Hawkish speaker slate and an OECD ratchet lift hike pricing as the 2s10s flattens to a 19-month low

0. Weekly Arc

The arc ran from the Sept 11 core CPI beat into the Sept 16 FOMC — the first hike in three years, unanimous 12–0 to 3.75%–4.00%, a hawkish dot plot, no forward guidance — and then straight into a post-blackout speaker cycle. Sept 20–21 produced the first real dovish rearguard, with Goldman and Nomura arguing the market had over-priced the cycle; Sept 21–22 swung back as Kashkari and Musalem reinforced the stickiness case and the sell-side split widened. Today’s marginal move is an institutional ratchet rather than a new policy fact: a hawkish official slate, a hawkish OECD, and Goldman joining the hike camp.

1. Policy Narrative & Expectations

There was no new policy action in the past ~24h — the target range stands at 3.75%–4.00% after the unanimous Sept 16 hike, and the dot plot still implies one more move this year while leaving eight officials 50bp above the current level in 2027 ^[1][2][3] — so the marginal information sits in four places. First, the post-blackout speaker slate stayed hawkish and broadened: Barkin warned that inflationary shocks are no longer one-off and that one hike may not be enough ^[4][1], Collins said she backed the hike and now sees an increased likelihood of inflation remaining notably above 2% ^[5], while Williams and Perli used the NY Fed’s Treasury Market Conference only for framework remarks ^[6][7]. Second, the institutional ratchet turned: the OECD raised its 2027 inflation projections and said the outlook “necessitates more tightening from the US to Australia” ^[8], and Goldman Sachs switched from no hikes this year to a 25bp move at the October 27–28 meeting with possibly another before year-end ^[9]. Third, the composition of the priced path keeps firming at the margin — swaps now imply three 25bp hikes by next June ^[10][11] and March 2027 SOFR call open interest runs about 1mn contracts above same-tenor puts, i.e. traders are paying up to hedge a shallower cycle than priced ^[10] — while CME FedWatch has an October hike at 54.2% against a hold at 45.8% ^[12], a modest retreat from Tuesday’s reading. Fourth, the rates market has repriced in a way that matters more than the level: the 2s10s spread hit its narrowest since March 2025 ^[13] and the 2s30s has halved in about a month to just below 55bp ^[14]. The net effect is a delivered hike that is fully priced, an October meeting still close to a coin flip, and a sell-side distribution that has quietly re-widened around the number of remaining moves rather than their direction.

1.1 FOMC Officials’ Remarks

• [NEW] Hawkish — Richmond Fed President Thomas Barkin: in a speech in Baltimore on 9/22 he stressed that “supply-side shocks are no longer one-off or temporary events” and that price pressures inside the economy are persistent; he said those pressures “may eventually fade but I expect it to take time, during which the currently elevated inflation could affect future inflation” ^[1]. He said last week’s hike “will help” return inflation sustainably to 2% but did not commit on further tightening — “whether further hikes are needed and by how much, we will act depending on circumstances” ^[1][15]. WSJ relays that he signalled more hikes could be needed and that one increase may not be enough ^[4]. In social relays of the same remarks he said he is “seeing more price pressures than I’m comfortable with,” that “passing shocks like tariffs and energy are not fading,” that conditions are “if anything, firming,” that there is momentum outside data centres and AI, and that suppressing inflation expectations might avoid relying on “demand destruction” — single source / unverified ^{[16][17][18][19]}. He also said he likes to think this period resembles a 1990s-style mid-cycle adjustment ^[20]. He is not an FOMC voter this year ^[1].
• [NEW] Hawkish — Boston Fed President Susan Collins: in a Tuesday (9/22) posting she said she supported last week’s hike, per Reuters: “I now see an increased likelihood of future scenarios in which inflation remains notably above 2%,” and “A somewhat more restrictive federal funds rate will help ensure that inflation durably returns to target” ^[5]. She added that “with the labor market on a better footing, monetary policy can focus on a timely return to price stability, especially after five and a half years of too-high inflation” ^[5][21]. She is not a voter this year and did not say whether she wants another increase ^[5].
• [NEW] Neutral — New York Fed President John Williams: at the NY Fed’s 2026 Treasury Market Conference (9/22) he defended the Fed’s implementation framework, saying that supplying “ample” reserves with the current toolset “has proven to be highly effective at delivering interest rate control and supporting the smooth functioning of core financial markets,” while adding that the framework “is not set in stone and can be adapted to changing market conditions” ^[6]. He did not address the monetary-policy or rate outlook and was not scheduled to take questions ^[6][22]. He separately said progress on central clearing of Treasuries and repo has exceeded expectations and reaffirmed flexible reserve supply ^[2].
• [NEW] Neutral — Roberto Perli, Manager of the System Open Market Account, New York Fed: said the Fed will continue to evaluate the level of reserves and that bill purchases are not on a pre-set course, that the monetary-policy toolkit “has been working very well,” and that reserve-management purchases of Treasury bills will be adjusted according to market liquidity needs — hinting the Fed could buy bills again if it judges a liquidity boost necessary ^[7][23][24].
• [NEW] Dovish — Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee: a Citi note flags the internal Fed disagreement directly, quoting Goolsbee as saying that forcing inflation back to target in the short term means pushing employment below target and that raising rates against an external supply shock would be “painful,” set against the Chair’s view that inflation can be lowered without harming the labour market; because policymakers’ tolerance for pain is limited, Citi concludes the hiking cycle should be constrained ^[25].
• [ONGOING] Chair Kevin Warsh: no fresh public remark in this batch; the operative characterisation remains that the economy is strong and inflation is too high ^[26].

