the two.
Risk-budget implication: stop paying for December direction; it is priced at 92–95% with a single-digit half-point tail, and the payoff has migrated to whether 50bp happens and whether the sequence extends into January. Size that as convexity, not as carry — front-end payer structures for the tail, receiver spreads and belly flatteners for the gradualist path the majority of the committee actually describes. Cut long-end level beta further: the 10-year sits a wide margin above model fair value by two independent houses, term premium is being rebuilt by supply and by a price-sensitive holder base, and the minutes added a fiscal-stability footnote in the form of government-debt levels interacting with long yields. Own inflation in the belly, not at the long end, because long-end breakevens are the leg the selloff has left cheap while real yields carry the whole move. In credit, the asymmetry favours optionality over spread: credit volatility is still cheap to equity volatility, index spreads are rich to fair value, and the AI-adjacent financing chain is where a discount-rate shock transmits — long vol, not long spread, is the way to own that. Equities deserve the smallest tactical budget and a dispersion hedge rather than an index hedge, because the operative risk is financing cost and sentiment inside the AI complex rather than index level, and the minutes just made that an official worry. Gold stays a tactical underweight with a structural residual: positioning is washed out, discretionary shorts still have room, and the medium-term case is intact — accumulate on weakness, do not chase the liquidation.
6. Contrarian & Tail Risks
- Consensus fragility: the baseline is “December is done, the sequence continues, and 50bp is a live tail.” Four assumptions are falsifiable. First, the 50bp case is one governor: Barclays is sceptical the committee supports a large move, Morgan Stanley sets a high bar requiring renewed oil pressure plus clear labour-market overheating, Citi states 50bp is not supported, and the most hawkish gradualist in the batch prefers 25bp increments — so “Waller said it” is being traded as “the committee will”. Second, the pricing is a scatter rather than a number — 95%, 92%/8%, “nearly 95%”, and a 50bp tail described as low — and the sell-side paths diverge on the number of moves (three from December, December plus January, December plus March, December alone then a hold), so there is no single “market path” to fade. Third, the minutes’ hawkishness is partially a communication artefact: the doves who supported the hold called it a close call and asked explicitly for language proving the pause did not weaken resolve, which is a committee managing its own credibility rather than a committee that has decided on a pace. Fourth, the whole structure rests on an asset-price condition the Fed has not tested — Citi’s pullback clause and the minutes’ AI-return scenario both say the sequence stops if equities or credit crack, which makes the hike path a function of the very asset prices it is supposed to be tightening against.
- Second-order transmission: three chains are not in the price. The AI-financing chain is now official rather than speculative: rapid AI-related debt raised through complex and opaque structures, off-balance-sheet lease commitments, circular financing among AI-related firms, concentration in a few borrowers, hedge-fund leverage and dealer intermediation capacity all named in the minutes, against a market where Nvidia gave back an entire post-earnings gain in a session and copper sold off on data-centre-capex doubt. The positioning chain is the second and is mechanical: gold non-commercial longs at historic lows with discretionary shorts still adding, copper net length at its lowest since March 2022, and CTA trend followers with room to press — a self-reinforcing liquidation whose reversal, on Deutsche Bank’s own framework, would be sharper if it is triggered by equity or credit cracks than by a dovish Fed. The dollar-funding chain is the third: a dollar at a 19-month high mechanically tightens conditions for non-US borrowers, and its two current supports — a widening differential and record foreign dip-buying of US equities — are exactly the two that Deutsche Bank says cannot both persist through continued turmoil.
- Source quality control: volume is not confirmation. The Reuters Barr item is an AI speech-to-text transcript explicitly not reviewed by journalists, so wording should be treated as approximate [16]; one Goldman note in the batch labels Hammack as “Chair” while the wire coverage, the Independent and multiple domestic notes identify her as Cleveland Fed President and Warsh as Chair, a mislabel that matters if the dissent is read as leadership signalling [7][1][19]. Long-end levels conflict across houses within hours — a 10-year quoted above 5.4% on one wire against 5.16%, 5.14% and 5.11% elsewhere, and a 30-year quoted below the 10-year, which cannot describe one curve at one moment [3][31][27][23]. Inflation data conflict on producer prices, with one note putting PPI above 6% year-on-year at a multi-year high and another reporting October PPI below expectations — different measures and vintages being read as one fact [13][36]. Several items are social relays or single-source commentary rather than attributable remarks, including the Ueda line, the El-Erian dollar comment, the Lacalle and Steno posts, and the roaming account of an Anthropic-IPO funding squeeze in metals, which is described in the source itself as rumour [34][37][38][39][4]. Finally, a large share of what reads as reporting is model output — fair-value regressions, regime probabilities, nowcasts, historical analogue averages and terminal-rate paths — and should be treated as distributions, not prices.
Appendix: Additional Sources
- [9] Citi — December hike “highly probable” unless sharp market pullback; January also likely; 50bp unsupported
- [10] HSBC — minutes read as cautious hiking; December to 4.00–4.25% then unchanged through 2027
- [8] Morgan Stanley — minutes more sceptical on AI productivity than the press conference; high bar for 50bp
- [24] JPMorgan (Feroli) — “hawkish but paused”; no record of 2027 schedule discussion
- [23] HSBC House Views — ECB deposit path to 3.00% by Q4 2027; long-end yields capped; gold forecasts
- [30] Deutsche Bank — inflation compensation collapsed while Fed tone held; over-tightening pricing regime
- [15] Hualong Securities — Musalem’s real-rate arithmetic and no-vote status
- [18] Hualong Securities — Williams on AI capex, wealth effect and the pace of further hikes
- [36] Soochow Securities — October PPI below expectations; 2027 “higher for longer” base case
- [31] Jefferies — 50-year analogue study; gold 12-month bullish with wide dispersion
This report is a macro-mechanism analysis, not investment advice.
