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Fed Watch

Post-hike Monday: yields ease as oil falls, Kashkari says inflation has spread economy-wide

The marginal shift is a widening two-sided split rather than a new policy fact — Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley now argue the market overprices the hike path while Bank of America and Morgan Stanley's own hike call stay hawkish, Chair Warsh's lever is described as the balance sheet rather than the funds rate, and Minneapolis Fed President Kashkari said inflation has "permeated every part of the economy" while Monday's tape delivered the first relief session of the cycle with the 10-year down 5bp to 4.95% and Brent down 2.4% .

57 sources ~55 min

0. Weekly Arc

The arc ran from the Sept 11 core CPI beat into the Sept 16 FOMC — the first hike in three years, 12–0 to 3.75%–4.00% with no forward guidance — and then through a digestion phase in which the BOJ hiked to 1.25% and the BOE held hawkishly. The turn was Sept 20, when Goldman Sachs and Nomura argued the market had over-priced the cycle; today that dovish analytical camp widened with Deutsche Bank and a Morgan Stanley call that the eventual tightening lands at the lower bound of market expectations, even as forecasters raised their published rate paths.

1. Policy Narrative & Expectations

No new policy action in the past ~24h, so the marginal information is entirely in the composition of the path debate and in what “restrictive” now means. Three moves matter. First, the dovish analytical case broadened again: Deutsche Bank argues the near-60% probability priced for an October move may be too aggressive given potential energy-price relief and midterm-election timing [1], and Morgan Stanley argues the September hike is a recalibration inside the existing framework rather than a new cycle, with the eventual tightening most likely landing at the lower bound of market expectations [2][3]. Second, the hawkish camp re-specified rather than retreated: Bank of America holds 25bp in each of October and December, reads a Taylor rule at 5.3%–5.4% and real-rate history at 5.8%–7.8%, and calls the market’s ~60bp of priced tightening too little [4][5][6][7], while Goldman Sachs lifted its US path to 4.125% for end-2026 and 3.625% for end-2027 with a 3.375% terminal [8]. Third, the framework question has migrated from the funds rate to the balance sheet: Morgan Stanley notes Warsh has consistently called the balance sheet the driver of inflation yet did not mention it at all in the September press conference, and reads the rate tool as secondary once a balance-sheet reform lands [2]. The net effect is a wider two-sided distribution on the path with the delivered hike fully priced.

1.1 FOMC Officials’ Remarks

  • [NEW] Hawkish — Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kashkari: said on Sunday that inflation “remains too high” and that price pressures have broadened beyond the Iran-war oil shock, adding in a television interview that what Americans feel daily “goes well beyond oil prices and has permeated every part of the economy,” and framing the Fed’s task as returning inflation to the 2% target [9][10]. A separate relay has him saying inflation is “reaching all corners of US economy” — single source / unverified [11].
  • [ONGOING] Hawkish — Chair Kevin Warsh (listed separately): the operative framework is unchanged from the Sept 16 presser — inflation is “too high and has persisted for too long,” price stability is “the result of policy choices,” current financial conditions “can hardly be called restrictive,” and no forward guidance is offered [12][13][14].