1.2 Policy Signals & Institutional Communication

• [ESCALATED] Goldman Sachs abandons its no-hike-this-year forecast: it now expects a 25bp hike at the October 27–28 meeting and possibly one more before year-end, citing the Middle East energy spike, Q3 real GDP tracking at 3.3% and a firmer August core PCE, while stressing the hawkishness is temporary — core PCE is seen at 2.2% y/y by Q4 2027, the neutral rate is estimated at 3.25%–3.5%, and cuts are expected only from around end-2027 ^[9]. Goldman’s chief economist separately said he expects another hike at the October FOMC ^[27].
• [NEW] The OECD formally calls for more tightening: in a report released Wednesday it raised its consumer-price-growth projections versus June and said global inflation will be faster than forecast in 2027, an outlook that “necessitates more tightening from the US to Australia” ^[8]; it expects both the Fed and the ECB to raise rates once more this year and then hold steady through 2027 ^[28].
• [NEW] UBS: the September SEP is one of the most hawkish on record once read through implied real policy rates — median participants now see the 2027 real fed funds rate about 50bp higher and the 2028 rate about 40bp higher than in June, with the 2028 implied real rate at 1.7%, the highest two-year-horizon projection since the Fed began publishing participant forecasts in 2012, implying policy must stay meaningfully restrictive for longer to return inflation to target ^[29].
• [ONGOING] The delivered decision stands: 25bp to 3.75%–4.00%, the first hike since 2023, by unanimous vote, with most officials supporting at least one more this year ^[2][1][3].
• [NEW] Institutional structure: Reuters reports the Fed under Chair Warsh has a series of task forces examining how it communicates, evaluates data and handles its still-large balance sheet, noting Warsh routinely criticised the Fed’s large asset holdings before taking over in May ^[6].
• [NEW] Treasury market structure: the NY Fed’s 2026 Treasury Market Conference is under way with Williams and Jefferson; Williams said central clearing of secondary Treasury trades, repo and reverse repo is progressing ahead of the regulatory deadline, with trading shifting from the non-cleared to the cleared market and industry participants expanding cleared infrastructure early ^[2][30].
• [NEW] Positioning is split, not one-way: interest-rate swaps imply three 25bp hikes through next June ^[10][11]; March 2027 SOFR call open interest is about 2.7mn contracts, roughly 1mn more than same-tenor puts, showing traders increasingly hedging the risk the Fed’s path is more dovish than priced, with demand for March SOFR call options rising all week ^[10]; CME FedWatch puts an October hold at 45.8% versus a 25bp hike at 54.2%, and by December a hold at 10.8%, a cumulative 25bp at 47.8% and a cumulative 50bp at 41.4% ^[12].

