Fed Watch

Minutes week opens with Schmid rejecting the supply-shock defence as three-hike paths stack up

The hawkish consensus is now the assumption rather than the argument — Schmid pre-emptively rejected both the supply-shock and policy-insensitive-demand defences of inflation, Deutsche Bank lifted its nominal neutral rate to 3.75–4% with a three-meeting hike path, and Morgan Stanley's 2027 outlook put the Fed at 4.25–4.50% into a hold, leaving Wednesday's October minutes as the only scheduled test of how divided the committee actually is .

46 sources ~57 min

0. Weekly Arc

The week ran from a priced December hike to a priced cycle. Nov 11–13 did the work: the CPI print met Waller’s half-point threshold, the front end delivered its largest weekly rise in two years, and the sell side extended paths into January and March. Nov 14 added BofA’s January call and a stability report that flagged AI valuations and record leverage. Nov 15 was voiceless — one gradualism restatement and a dated minutes calendar. Today consolidates: the direction is uncontested, the argument has moved to the terminal rate, the 2027 path and the plumbing.

1. Policy Narrative & Expectations

No new print and no repricing event in the past 24h; what changed is the architecture around an already-settled December. Pricing is described as fully consistent with a quarter-point move, with a residual half-point tail small enough that one relay puts it near 8% against roughly 92% for 25bp [1], and the marginal analysis has shifted one level up — to the neutral rate and the length of the sequence. Deutsche Bank, having gone to three consecutive hikes in December, January and March, has now also raised its nominal neutral-rate assumption by 25bp to 3.75–4%, arguing policy is not restrictive enough to return inflation to target and projecting a materially steeper Treasury curve with the 10-year at 5.05% by end-2027 [2]. Morgan Stanley’s 2027 outlook frames a “measured recalibration” — two more quarter-point hikes to 4.25–4.50%, a hold through 2027, then 75bp of cuts in 2028 — built on a real neutral rate that has risen to about 150bp and on core PCE that only grinds down [3][4]. J.P. Morgan carries December, January and March and then a hold, while noting market pricing implies a larger cumulative tightening than its own forecast but at a slower pace [5]. The counterweight is a domestic house that keeps 25bp in December as the base case and puts a low probability on 50bp, explicitly noting that no official said the Fed is behind the curve and several said the opposite [6]. The next institutional input is dated: the October minutes land Wednesday [7][8][9], ahead of a week carrying roughly sixteen Fed appearances [10].

1.1 FOMC Officials’ Remarks

  • [ESCALATED] Hawkish — Kansas City Fed President Jeff Schmid (non-voter this year): the most substantive pushback of the batch, and the marginal addition versus his earlier appearances is that he has now attacked the arguments rather than the data. He said inflation is “uncomfortably above the 2% price stability target, and moving in the wrong direction,” and that “inflation is always the result of an imbalance between supply and demand… Demand always plays a role in inflation, and the Fed, through its influence on demand, always has the tools and responsibility to address inflation,” adding that both the supply-shock and policy-insensitive-demand narratives share the premise “that inflation is somehow beyond the Fed’s power to control. I don’t believe this to be true,” and citing Chair Warsh’s line that “we have work to do” [11]. He also rejected the idea that demand-driven sources such as the AI buildout are immune to Fed policy [11]; a single-line relay of the same message is single source / unverified [12].
  • [ONGOING] Hawkish — Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee: inflation has spread into services and healthcare beyond energy categories and the Fed “definitely has work to do” in rebuilding its inflation credibility, with the labour market stable but price shocks likely to show up there with a lag and AI construction heating the economy [13][14]. One relay renders his line as a demand to confront “out-of-control inflation” [15].
  • [ONGOING] Hawkish — San Francisco Fed President Mary Daly: “overlapping shocks” have changed the underlying inflation rate, the Fed “most likely” needs to raise rates, and policy may not be restrictive enough [13]; she continues to flag core services excluding housing [14].
  • [ONGOING] Hawkish — New York Fed President John Williams: inflation remains “far too high” and policymakers need to act over the coming period [1][15]. He is on the Monday schedule [10].
  • [ONGOING] Neutral — Boston Fed President Susan Collins: “a steady, gradual path seems appropriate to me at the moment. But I’m open-minded,” with the considerations currently arguing against a more aggressive pace, while the past three months of price data and a firmer labour market mean “the path of policy rates over the, you know, next year might be a bit higher than I had thought a couple of months ago” [11]. She also sees no de-anchoring of inflation expectations [13].
  • [ONGOING] Neutral — Richmond Fed President Thomas Barkin: direction clear, pace to be handled cautiously [16][15].
  • [NEW] Chair Kevin Warsh — the week’s central scheduled event: he delivers opening remarks at a San Francisco Fed event at 01:00 Beijing time on 17 November and chairs two panels and a fireside chat, with the theme productivity and employment and the AI impact on both — a setting in which remarks on inflation, productivity or policy could move the dollar, Treasuries and gold [17][7]. The carried content of his position is that policy is beginning to take effect while he keeps reminding markets of persistent inflation pressure [1], and his “we have work to do” line is already being quoted back by other officials [11].