1.2 Policy Signals & Institutional Communication

  • [ONGOING] The decision and projections stand: a unanimous 25bp hike to 3.75%–4.00%, the first since 2023, with the dot plot implying one more 2026 move and the median end-2026 rate at 4.1% [15][12][16][17].
  • [ESCALATED] The “market overprices the path” camp gained a major member: Deutsche Bank argues the ~60% October probability may be overestimated and keeps a baseline of 50bp more taking the funds rate to 4.375% by end-Q1 2027, while flagging ~40bp of upside risk if the real neutral rate settles near 2.0% rather than 1.5% [1][18].
  • [NEW] Morgan Stanley reframed the hike as a “recalibration” within the existing framework — the six-month inflation trend is falling, just not fast enough — and argued that because Warsh’s policy centre of gravity is the balance sheet rather than the rate tool, the eventual tightening should land at the lower bound of market expectations; it also flags that the balance sheet went unmentioned in the September press conference [2][3].
  • [ESCALATED] Goldman Sachs raised policy-rate forecasts across the US, UK, euro area, Japan and Australia, moving its US end-2026 forecast to 4.125% and end-2027 to 3.625%, with the terminal rate lifted 25bp to 3.375%, on reassessed inflation persistence and economic resilience; it notes 83% of developed-market central banks hiked over the past three months and none cut [8].
  • [ESCALATED] Bank of America kept the most hawkish published path — 25bp in both October and December for 75bp cumulative — and warned that the ~60bp of tightening the market prices may be insufficient, recommending paying fixed on 2- to 5-year swaps and a 2s30s flattener [4][6][7].
  • [NEW] Barclays’ summary of the meeting has the dot plot showing two more hikes in 2026 with rates unchanged in 2027 and cuts in 2028–2029, and it expects a December hike followed by a higher-for-longer hold through most of 2027 with a first cut only in December 2027 [15][19].
  • [NEW] Chair Warsh has set up a working group on AI and will submit a report by year-end analysing its impact on monetary policy [12].
  • [NEW] Fedspeak returns: New York Fed President Williams and Vice Chair Jefferson speak at the Treasury market conference on Sept 22, Williams again in London on Sept 24 alongside Cleveland’s Hammack and Philadelphia’s Paulson, and Williams once more on Sept 25; Chicago Fed President Goolsbee speaks Monday [9][17][20][21].
  • [NEW] New academic evidence on the long end: a CEPR/VoxEU column finds that three-day windows around nonfarm-payroll releases and Fed speeches cover only ~24% of trading days between August 2020 and September 2026 yet account for 90.5% of the rise in the 10-year nominal yield, 91.3% of the 5-year/5-year forward rate and 81.0% of the average expected short rate over the next decade, implying these events shift the perceived policy path rather than r*, which “provides a very weak anchor to long-term rates” [22].
  • [ONGOING] The political channel stayed active: President Trump said after the hike that US rates should be 1% and renewed his attacks on the Fed [23][24][25][26].

2. Key Data & Market Read

  • [NEW] Household survey: the University of Michigan’s September preliminary reading put the five-year inflation expectation at 3.4% while consumer sentiment fell to 47.8, close to the historic low of 44.8 — a soft-growth, sticky-expectations combination [3].
  • [NEW] Nominal demand: Bank of America notes US nominal spending running at 6.3% year-on-year and argues that when nominal spending exceeds 5% core PCE tends to exceed 2%, with underlying inflation stuck around 2.5% [4].
  • [ESCALATED] Morgan Stanley flipped its US macro baseline from benign disinflation to an oil risk premium, raising end-2026 core PCE to 3.2% from 3.1% and end-2027 to 2.7% from 2.4%, lifting its third-quarter GDP tracking by 0.5pp to 2.5% on stronger-than-expected August retail sales, and putting private final domestic purchases growth at 3.7% [27].
  • [NEW] Tariffs: Morgan Stanley has the July effective tariff rate at 6.7% and expects convergence toward roughly 10% by year-end [27].
  • [NEW] AI as an inflation line item: August saw computer software and accessories prices rise a record 25.4% year-on-year and computers, peripherals and smart-home assistants 8.4%, overall construction employment hit a record high, and the Fed’s 2026 meeting minutes listed AI investment among its three inflation risks for the first time [28].
  • [NEW] Nowcast: the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow put third-quarter GDP at 5.1% annualized on Sept 17 [29], and Morgan Stanley sees September ISM manufacturing at 54.4, slightly below August’s 54.6 [3].
  • [ONGOING] August CPI (+0.4% m/m, +3.4% y/y; core +0.3% m/m, +2.4% y/y), PPI (+0.4% m/m) and payrolls (+162k against a 56k consensus, unemployment at 4.1%, average hourly earnings +3.1% y/y) remain the data the hike was built on [28].
  • [NEW] The oil-scenario split on CPI: CICC estimates CPI cannot keep falling if the oil centre stays above $100, but would fall back to about 3% year-on-year by year-end if oil centres on $80 in Q3–Q4, which would materially reduce the need for further large hikes [30].
  • [ONGOING] UK August CPI rebounded to 3.1%, a high for the year, feeding gilt yields and BOE hike pricing [31].
  • [NEW] China’s August data stayed weak — fixed-asset investment still negative on a cumulative basis, retail sales up only 0.4% year-on-year, industrial value added up 5.2% — a reminder that the Fed is tightening while the second-largest economy is not [16][32].
  • [NEW] Narrative impact: the marginal inflation inputs have changed character — energy, tariffs and AI capital expenditure now do the work, all supply-side items a funds-rate move cannot offset quickly [27][28][4] — which is why two desks name the August PCE print as the live test of whether the post-hike calm holds [14].