2. Key Data & Market Read

• [NEW] US housing data softened across the board: last week’s main US data focus was real estate, with new home starts, building permits and builder confidence all below expectations, read as evidence the housing cycle may stay depressed under high rates ^[31].
• [NEW] Regional activity and prices diverge in the same survey: Nomura notes the September Philly Fed non-manufacturing general activity index fell to -22.0 from -10.6 in August, while the full-time employment index rose to its highest since June 2022 and input and output price indices both increased with wage costs staying high — a cooling-activity, strong-employment, persistent-price combination that leaves the Fed weighing growth against inflation control ^[32].
• [NEW] High-frequency reads leaned resilient: the US Weekly Economic Index edged down while its four-week average rose, Redbook commercial retail sales growth edged up, initial and continuing jobless claims both fell, and the Indeed job-openings index rose ^[31].
• [NEW] Labour-market slack (single source / unverified): the Chicago Fed’s flow-consistent unemployment rate sits above the headline rate, implying underlying labour-market conditions have weakened more than the headline alone suggests ^[33].
• [NEW] The energy pass-through channel is still live: Brent traded near $100/bbl with diesel at a nominal record high and European natural gas about 150% above pre-war levels ^[34][26]; US benchmark crude futures sat near $91/bbl, up 35% since the start of the Iran war on Feb 28, which two market participants name as the market’s primary focus ^[35].
• [EASED] The immediate inflation impulse softened at the margin: gold edged up in early Asian trade as markets weighed a pullback in oil prices, which if it holds would ease the inflation fears that lifted bond yields and stoked hike expectations ^[36].
• [ONGOING] Household transmission: the 30-year mortgage rate was 6.95% as of Sept 17 and mortgage application demand fell ^[31].
• [NEW] Narrative impact: the marginal data flow still justifies the hike without settling the path, but the burden of proof has shifted again. The hawkish leg now rests on survey-level price evidence — Barkin’s business contacts raising prices faster than pre-pandemic, rising input and output price indices, and sticky wage costs ^[1][32] — which is a more durable input than the volatile core-CPI categories the dovish camp has been pointing to. The dovish leg rests on housing data missing across the board and a cooling Philly Fed activity read ^[31][32], plus the observation that higher policy rates cannot lower energy prices but do deepen the housing contraction ^[25]. That asymmetry is why the curve, not the funds rate, is now the swing variable.

3. Financial-Conditions Signals

• [NEW] Curve flattening has become the loudest rates signal: the 2s10s spread hit its narrowest since March 2025 ^[13], the 2s30s has halved in roughly a month to just below 55bp ^[14], and the 2-year yield sits near 4.76% — more than 75bp above the top of the federal funds target range — and only about 22bp below the 10-year, against a gap of nearly 75bp in February ^[27]. WSJ frames the flattening as the latest sign investors are pricing in higher rates ^[13].
• [ESCALATED] Dollar: the dollar rose to its highest since late July against a basket of currencies as markets bet on further Fed hikes, outweighing lower oil prices, with DXY at 100.33 ^[37][26]. HSBC argues the dollar has been freed from the “debasement” narrative by the Fed’s re-established hawkish stance and US relative resilience, and that high Treasury yields now reflect global fiscal worries rather than dollar weakness ^[26].
• [NEW] Credit and banking: J.P. Morgan’s global BB-B USD spread-to-worst widened modestly on the week ^[31]; financial conditions tightened marginally, with the Bloomberg US financial conditions index at 1.27 versus 1.338 a week earlier ^[31]; and flattening squeezes bank net interest margins — S&P 500 financials fell 1.8% on Tuesday, a move that would wipe out the sector’s year-to-date gains, and utilities are down 4.8% year-to-date with the S&P 500 and Nasdaq still near records ^[27]. Citi’s mechanism note is the clearest statement of the transmission: high policy rates cannot meaningfully lower energy prices but will deepen the housing contraction and weaken the labour market at the margin ^[25].
• [NEW] Liquidity: Williams reaffirmed flexible reserve supply and said there should be little or no opportunity cost to holding reserves ^[6]; Perli said reserves remain in the ample range, that bill purchases are running smoothly and that reserve-management purchases are not a preset path ^[7][38]; the Fed stopped shrinking its balance sheet late last year and began reserve-management purchases to hold reserves at the ample level ^[2]; on cross-currency plumbing, dollar offshore liquidity eased against the euro and tightened marginally against the yen ^[31].
• [NEW] Equity financing: J.P. Morgan’s US equity financing monitor shows implied financing rates easing 2–4bp at the front and belly while the long end stayed flat, steepening the term structure; three-month financing spreads sit at the 64th percentile of the past five years and six-month-plus spreads around the 80th, with long-term financing costs still historically elevated even as marginal costs improved ^[39].
• [NEW] Gold: gold slipped about 0.9% last week to $4,348/oz ^[40] and edged up in early Asian trade on the oil pullback ^[36].