1.2 Policy Signals & Institutional Communication

  • [ESCALATED] The minutes are now dated rather than expected: the October meeting minutes are released Wednesday [7][8][9], and a domestic read expects them to detail the divisions over the rate path [9]. Bond desks frame the whole week around that plus the speech slate [18][19][20].
  • [ESCALATED] The speaker calendar is the densest institutional input of the cycle: roughly sixteen appearances between 16 and 20 November across the Chair, governors and regional presidents [10] (schedule page; single source), ahead of the blackout that starts 28 November and leaves about two weeks of public commentary before the December meeting [16].
  • [ESCALATED] Deutsche Bank lifts the neutral rate as well as the path: three consecutive 25bp hikes in December, January and March, a nominal neutral rate raised 25bp to 3.75–4%, first cuts in the second half of 2028 and a peak policy rate in early 2027; the bank argues current restrictiveness may be insufficient to reach 2%, with a tightening labour market and rising housing inflation as additional catalysts, and notes the market’s neutral-rate indicator has already moved to the same 3.75–4% range [2]. Its rate strategy carries a 10-year at 5.05% by end-2027 and 5.15% by end-2028, with 2s10s widening to 50bp and then 80bp driven by front-end falls once hiking ends plus a modestly higher term premium [2][13].
  • [NEW] Morgan Stanley publishes the 2027 framework: two more 25bp hikes to 4.25–4.50%, a hold through 2027, then 75bp of cuts in 2028 to 3.5–3.75%, with the real neutral rate at about 150bp, core PCE easing only from 3.2% to 2.6% to 2.2%, real GDP at 2.5% and 2.7% in 2027–28, and the balance sheet shrinking by about $1.5trn with tiered reserve rates and passive runoff limiting the hit to financial conditions [3][4][21]. Four alternative scenarios bracket the Fed path from 1.375% to 5.625% [4][21].
  • [NEW] J.P. Morgan keeps December, January and March, then a hold, with the 10-year at 5.05% and the 2-year at 4.70% by end-2026 and the effective funds rate rising from 3.88% to 4.15% [5]. Its structural work is the more useful part: coupon auction sizes begin rising from August 2027, the holder base has shifted toward price-sensitive buyers (foreign share down from 51% in 2010 to 33% in 2025, the Fed’s from 24% to 14%, households up to 11% and money funds to 12%), and that shift has pushed the term premium back to a more average level, with a fair-value model at a 96.8% R-squared and a residual of only -4.4bp [5].
  • [NEW] U.S. Bank keeps the base case at two moves and calls the half-point tail small: it notes October CPI did reach the threshold Waller had set, but still expects 25bp in December and another 25bp in March, judging the committee to favour a steadier pace and putting the 50bp probability relatively low [1].
  • [NEW] A domestic house pushes back on the tail explicitly: GF Macro keeps 25bp in December as its base case, puts a low probability on 50bp, and observes that no official said the Fed is behind the curve while several said the opposite — while noting there is still no internal consensus behind the half-point option [6].
  • [NEW] Soochow Securities argues the market is too relaxed about timing: US inflation stickiness and its breadth are underappreciated, the implied oil path below $90 through next year is too optimistic, and hikes may arrive earlier than priced — possibly 25bp each in December and January with the next pulled forward to March or April, and possibly 50bp in December if oil rises further or October PCE shows more stickiness; the two-year faces continued upward pressure while the ten-year hinges on whether the two parties signal fiscal tightening around the December 12 shutdown deadline [22].
  • [NEW] A political-pressure signal lands on the tape: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned the Federal Reserve against additional monetary tightening (single source / unverified) [23].
  • [ONGOING] The Fed’s stability work continues to flag asset prices: the Financial Stability Report states that elevated asset prices pose risks, partly AI-driven [15].