3. Financial-Conditions Signals

  • [NEW] Rates: Monday brought the first relief session of the post-hike period — the US 10-year yield fell 5bp to 4.95% while Brent dropped 2.4% to $101.39, European and Asian equities rose and S&P 500 futures were up 0.7% at 06:21 ET [33][34][21]. Risk sentiment was described as tentatively improving on central banks’ commitment to return inflation to target and growing oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz [34].
  • [ONGOING] The 2-year yield remains at a multi-year high near 4.75%, well above the new policy range, with the 1-year bill near 4.4% against about 5% on the 10-year and 5.3% on the 30-year [35][36].
  • [ESCALATED] Long-end driver: the debate sharpened into a contest between policy-path perception and structural term premium — the CEPR work assigns 80–90% of the rise to policy-path windows and warns of self-validating “higher-for-longer” dynamics [22]; Everbright Futures points to a deficit at 5.8% of GDP, federal debt above $40tn and heavy AI-related long-bond issuance as structural lifts, with the 10-year seen centred at 4.7%–5.0% [17]; Bank of America’s fair-value framework puts the 10-year at 4.35%–4.55% with 30–35bp of allocation value and does not rule out above 5.5% [5]; and a WSJ piece frames the 19-year-high yield as the product of pandemic- and war-related goods-supply constraints plus government borrowing [37].
  • [NEW] Liquidity and supply: roughly $1tn of net Treasury-bill borrowing over the next year is now the working assumption — Bank of America at $1.07tn for the fiscal year to September 2027, JPMorgan at $1.09tn for calendar 2027 and Goldman at $961bn — taking outstanding bills to about $8tn, or 24.3% of marketable Treasuries, near the pandemic-era peak [35][38][39]. A Treasury official countered that the historical average bill share is 24.3% and the current 22.8% is below it [35]. The associated concern is that refinancing risk shifts from the fiscal statement to the yield curve [40].
  • [NEW] Credit & banking — the plumbing has turned: fixed income funds recorded their first weekly net outflow in 24 weeks, ending a 23-week inflow streak, with investment grade and high yield both in outflow for a second consecutive week, while government bond funds took a second week of inflows and emerging-market debt extended its inflow streak to seven weeks [41]. Deutsche Bank’s positioning work shows the split starkly: discretionary investors have cut equity exposure to near neutral with sentiment at the 5th percentile, while systematic and risk-parity strategies added equities, with risk-parity funds lifting equity allocation to the 82nd percentile amid subdued volatility; money-market funds lost $75.9bn, the most in two months, and equity inflows hit a three-month high of $79.3bn [42][43].
  • [NEW] The AI crowd-out claim got a direct rebuttal: Morgan Stanley’s read of the Fed’s Z.1 flow-of-funds data shows life insurers’ and pension funds’ Treasury allocations did not decline despite heavier AI-related corporate bond supply, with their Treasury holdings outgrowing the overall market by 9.5pp and 4.1pp over the past year and average quarterly net purchases of $33bn and $132bn [44].
  • [ONGOING] Household transmission: the average 30-year mortgage rate was 6.95% last week, the highest in more than 18 months, and existing home sales fell again [23][30].
  • [ESCALATED] Dollar: the dollar index has reclaimed 100, and Bank of America reads a confirmed post-Fed double bottom with tactical targets at 101.17/101.80 and medium-term objectives of 102.86/104.59, while noting the yen’s decoupling from US yields since July points to non-rate factors leading [45][46][1].
  • [ONGOING] Gold was steady around $4,375/oz and edged lower in early Asian trade, with tighter US policy expectations seen capping prices [47][9][48].