4. Global Central-Bank Linkages

• [NEW] Multi-central-bank — OECD: more tightening is needed across economies from the US to Australia, with global inflation seen faster than previously forecast in 2027 and both the Fed and the ECB expected to hike once more this year before holding through 2027 ^[8][28].
• [ESCALATED] ECB: HSBC expects the ECB and the RBA to hike twice each ^[34] and Goldman expects a third ECB hike in December to 2.75% ^[9]; HSBC also notes the ECB is cautious about further hikes, contrasting with US policy ^[26].
• [ONGOING] BOJ: the policy rate sits at 1.25%, a 31-year high, with the hike interval shortened to three months and the bank saying it will keep raising rates based on economic, price and financial conditions while watching the Middle East, AI demand and FX ^[40]; UBS notes the 7–2 vote and Governor Ueda’s remarks fell short of the hawkishness markets expected, explicitly saying policy is not set for FX levels ^[41]; HSBC expects another 25bp ^[34]; Goldman expects Japan to tighten by less than market pricing ^[9].
• [ONGOING] BOE: the only major central bank that did not raise rates in September ^[42]; HSBC expects Bank Rate to reach 4.25% ^[34]; Goldman expects a 25bp November hike to 4% and then a stop ^[9].
• [NEW] Others: UBS expects Norges Bank to hike to 4.5%, the Riksbank to hold despite economists pencilling a December hike, judges the market to be underestimating the chance of an SNB hike by year-end on CHF weakness and imported inflation, sees the RBA’s hawkish repricing as already done with limited AUD upside, and recommends short AUDNZD as the cleaner expression ^[41].

5. Asset Implications

Quadrant	Current probability tilt	Key asset implication	Anchoring narrative
Growth↑ + Inflation↑	Rising	Energy/commodities and TIPS stay the cleanest expressions — Brent near $100, diesel at a nominal record, European gas about 150% above pre-war levels — while nominal long bonds are capped by a curve flattening to a 19-month narrow and a rising dollar at an eight-week high; the robust expressions are front-end carry and curve relative value rather than outright long duration	§2 / §3
Growth↑ + Inflation↓	Falling further	The “it’s temporary” case survived but lost a member: Goldman still sees core PCE at 2.2% y/y by Q4 2027 and cuts from end-2027, but its own October hike call now sits inside a path where swaps price three hikes by June; quality, cash-flow-durable equity beta and belly carry beat duration	§1.2 / §2
Growth↓ + Inflation↑	Rising (tail)	The supply leg is unchanged and policy-insensitive — WTI up 35% since the Iran war began — and the household channel does the tightening: mortgage rates near 7% with applications falling, and Citi’s explicit point that rate hikes deepen the housing contraction without lowering energy prices	§2 / §3
Growth↓ + Inflation↓	Falling	The cycle tail got more expensive as the OECD, Goldman and a hawkish official slate all pointed the same way, and the UBS real-rate reading of the SEP says participants implicitly need policy meaningfully restrictive for longer	§1.2 / §4

Stock-bond correlation call: the regime remains inflation/policy-driven positive correlation — the configuration that hurts risk parity — and today’s evidence clarifies the mechanism rather than the sign. Two facts do the work. First, the flattening: the 2s10s at its narrowest since March 2025 and the 2s30s halved in a month ^[13][14] says the marginal repricing is entirely about the expected path of policy, not about long-run inflation compensation or a growth shock — and because equities reprice off that same path, duration is repricing the identical variable. Second, the WSJ framing that since 2020 stocks have tended to fall when bond yields rise precisely because higher inflation lifts yields “without reliably bringing the accompanying higher profits that a stronger economy does” ^[43] is the cleanest statement of why the profit offset is absent: the yield move is inflation-driven and supply-driven, not demand-driven. That combination means the hedge fails exactly in the drawdown it is purchased to cover. The counter-print is genuinely on the table and worth naming: if the equity market is instead repricing a shallower cycle — and the options positioning, with March 2027 SOFR call open interest about 1mn contracts above puts ^[10], says some large accounts are positioned that way — then a softer data run compresses the policy-uncertainty component and medium duration partially recovers hedge value. Note also that Barclays’ month-/quarter-end rebalancing model is screaming a mechanical sell-USD signal against most G10 currencies at end-September, driven entirely by US equity outperformance and the resulting hedge-ratio arithmetic, with no directional bias in USDJPY ^[44] — that flow is unrelated to fundamentals and is precisely the sort of non-fundamental, calendar-driven move that can be mistaken for a regime shift.