30-day review of this series 10/15 – 11/14
- December repricing and path shift — From a mid-October debate where December was priced but not settled, hot inflation, payroll volatility and hawkish official comments pushed it to a fully priced hike by mid-November; the marginal argument then moved from whether December happens to how many cumulative moves follow, with January and a third hike entering the priced path.
- Official rhetoric versus market conviction — A hawkish speech wave and dissents built a restrictive-policy consensus, but the Chair’s anti-guidance doctrine and uneven communication repeatedly left markets pricing a slower or more conditional path; the gap narrowed as data and front-end pricing validated the hawkish tone.
- Real-rate rather than breakeven repricing — Inflation surprises initially lifted hike odds, but the decisive move became a real-yield and policy-path repricing; long-end breakevens stayed contained or fell, marking the selloff as discount-rate and term-premium driven rather than an inflation-compensation shock.
- Supply, term premium and fiscal plumbing — Refunding guidance, weak long-end auctions, bill-heavy issuance, TGA swings and debt-ceiling timing repeatedly pressured the long end; term-premium estimates and buyer-base shifts became central to explaining why duration behaved poorly as a hedge.
- Contested stock-bond correlation and AI-credit stress — The regime oscillated between inflation-driven positive correlation and episodic negative haven bids tied to AI-financing stress; credit dispersion, data-centre funding and equity concentration became the main transmission channel between rate shocks and risk assets.
- Global divergence and liquidity constraints — BOJ, ECB and BOE pricing moved with Fed expectations but on different timings; funding-market calm masked TGA/reserve mechanics and offshore dollar tightness, which repeatedly surfaced as a secondary constraint on the rates outlook.
Sources39
- Fed policymakers focused on inflation risks in October, with some seeing need for bigger rate hike
- 美联储纪要鹰声大作:几乎全体认为还需加息,更多人支持10月就行动,“不透明”AI债务风险引担忧
- Treasury yields inch higher as investors weigh the state of the U.S. economy
- 金属崩了!金银铜齐跌
- 美联储会议纪要释放明确鹰派信号,几乎所有官员预期后续加息,理事沃勒呼吁考虑12月加息50个基
- 10月FOMC会议纪要:短暂停歇
- 美国:FOMC会议纪要显示“几乎全部”与会者认为“进一步行动”提高联邦基金利率“可能将是合适的”
- 10月FOMC会议纪要:对金融环境收紧的鸽派担忧
- 近期政策偏鹰,但会议纪要暗示对AI的担忧
- FOMC会议纪要:抗通胀策略
- 美元:驾驭蓝色浪潮
- 每日经济简报:那只是一个梦
- 美联储纪要重磅信号!未来将有更多加息
- Fed Saw Need to Continue Raising Rates Despite October Skip
- [华龙证券]有色金属行业点评报告:穆萨莱姆释放强鹰信号,加息预期上修金属承压
- Fed's Barr says rate rises likely lie ahead
- 每日更新:美联储无需戏剧性行动
- [华龙证券]有色金属行业点评报告:加息方向渐成共识,节奏幅度分歧凸显
- Fed minutes: Higher interest rates needed in December as inflation worries mount
- [南华期货]人民币汇率热点:10月FOMC议息会议点评:按兵不动,静待数据
- 10月美联储FOMC会议纪要:为10月未加息“找一堆理由”,又强烈指引12月“至少加息25基点”
- 美联储纪要放鹰!通胀难降,AI狂热暗藏风险
- 汇丰市场观点:2026年11月——回调创造机遇
- 主啊,让我鹰派,但还不是时候
- [南华期货]南华宏观热点:美国10月核心通胀再超预期,真要加息50BP?
- 美国:高盛经济指标更新
- 美国利率观察:月度利率模型:2026年11月版
- 美联储最新会议纪要与理事沃勒的强硬表态正推动美元逼近104关口,金银持续承压,市场正同步消化美科技股震荡以及美债走强等事件……点击查看…
- 为什么?
- 美联储过度紧缩担忧主导
- 从历史看黄金后市
- 两个市场的故事:对冲需求上升
- 加息恐惧引爆金属市场“无差别抛售”!德银警告:金、铜空头仍有加仓空间
- BoJ Governor Ueda: FX swings could influence price changes more than before, impacting long-term inflation expectations and core inflation
- [宁证期货]专题报告:美国中期选举对资产配置影响浅析
- 【东吴宏观唐遥衎】大浪与潜流:条件式渐进修复——政策、盈利、筹码三重确认下的2027年A股年度展望
- The dollar index is stronger after Federal Reserve Governor Chris Waller stated once again that the central bank should consider hiking rates by 50 bp...
- He wants to engineer a private secror recession? Fed’s Waller says central bank may need to ‘shock people’ with half-point rate hike https://cnb.cx...
- Agreed. It will be shortlived