2. Key Data & Market Read

  • [ONGOING] October CPI remains the reference print and the reason December is settled: headline and core both came in above expectations, core holding the same monthly pace for a third consecutive month [24][6][25][16].
  • [ESCALATED] October PPI is the two-sided print of the week, and the core detail is genuinely ambiguous: headline producer prices rose less than expected while the annual rate was the highest since late 2022, and the pipeline detail ran hot on at least one definition — one house reports core PPI above expectations at 0.5% m/m, another reports core ex-food-and-energy in line with the ex-trade measure at 0.5% [13][14][6][7]. Market read: the release cooled rate-hike pricing and produced a twist-steepening, with front-end yields falling while the long end held on hawkish commentary, weak tech and high oil [14][22].
  • [NEW] The Fed’s preferred gauge is still being marked near a pace inconsistent with target: post-PPI nowcasts cluster around 0.29–0.30% m/m for core PCE, which annualises to roughly 3.2–3.7% depending on the house, after one estimate was trimmed from 0.35% [13][6][14].
  • [NEW] Consumer expectations remain anchored-high: the New York Fed survey holds the one-year measure at 3.9% with the three- and five-year measures stable at 3.3% and 3.0% [15].
  • [NEW] The fiscal backdrop is deteriorating at the margin: the October federal deficit ran at $404bn against $284bn a year earlier, the highest for that month in more than a decade, and the release coincided with the move higher in the long end [15][22]; FY2026’s deficit reached about 6.2% of GDP and Morgan Stanley projects roughly 5.9% for FY2027 with fiscal policy neutral in 2027 [3][22].
  • [NEW] The week’s data risk is dated and second-tier relative to the minutes: retail sales are due Tuesday with traders looking for a modest deceleration from September’s pace, alongside housing starts and jobless claims [7][8].
  • Narrative impact: the inflation data confirm rather than arbitrate, and they now sit behind the market — the burden has moved to the minutes, to the neutral-rate debate and to whether the March hike survives a soft PPI core. The one genuinely two-sided input is that the same release that kept the annual rate at a multi-year high also softened the components that feed core PCE.