Risk-budget implication: keep commodity and energy risk at or above benchmark. Energy remains the only sleeve whose driver — Iranian supply, refining bottlenecks, European gas inventories — is orthogonal to the Fed’s reaction function and the cheapest hedge against the stagflation quadrant, and the same variable is now doing double duty as the stated cause of the hawkish pivot. In rates, do not rebuild long-end duration into a flattening that is being driven by the expected policy path: the 2-year more than 75bp above the top of the target range ^[27] means the front end is where any disappointment shows up first, while the 2s30s compression says the market is paying for carry rather than for convexity. Prefer belly and curve structures. Two positioning facts argue for keeping options hedges on: SOFR call demand is building specifically against a shallower cycle ^[10], and J.P. Morgan’s equity-financing data shows the term structure steepening while long-term financing costs remain historically elevated ^[39] — consistent with a market that is short at the front and long at the back. In credit, keep duration short and favour spread over pure duration, but recognise the deterioration is small and orderly so far — BB-B spreads widened only marginally on the week ^[31] and the Bloomberg US financial conditions index tightened by roughly 0.07, not a break ^[31]. The real fragility sits in equity composition, not credit: financials falling 1.8% on a curve-flattening day while the index hovers at records is the signature of a market that is de-rating rate-sensitive sectors while paying up for AI-linked cash flows. That is also why the Galaxy Securities framework is useful: with the discount rate structurally higher, AI pricing logic has switched from “long-term vision” to “current-period realization,” favouring compute hardware with current earnings and squeezing names reliant on far-forward narratives ^[45] — a rotation that makes the AI sleeve an earnings-duration trade, not a rates hedge. Hold gold as the structural fiscal and dollar-credit hedge, sized for real-rate whipsaw; it slipped about 0.9% on the week to $4,348/oz ^[40] and its near-term direction is now hostage to whether the oil pullback holds ^[36].