4. Global Central-Bank Linkages

  • [NEW] ECB: Goldman added a 25bp December hike to a 2.75% end-2026 rate with the terminal lifted to 2.25% [8], while Morgan Stanley also expects a December 2026 hike but argues the market path sits well above what fundamentals justify, recommending buying October ECB rate options at the 20bp level on a 4:1 risk-reward and shorting high-deficit sovereigns — France, Belgium and Austria — against the EU and the Netherlands, with a German 10-year forecast of 3.40% at end-2026 [49]. The ECB itself hiked unanimously to 2.50%, abandoning its fixed-path commitment for meeting-by-meeting data dependence [16].
  • [ONGOING] BOJ: the policy rate is at 1.25%, a 31-year high, with the BOJ stressing that financial conditions remain accommodative [16][14]; Goldman lifted its Japan path to 1.25% for 2026 and 1.75% for 2027 [8], Bank of America expects 25bp hikes in both September and December with USD/JPY at 149 by end-2026 and 145 by end-2027 [45], and Deutsche Bank notes hedged 10-year JGB yields sit 73bp above Treasuries and 30-year 138bp above [1].
  • [NEW] BOE: Barclays added 25bp hikes in November 2026 and February 2027 to a 4.25% Bank Rate if the conflict persists [15]; the QT plan runs the APF gilt stock to zero, pauses active sales to the private sector, sells £20bn a year of 8–22 year gilts to the government and retains £120bn of long-dated gilts [8]; the MPC raised its Q4 2026 inflation forecast to 3.75% and its Q1 2027 forecast to slightly above 4%, with Bank of America adding a November hike to its base case while calling the market’s nearly four priced hikes too aggressive [4].
  • [NEW] PBoC: last week’s open-market operations delivered a net injection of RMB 826.8bn, with the central bank restarting 14-day reverse repos at an early date and in large size and rolling over RMB 70bn of maturing treasury cash deposits and RMB 500bn of outright reverse repos on an equal-offset basis [29][50][32]. Governor Pan Gongsheng, writing in Qiushi, warned against financial aggregate growth exceeding the real economy’s needs and creating idle capital that pushes up the macro leverage ratio [51].
  • [NEW] Others: the market prices a 20bp RBA hike in September and 65bp cumulative to mid-2027, with Bank of America’s economists looking for a strong August employment report and Goldman lifting Australia to 4.6% for 2026 and 4.1% for 2027 [7][8]; Canada’s core inflation is already at target amid trade uncertainty, South Africa may hike, Switzerland is vigilant on franc appreciation, and intervention risk during Japan’s long holiday is rising [4][3][45][52].