3. Financial-Conditions Signals

  • [ESCALATED] Dollar & rates — the driver remains real rates and the policy path, not inflation compensation: the two-year rose about 35bp on the week to roughly 4.87%, its largest weekly advance in more than two years, and the ten-year returned to about 5.15%, near its multi-year high [26][6][9][18][20]; Monday brought only tentative stabilisation, with the ten-year down about 2bp to 5.131% after Friday’s push to 5.174% and the two-year around 4.85% [7][27]. The decomposition is unambiguous: the ten-year TIPS real yield rose about 28bp to 2.91%, back to the cycle high, while two-year breakevens fell 2.4bp and ten-year breakevens 0.8bp [6][14]. The dollar index closed at 103.41–103.42, up about 1.1% on the week and at its highest since April 2025, having risen four sessions in a row and briefly broken 103.50, and it now sits above its 200-week moving average [26][6][9][14][15].
  • [NEW] Effective financial conditions have already tightened by the size of a small hike: one calculation puts the tightening since the September FOMC at about 20bp, driven mainly by dollar appreciation and higher rates, which mechanically raises dollar funding costs and debt service for non-US borrowers, lifts discount rates, compresses valuations and raises refinancing costs [26].
  • [ESCALATED] Volatility is repricing with the path: the MOVE index rose to 98.79 from 92.77 the prior week against an October monthly average near 100 [6].
  • [ESCALATED] Credit flows have turned, but the duration bid has not: European-registered investment-grade funds posted a seventh consecutive weekly outflow and high-yield funds flipped back to net redemptions, while long-duration investment grade extended its inflow streak to an eighth week and credit ETFs kept taking money — the picture of investors chasing quality yield rather than adding risk [28].
  • [NEW] The balance-sheet and term-premium plumbing is being quantified: Morgan Stanley expects about $1.5trn of shrinkage with tiered reserve rates cutting reserve demand by up to $1trn and passive runoff running near $1trn a year [4], while J.P. Morgan attributes the term premium’s normalisation to a holder base that has moved from official and central-bank buyers toward price-sensitive ones [5].
  • [NEW] Bank capital sensitivity to the rate path is being re-measured: under a +100bp parallel shift, money-centre banks became more asset-sensitive on average (FY27 EPS around +4%), JPMorgan is the only one to cut sensitivity, and large regionals are neutral on average, with AFS duration already shortened and Basel III endgame relief worth 80–100bp of CET1 for regionals [29].
  • [ONGOING] Gold stays pinned near one-year lows at roughly $3,875–3,890/oz after a weekly decline of about 4.5–4.7%, with higher yields and renewed hike bets cited as the operative drag and only a modest Monday bounce [26][30][22][9][25].
  • [NEW] The deleveraging is concentrated in high-beta risk assets: crypto saw large long liquidations over the weekend with bitcoin briefly at $62,022, a four-month low and an 18.9% year-to-date loss [26].

4. Global Central-Bank Linkages

  • [NEW] BOJ — a board member argues explicitly against anchoring to a neutral-rate estimate: Takata said the Bank is still in the process of raising its policy rate to normalise policy and respond to global monetary and fiscal shifts, that it should not target an estimated neutral rate or be constrained by ranges the market anticipates, that it needs a regime change and that moving early would leave it in a good position, that it must show resolve to stop upward price shifts, and that it should avoid a fixed pace or size while watching how the yen transmits into prices [31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38]. The pricing response is violent: overnight index swaps put the December hike probability at about 87% from roughly 42% a week earlier, the 10-year JGB rose 23.5bp to 2.88% and the 30-year 19.3bp to 4.02%, and the terminal rate under the current governor is back above 2% [6][14].
  • [ESCALATED] ECB — December is now effectively pre-announced: both the President and the chief economist have confirmed a December hike as the base case absent a very large data surprise, and Morgan Stanley judges a major surprise unlikely [39][14]. The desk view is that December completes the last hike and rates then stabilise, which rotates the credit opportunity from long duration toward the belly and front end [28].
  • [NEW] PBoC — the stance stays loose while the operations turn quietly tighter at the margin: the third-quarter report keeps a moderately loose policy line with stable growth as the top priority, while noting loan rates are already relatively low and that deposit-rate cuts are the precondition for further declines given net interest margins [6][16][15]. Operationally, the 16 November six-month outright reverse repo renewed only 200bn against 300bn maturing, a net withdrawal of 100bn, taking the two tenors combined to a 300bn net drain against October’s 400bn net injection, even as a 200bn outright operation was announced [40][9].
  • [NEW] Others: the RBA’s November minutes may reveal the concerns of the three members who opposed a 25bp hike [13]; Peruvian rates were raised 25bp to 4.50% [14]; and New Zealand’s third-quarter inflation-expectations survey carries upside risk from higher oil [13].