6. Contrarian & Tail Risks

• Consensus fragility: the baseline is now “hike delivered, one more in October or December, and the terminal rate is higher than the dots imply.” It rests on assumptions that are visibly unsettled. First, the priced path is a market construct built against a Fed that has deliberately withdrawn guidance — swaps imply three hikes by June ^[10][11] while the Fed’s own median implies one more this year with no 2027 move — and CME FedWatch at 54.2% for October is a coin flip, not a commitment ^[12]. Second, the sell-side cannot all be right: Goldman now expects October plus possibly another by year-end ^[9], Morgan Stanley holds a 4.25%–4.50% terminal, the OECD expects one more then a long hold ^[28], and Citi argues the hiking cycle is constrained by limited political tolerance for pain ^[25]. Third, the “one of the most hawkish SEPs on record” reading ^[29] sits awkwardly with the same document’s pushed-out 2029 return to 2% — UBS reconciles that only via a higher real-rate path, which is an interpretation rather than a fact. Fourth, the positioning is genuinely two-sided in a way that usually means neither side is comfortable: swaps and the front end lean hawkish while the options market is paying up for a shallower cycle ^[10]. Fifth, the commodity correlation the whole stagflation quadrant depends on is itself unstable — a sustained oil pullback would ease both the inflation impulse and the hike path at once, which is the single cleanest way the current pricing is falsified ^[36].
• Second-order transmission: four chains are not in market pricing. The curve-flattening chain is now active and under-appreciated: with short-end deposit costs rising and long-end lending yields capped, bank net interest margin — the sector’s survival business — gets squeezed without any recession occurring, which is why financials fell 1.8% on a flattening day and why El-Erian flags the 2s30s compression as flying under the radar ^[27][14]. The policy-creep chain is the one El-Erian names explicitly: markets may be forcing central banks to raise rates, and if the more aggressive path materialises, both markets and the economy face unnecessary pressure ^[42] — a self-validation loop in which the pricing becomes the policy. The fiscal chain is already quantified on the sell side: a FY26 deficit at 6.5% of GDP, net interest payments reaching $1.2tn in FY27, and a debt-limit fight that Barclays places in the lame-duck session or Q4 2027, affecting money markets and T-bills rather than coupons ^[46]. The AI chain has flipped to a two-sided risk: HSBC warns that if the AI investment boom proves to be a bubble, its bursting would hit equities, consumption and global growth ^[34], while supply-side shocks transmit into second-round effects through the wage-price channel and keep core inflation elevated ^[34]. Layered on top, the official-sector communication channel is being reorganised: Williams’ and Perli’s remarks were about reserves and clearing rather than rates ^[6][7], and Reuters reports Warsh’s task forces are reviewing exactly those plumbing and communication functions ^[6] — which means the framework itself, not the data, may be the next source of shock.
• Source quality control: several of the most quotable items today are social relays or single-source extracts and should be treated as indicative only — Barkin’s “more price pressures than I’m comfortable with,” “tariffs and energy are not fading” and “conditions are, if anything, firming,” which are real remarks but arrive without full context ^[16][17][18]; his “1990s mid-cycle adjustment” comparison ^[20]; the Chicago Fed flow-consistent unemployment-rate chart ^[33]; the Bloomberg “traders load up on hedges for a shallower rate-hike cycle” headline, which is relayed rather than read ^[47]; and the Timiraos-cited paper on the concentration of 10-year-yield increases in payroll and Fed-speech windows, where the sourcing runs through a social repost ^[48][49]. Direct conflicts deserve side-by-side reading. First, the direction of the cycle: Goldman flips to hiking while Citi argues the cycle is constrained, and the OECD expects one more then a hold — three incompatible paths ^[9][25][28]. Second, the read of the same SEP: the dot plot looks mild on its face (one more this year, none in 2027, cuts from 2028) while the implied real-rate path makes it historically hawkish ^[29] — the document supports both headlines, so neither should be traded in isolation. Third, on the household data, one source has US retail gasoline at $4.17/gallon for the week of September 14 ^[31] while earlier briefings carried regular gasoline materially higher; the series and vintage differ and neither should be used as a level trigger. Fourth, the housing signal is directionally clear but the granular datapoints differ across brokers and should be read qualitatively. Citi’s own note carries an explicit source caveat that the original text names “Chair Warsh” where Powell would normally appear and that it follows the source wording strictly ^[25] — treat that attribution as unresolved. Finally, several items in this batch are model outputs or survey-derived frameworks (Barclays’ rebalancing model is explicitly mechanical and unrelated to market fundamentals ^[44]; the Galaxy AI framework is a sector-rotation lens, not a price ^[45]) and should be used as framing rather than as signals, and the flow data carry their own caveat that EPFR’s coverage may not fully capture private funds, insurance capital or direct retail holdings ^[50].

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Appendix: Additional Sources

• ^[51] Jin10 — Collins backs last week’s hike; probability of inflation well above 2% is rising
• ^[28] Gelonghui — OECD: Fed and ECB to hike once more this year, then hold through 2027
• ^[42] Gelonghui — El-Erian: markets may be forcing central banks to hike; hikes are not the best anti-inflation tool
• ^[41] UBS — FX Compass: flatter curve, stronger USD; Norges Bank, Riksbank, SNB and RBA calls
• ^[34] HSBC — Global Economics Q4 2026: synchronized tightening, energy-driven inflation, AI-bubble and fiscal-sustainability risks
• ^[52] Jin10 — Middle East conflict lifts oil and revives Fed tightening expectations across the board
• ^[32] Nomura — Philly Fed non-manufacturing at -22.0, record full-time employment index, rising input and output prices
• ^[45] Galaxy Securities — higher risk-free rate compresses P/E; AI pricing shifts from long-term vision to current-period realization
• ^[2] Wallstreetcn — Williams on Treasury central clearing, the ample-reserves framework and reserve supply
• ^[40] Oriental Credit — last week’s cross-asset recap: Fed and BOJ hikes, global yields up, dollar rebound, gold down
• ^[31] Huachuang Securities — US housing data misses, WEI, Redbook, jobless claims, financial conditions and credit spreads

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This report is a macro-mechanism analysis, not investment advice.