5. Asset Implications

QuadrantCurrent probability tiltKey asset implicationAnchoring narrative
Growth↑ + Inflation↑RisingEnergy/commodities and TIPS remain the cleanest expressions — Brent near $101 after a 2.4% drop and diesel at a record — while nominal long bonds are capped by a 4.7%–5.0% 10-year centre and a structurally lifted term premium; curve and relative-value expressions dominate outright duration§3 / §2
Growth↑ + Inflation↓Rising modestlyBelly carry plus quality, cash-flow-durable equity beta; the marginal support is the widening “market overprices the path” camp and Morgan Stanley’s lower-bound delivery call, explicitly contingent on energy relief and an in-line August PCE§1.2 / §2
Growth↓ + Inflation↑Rising (tail)Commodities and gold, not duration: the inflation inputs are now supply-side and policy-insensitive (energy, tariffs, AI capex), and the growth hit lands first in the household channel — a 6.95% mortgage rate, falling existing home sales and sentiment near a record low§2 / §3
Growth↓ + Inflation↓Falling furtherThe cycle tail got more expensive this week as Goldman lifted rate paths across five economies and Bank of America held 75bp of hikes; the Fed’s own median still pushes the 2% return to 2029§1.2 / §3

Stock-bond correlation call: the regime is still the inflation/policy-driven positive-correlation configuration that hurts risk parity, but today’s evidence pushes the mechanism one step further from inflation compensation toward policy-path perception plus structural term premium. The CEPR finding that roughly 90% of the 10-year’s rise since August 2020 occurred inside payroll and Fed-speech windows, which cover under a quarter of trading days, is the cleanest statement yet that duration fails to hedge because it reprices the same variable equities reprice — the perceived path of policy — not because inflation expectations are unanchored. That paper’s self-validation channel is the part worth internalising: if a central bank mistakes a supply shock for a higher neutral rate and adopts higher-for-longer, the resulting dynamics validate the belief, which extends the positive-correlation regime beyond what a purely cyclical reading would suggest. Monday’s session is the counter-print — yields and oil falling together with equities up, i.e. genuine inflation relief rather than a growth scare — but it is a relief trade resting on an oil move and a Hormuz flow improvement, not on a change in the reaction function. Treat it as rebalancing guidance, not a regime signal.

Risk-budget implication: keep commodity and energy risk at or above benchmark, since energy remains the sleeve whose driver is orthogonal to the Fed’s reaction function; it is also the only cheap hedge against the quadrant in which energy, tariffs and AI capex all keep inflation sticky. In rates, do not chase duration after a single relief session: the terminal-rate distribution is unusually wide — Bank of America at 5.3%–5.8% on Taylor and real-rate readings, Deutsche Bank at 4.375% by end-Q1 2027, Morgan Stanley at 4.25%–4.50% with lower-bound delivery, Goldman at a 3.375% terminal — and the whole complex is being driven by policy-path perception rather than by any observable anchor. Prefer belly and curve exposures to long-end directional risk. On supply, note that the duration ledger is genuinely contested: the $1tn bill-supply and rollover-risk story is a front-end phenomenon financed by roughly $8tn of money-market assets and the Fed’s own bill purchases, which means it argues for caution on the front end rather than for abandoning long duration, while Morgan Stanley’s Z.1 work shows liability-driven buyers increasing Treasury allocations and directly rebutting the AI crowd-out thesis. In credit, the first fixed income fund outflow in 24 weeks plus two consecutive weeks of IG and HY outflows says keep duration short, favour spread over pure duration, and size positions for a rates-volatility regime that historically accompanies outflows. Two portfolio-level warnings are worth stating plainly: risk-parity funds themselves have lifted equity allocation to the 82nd percentile while discretionary investors sit near neutral with sentiment at the 5th percentile, which makes systematic positioning the crowded side of the trade; and Bank of America’s Bull & Bear indicator at 9.5 is a sell signal. Hold gold as the structural fiscal and dollar-credit hedge, sized for real-rate whipsaw rather than as equity insurance, and recognise that the specific value case two desks are making sits in the front end, where the 2-year at ~4.75% exceeds the ~4.68% terminal rate priced via swaps to September 2027.