5. Asset Implications

QuadrantCurrent probability tiltKey asset implicationAnchoring narrative
Growth↑ + Inflation↑Unchanged at a high levelcommodities mixed, TIPS↑, nominal long bonds↓ — a three-hike path plus a higher assumed neutral rate keeps the discount rate grinding up even as growth holds§1.2 / §2
Growth↑ + Inflation↓Fallingstocks↑, long bonds↑, gold↓ — this now requires the soft PPI detail and the trimmed core PCE nowcast to survive a committee that just watched core hold its pace for a third month§2 / §1.1
Growth↓ + Inflation↑Rising modestlycommodities↑, gold↑, stocks↓ — the AI buildout named as a live demand-side price source, a fiscal deficit running at a decade high for the month, and a term premium rebuilding as official buyers retreat§1.1 / §3
Growth↓ + Inflation↓Fallinglong bonds↑↑, stocks↓, credit spreads↑ — the dealer base case dates any relief to a post-hike front-end rally in 2027–28, and credit funds are already redeeming in Europe§1.2 / §3

Stock-bond correlation call: the regime stays positive and real-rate driven, and this week’s decomposition is the cleanest argument for it — the ten-year real yield went to a cycle high while breakevens fell at both the front and long end, so the bond sleeve lost money without accruing any inflation compensation to offset equity losses. That is the worst of the four configurations for a levered balanced book, and nothing in today’s batch supplies the mechanism that reverses it. The counter-mechanism that would restore negative correlation is a front-end rally once hiking ends plus a term-premium grind higher at the long end — i.e. a bear-steepening that hurts long duration for a different reason, and one that several desks now publish as their 2027 path. My call: positive correlation persists through Wednesday’s minutes and into December, because the market is no longer trading the decision — it is trading the terminal rate and the length of the sequence, and neither is falsifiable by a single print. The genuinely two-sided risk is the neutral-rate upgrade itself: if the real neutral rate really is 150bp rather than 100bp, then every duration rally from here is a policy-path rally with a shallower floor, and the “bonds hedge equities” assumption holds only in a growth accident.

Risk-budget implication: stop paying for December direction, which is now consumed, and stop paying for long-end level beta, because the batch supplies three independent reasons the long end is a policy-and-supply asset: a term premium that has normalised as official buyers retreat, a coupon-issuance expansion dated to August 2027, and a fiscal deficit running at a decade high for the month. The efficient expressions are in shape rather than level — and here the sell side is genuinely split, with one house publishing a 2s10s steepener to 50bp on front-end falls after the hiking cycle ends and another carrying a Treasury curve flattener, which is the same disagreement about whether the long end is policy path or term premium expressed in opposite directions. Size either small and prefer the belly: own inflation there rather than at the long end, since long-end breakevens are the leg that did not participate in a hot print. Keep front-end optionality as the tail hedge, because the half-point case is a single official’s condition rather than a committee position, and it is cheap precisely because the market has decided it is closed. In credit, upgrade quality and shorten: European investment grade is redeeming for a seventh week, high yield has flipped, and the one persistent bid is long-duration quality — which is a carry trade that works until the front end rallies and the yield premium disappears. Equities deserve the smallest tactical budget and a dispersion hedge rather than an index hedge, because the operative risk is financing cost inside the AI complex rather than index level. Gold stays a tactical underweight with a structural residual: it is at a one-year low, real yields are at a cycle high, and the constructive case is a 2027 story built on reserve diversification and an eventual cutting cycle — add on weakness, not here.

6. Contrarian & Tail Risks

  • Consensus fragility: the baseline is now “December is done, three hikes are coming, and the neutral rate is higher than we thought.” Five assumptions are falsifiable. First, the paths are not converged even in direction: three consecutive hikes with a raised neutral rate, two hikes and a hold through 2027, December-January-March then a hold, December plus March, and December alone with a low half-point probability are five different terminal distributions being sold as one consensus. Second, the neutral-rate upgrade is the load-bearing assumption and it is being made after the move rather than before it — a 50bp revision to the real neutral rate changes every duration valuation in the book, and it rests on model estimates rather than observation. Third, the half-point tail is closed by assertion: the condition one official set has been met, one large asset manager says plainly that investors consider him a minority because even the hawks do not expect much further tightening, and a domestic house notes that no official said the Fed is behind the curve. Fourth, the disinflation leg rests entirely on the soft PPI components and the trimmed core PCE nowcast while the annual PPI rate sits at its highest since late 2022 — the same release read two ways, which is not a foundation. Fifth, the “conditions are tightening for us” argument is untested: the effective tightening is roughly the size of a small hike, the dollar is at a nineteen-month high, and the equity market has not yet transmitted it.
  • Second-order transmission: four chains are not in the price. The AI-financing chain is the most advanced and is now a rate story rather than a credit story: hike expectations themselves are feeding worries about capex sustainability, one official warns that a failed AI bet could hit equities sharply, and the financing sensitivity work shows exactly which institutions absorb a higher discount rate first. The bank-capital chain is the second and is mechanical: a market that marks all banks to AFS unrealised losses regardless of whether those losses enter regulatory capital will price a rate shock into tangible equity faster than into CET1, so a long-end grind higher transmits into regional bank valuations before it transmits into credit. The fiscal-supply chain is the third: a deficit at a decade high for the month, coupon increases dated to August 2027, and a holder base that has shifted toward price-sensitive buyers together mean the term premium is now a policy variable that no funds-rate decision can offset. The yen chain is the fourth and is the one most likely to be mispriced: Japanese hike odds roughly doubling in a week, a 30-year JGB near 4%, and a yen carry trade explicitly flagged as facing reversal risk is the channel through which US front-end repricing becomes a global de-risking event.
  • Source quality control: volume is not confirmation. A large share of today’s official content arrives as single-line social relays — the BOJ board member’s remarks are seven separate posts from one feed, and the Schmid message appears twice in one-line form — so apparent corroboration is one source reproduced; the attributable quotes are the CNBC write-ups. There is a real definitional conflict on producer prices, where one house reports core PPI above expectations at 0.5% m/m and another reports core in line at 0.3% with the ex-trade measure at 0.5%, which matters because “core pipeline inflation is sticky” is the load-bearing claim in the hawkish case. Market levels conflict and must be read side by side rather than averaged: the ten-year appears at 5.13%, 5.131%, 5.14% and 5.15%; the dollar index at 103.41 and 103.42; gold’s weekly decline at 4.5%, 4.58%, 4.6%, 4.69% and 4.7%. Several items carry no usable Fed content — a promotional webinar note with no data, a China financial-data analysis that explicitly says nothing about US policy, and an ETF flow review whose own risk disclosure warns of coverage gaps and methodology changes. The political-pressure item and the full speaker schedule are single-source. Finally, a meaningful share of what reads as reporting is model output — neutral-rate estimates, alternative-scenario probabilities, fair-value regressions and forecast paths — and should be treated as distributions rather than prices.

Appendix: Additional Sources

  • [41] Christophe Barraud — Schmid: Fed has more work to do to bring inflation down (social relay, single source)
  • [12] Financial Juice — Schmid: inflation running too high (social relay, single source)
  • [31]–[38] Financial Juice — seven separate relays of BOJ board member Takata’s remarks (single source cluster)
  • [24] Tianfeng Securities — gold and copper falling together as the dollar and rates re-bind commodity pricing
  • [42] China Post Securities — payrolls beat lifted December hike odds and pressured metals valuations
  • [43] Huachuang Securities — China October credit data; no US Fed content
  • [44] Huachuang Securities — EPFR global fund flows; equities absorbing the weekly increment, bond inflows near zero
  • [45] Guotai Junan Futures — long-end yields without a trend turning point; shorting long duration judged poorly priced
  • [25] Chengtong Securities — CPI above expectations with broadly hawkish official remarks
  • [46] CICC — webinar promotional note, no data or market facts

This report is a macro-mechanism analysis, not investment advice.