6. Contrarian & Tail Risks

  • Consensus fragility: the baseline is now “hike delivered, one or two more, equities can look through it,” and it rests on pillars that are visibly unsettled. First, the path is a market construct built against a Fed that has deliberately withdrawn guidance, so instrument and snapshot time dominate. Second, the sell-side cannot all be right: Bank of America’s Taylor-rule 5.3%–5.4% and real-rate 5.8%–7.8%, Deutsche Bank’s 4.375%, Morgan Stanley’s 4.25%–4.50% with lower-bound delivery, and Goldman’s 3.375% terminal are mutually exclusive. Third, the dot plot is being read inconsistently — Barclays reports two more hikes in 2026 while the majority reading is one more with the median at 4.1%. Fourth, the reaction function itself is the uncertainty: “full employment” is now the stated starting point and the search is for an unknown “restrictive” level, so the rule set rather than the data is what markets must guess. Fifth, the entire inflation case has migrated to supply-side items — energy, tariff pass-through, AI capex — that rate hikes cannot address, which caps how much credibility any hike path can buy.
  • Second-order transmission: four chains are not in market pricing. The refinancing chain is now the most explicitly named: a ~$1tn net bill programme taking the bill share to ~24.3%, near the pandemic peak, concentrates interest-cost volatility in the front end and makes the fiscal position more sensitive to every subsequent hike. The AI-insensitivity chain is the equity transmission vector — hyperscale cloud providers commit over 90% of operating cash flow to AI infrastructure and are unlikely to reverse for a 25–75bp rise in data-centre financing costs, and RSM’s read is that the expansion is “imbalanced” with growth “entirely dependent” on that buildout and on wealthy consumers’ spending. The tariff chain has a dated release: PIIE expects the lagged pass-through to add roughly 50bp to inflation as inventories deplete, with CBO research putting about 70% of levied tariffs onto consumers and New York Fed surveys showing 47% of service firms and 44% of manufacturers still planning increases. The European-sovereign chain is quieter but live: Dutch pension funds cut fixed-income duration and kept rotating out of AA-rated bonds, which pressures France and Belgium precisely as their politics and budgets deteriorate and as the OAT-Bund spread approaches a forecast ceiling.
  • Source quality control: several internal and cross-source conflicts deserve side-by-side reading. The BOE vote is reported as 3–0 in Barclays’ own summary against 6–3 with three members favouring a hike elsewhere, which is either a truncation or an error and should not be used as a vote count. The dot plot is reported by Barclays as showing two more hikes in 2026 while the Fed’s projections are otherwise consistently described as one more with the median at 4.1%. Equity flow direction conflicts materially: Deutsche Bank and Bank of America report equity inflows of $79.3bn to a three-month high driven by the US, while Bank of America’s own flow note at the same time says equity funds returned to outflows with ETFs the seventh consecutive weekly buyer — a definitional split between funds and ETFs, not a contradiction of fact, but it means neither headline should be traded. Credit spread levels differ by index: Barclays cites IG at 215bp and HY at 328bp, well above the tight prints carried earlier in the week, so level-based triggers must specify the index. The rate decision is dated Sept 16 in one source and Sept 18 in another, and the “3.9%” rate cited by wire copy is the midpoint of the 3.75%–4.00% range rather than a separate setting. Single-source or unverified items include the social relay of Kashkari’s “all corners” line, the Christophe Barraud headline on ~$1tn of short-term issuance, El-Erian’s weekly note, Daniel Lacalle’s argument that the era of unlimited state spending and central-bank easing is over, and the Jin10 headline digest covering gold’s resilience, the $7tn reallocation and Japan holiday intervention risk. Two items are not usable as current evidence: Jin10’s teaser is headline-only with no extractable facts, and the Guosheng timing radar is dated mid-August and should be read as background. Finally, Kaiyuan’s 1999 analogy is an explicit historical comparison carrying its own “history does not represent the future” caveat, and should be treated as a framework rather than a signal.