30-day review of this series 10/15 – 11/14
  • December repricing and path shift — From a mid-October debate where December was priced but not settled, hot inflation, payroll volatility and hawkish official comments pushed it to a fully priced hike by mid-November; the marginal argument then moved from whether December happens to how many cumulative moves follow, with January and a third hike entering the priced path.
  • Official rhetoric versus market conviction — A hawkish speech wave and dissents built a restrictive-policy consensus, but the Chair’s anti-guidance doctrine and uneven communication repeatedly left markets pricing a slower or more conditional path; the gap narrowed as data and front-end pricing validated the hawkish tone.
  • Real-rate rather than breakeven repricing — Inflation surprises initially lifted hike odds, but the decisive move became a real-yield and policy-path repricing; long-end breakevens stayed contained or fell, marking the selloff as discount-rate and term-premium driven rather than an inflation-compensation shock.
  • Supply, term premium and fiscal plumbing — Refunding guidance, weak long-end auctions, bill-heavy issuance, TGA swings and debt-ceiling timing repeatedly pressured the long end; term-premium estimates and buyer-base shifts became central to explaining why duration behaved poorly as a hedge.
  • Contested stock-bond correlation and AI-credit stress — The regime oscillated between inflation-driven positive correlation and episodic negative haven bids tied to AI-financing stress; credit dispersion, data-centre funding and equity concentration became the main transmission channel between rate shocks and risk assets.
  • Global divergence and liquidity constraints — BOJ, ECB and BOE pricing moved with Fed expectations but on different timings; funding-market calm masked TGA/reserve mechanics and offshore dollar tightness, which repeatedly surfaced as a secondary constraint on the rates outlook.

Sources46

  1. 机构:美联储鹰声四起,但12月加息50基点仍是小概率事件 格隆汇快讯 Score 62
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  5. 摩根大通北美虚拟信用训练营:美国国债市场概览 外资研报 Score 61
  6. 【广发宏观团队】为什么资产表现越广谱,市场稳定性往往越高? 郭磊宏观茶座 Score 62
  7. Treasury yields fall as investors await comments from Fed Chairman Warsh CNBC Score 60
  8. 🇺🇸U.S. ECONOMIC DATA THIS WEEK: • NY FED MANUFACTURING INDEX (MON.) • RETAIL SALES (TUES.) • INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (TUES.) • PENDING HOME SA... Twitter·财经快讯 Score 61
  9. 【东吴宏观唐遥衎】外部紧缩冲击、国内承接整固,结构转向两端平衡 宏观fans哲 Score 62
  10. 🇺🇸FED SPEAKERS THIS WEEK: • FOMC MEMBER BARR (MON. 5:00AM) • FOMC MEMBER WILLIAMS (MON. 9:05AM) • FED CHAIR WARSH (MON. 12:00PM) • FOMC MEMB... Twitter·财经快讯 Score 64
  11. Fed 'has some work to do on inflation,' Kansas City Fed chief says CNBC Score 62
  12. Fed’s Schmid: inflation running too high, central bank has some work to do on inflation Twitter·财经快讯 Score 64
  13. 更鹰派的美联储言论;本周活动数据与APEC会议 外资研报 Score 64
  14. 11月13日:PPI缓解令曲线趋陡 外资研报 Score 61
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  17. 周二凌晨1点 聚焦美联储主席沃什讲话 格隆汇快讯 Score 61
  18. 美债交易员目光转向美联储官员讲话和会议纪要 以寻找下一步政策线索 格隆汇快讯 Score 67
  19. 机构:市场紧盯美联储官员讲话及纪要,寻求下一步利率线索 格隆汇快讯 Score 68
  20. Roughed-Up Bond Traders Look to Fedspeak, Minutes for Next Move Bloomberg Score 70
  21. 2027年全球经济展望:AI驱动,石油检验 外资研报 Score 61
  22. [东吴证券]海外周报:通胀隐含油价预期偏乐观,加息仍有升温空间 内资宏观研究 Score 62
  23. Bessent on Fox warns Federal Reserve against additional monetary tightening Twitter·财经快讯 Score 62
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  25. [诚通证券]宏观与大类资产周报:中国出口维持高增长,美联储加息预期增强 内资宏观研究 Score 61
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