Appendix: Additional Sources

  • [53] Barclays — long bonds struggling with French fiscal as the latest catalyst; neutral duration, risk assets to grind up
  • [54] Jin10 — uncertainty persists; rate hikes can contain but cannot eliminate inflation
  • [55] Bloomberg — markets can handle a hawkish Fed but not uncertainty; oil and AI risks keep investors from committing
  • [39] Christophe Barraud — Wall Street expects about $1tn of short-term US debt issuance as borrowing costs climb
  • [37] WSJ — the 10-year’s 19-year high above 5%, driven by goods-supply constraints and government borrowing
  • [40] Jin10 Data — short-debt rollover risk transmitting from the fiscal statement to the yield curve
  • [38] Jin10 — Bank of America, JPMorgan and Goldman see roughly $1tn of net T-bill borrowing
  • [56] Bloomberg — Treasury investors shifting to shorter-dated bonds as a bet on the Fed winning on inflation
  • [57] WSJ — economists raising neutral-rate estimates; some see a silver lining in higher borrowing costs
  • [52] Jin10 — headline digest: gold holds against the hike, $7tn shifting gears, Japan holiday intervention risk

This report is a macro-mechanism analysis, not investment advice.

30-day review of this series 9/10 – 10/10

  • Hawkish repricing to a credibility hike: September hike odds climbed from a coin flip to near-certainty after the Sept 4 payrolls beat, hot PPI and a core CPI overshoot concentrated in volatile items like wireless services. The Fed then delivered a unanimous 25bp hike with a hawkish dot plot, flipping the question from whether to act to how many moves follow.

  • Sell-side path consensus splitting, then narrowing to December: Forecasters flipped from hold calls to a September hike, then clustered around “one more, probably December.” By mid-October the distribution split three ways — Goldman’s December terminal, Citi’s hold-through-2027, and Bank of America’s hikes in both October and December — while pricing repeatedly settled near a one-fifth October probability.

  • The long end decoupling from the Fed: Across the month the 10-year rose from roughly 4.4% to above 5.3% and the 30-year past 5.7%, even as October hike odds collapsed. Attention migrated from the policy path to the term premium, reaching a 12-year high on the New York Fed’s model, then to a contested driver debate.

  • A dovish data shock that bonds refused to honour: The soft September payrolls and downward-revised core PCE cut October odds sharply, yet the long end kept printing multi-decade highs and barely rallied on weak data. This crystallised the month’s central puzzle: front-end duration traded the Fed, long-end duration traded something else.

  • From hiring-boom tension to institutional floor: The arc ran from hawkish accumulation, through a dovish repricing, to restored hawkish scaffolding as the September minutes and Waller’s “additional hikes” language hardened the year-end case without restoring October urgency.

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  22. Anatomy of a rise: Monetary policy and the post-Covid surge in long-term interest rates CEPR / VoxEU Score 62
  23. Federal Reserve rate hike reflects new world of sticky inflation and faster growth Chicago Tribune Score 61
  24. Federal Reserve rate hike reflects new world of sticky inflation and faster growth Seattle Times Score 62
  25. Federal Reserve rate hike reflects new world of sticky inflation and faster growth The Independent Score 62
  26. Federal Reserve rate hike reflects new world of sticky inflation and faster growth AP News Score 62
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  33. There's $33 Trillion in Stock Gains Riding on the Future of AI Bloomberg Score 63
  34. Government Bond Yields Fall as Risk Sentiment Tentatively Improves WSJ Score 63
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  39. 🇺🇸 Wall Street expects US to issue about $1tn of short-term debt as borrowing costs climb - Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/3fcee89f-... Twitter·宏观市场 Score 62
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  47. Gold Steadies as Traders Weigh Inflation and Fed Hike Outlook Bloomberg Score 62
  48. Gold Edges Lower as Investors Monitor Central Bank Clues on Rates WSJ Score 63
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  55. Markets Can Handle a Hawkish Fed, Not Uncertainty Bloomberg Score 63
  56. Short-Term Treasuries Emerge as Popular Bet on Fed Inflation Win Bloomberg Score 72
  57. The Silver Lining in Soaring Interest Rates: The Economy Can Handle Them WSJ Score 60